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in an Era of Individualization and Globalization scrutinizes these claims, 
both theoretically and empirically. It focuses on informal solidarity, 
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on formal solidarity, such as social benefits and development aid. The 
book examines the theoretical arguments that increasing competition 
and capital flows between countries and growing selfishness of mod-
ern citizens hurt social solidarity. Empirically, it is the first thorough 
study of international comparative data on solidarity, globalization 
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mobility of people, commodities, services, money and informa-
tion – globalization – has far-reaching consequences for the way
individual citizens are living and experiencing their lives. Contem-
porary society is characterized by cultural and ethnic diversity.
People’s social and cultural identities have become more varied.
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people form social bonds and experience mutual solidarity in our
society? Is there any empirical support for the widespread idea
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most vulnerable for a potential decay of solidarity? What is the
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1 Individualization, globalization
and solidarity
We are inclined to compare the present with the past. Due to im-
pressive technological progression we have means of transport
and communication that we could not have imagined in the past
and that have changed our world dramatically. Looking at societal
developments we usually emphasize the differences with the past
and forget about the common threads between the now and the
then. But is the now really that different from the past or are we
simply labelling it “renewed”, in the same way as we do with
washing powders? Concentrating on the three central themes of
this book, it is tempting to characterize present-day society with
labels such as individualization, globalization and decreasing soli-
darity. After all, is it not true that modern humans are extremely
individualized, making their own choices, and solely concerned
about their own lives? Is the impact of globalization not visible
through the variety of foreign products, the increasing number of
migrants, and the ever-increasing power of international organiza-
tions? And in earlier times, were we not more willing to assist
each other? In that case, individualization and globalization have
led to the demise of solidarity, right? Clearly, individualization and
globalization belong to the now, and solidarity is part of the past.
The very core of society is affected by individualization, globali-
zation, and solidarity. Such developments touch each of us, and
therefore everyone has an opinion about them. Through our own
experiences and the media we form an image of how well our
society is doing. That kind of information tells us that we live in
times of individualization, with a growing number of people liv-
ing singly and fewer people being part of traditional institutions,
and of globalization, visible through multinational corporations,
migration, and international organizations. Furthermore, it tells
us that we live in a society in which people are less prepared to
help each other and in which cuts in public expenditures are the
rule rather than the exception. These developments affect us all,
and we discuss them with friends, family, and colleagues. Being
9
that closely involved in the subject can also be a hindrance if we
try to look at these developments from more of a distance, in or-
der to judge whether they really are related.
Statements about individualization, globalization, and solidarity
are linked to how we think that the now relates to the past. Solidar-
ity seems to refer to way back when people stood up for each
other. The interesting thing about this view is that it is as old as
the literature on solidarity. For a large part, research into solidarity
has aimed at answering the question of whether solidarity is
threatened, which is also an indication that we regard solidarity as
an important part of society. A society without solidarity is a so-
ciety without cohesion, in which each person has to take care of
himself. The fear of losing solidarity is often accompanied by a
plea to save it. In such instances, the term solidarity means some-
thing positive to strive for. This implicit value of solidarity is evi-
denced by the fact that a number of political parties explicitly state
that they want to sustain or strengthen solidarity, while there are
no parties trying to get votes by aiming at decreasing solidarity.
Somehow, a political party working against solidarity is not likely
to enter the political arena. At the same time, solidarity conjures
up less positive images of a past that we would rather not return
to. In that case, we think of solidarity located within small and
close-knit communities. To some extent, people may find such
communities nice and warm, but they also find them a bit boring
and old-fashioned and maybe even suffocating. Nowadays, as
most people live in large cities, it may seem that we do not prefer
this lifestyle. In that regard, political parties putting solidarity on
the agenda can resemble organizations for monument preserva-
tion and nature conservation, trying to protect the last bit of soli-
darity from a variety of threats. Individualization and globalization
provoke the same kinds of mixed feelings. On the one hand, they
are regarded as modern achievements. Individualization means
that we have more freedom in making our own choices and that
we can give a direction to our lives without being restricted by old
traditions and other circumstances standing in our way. Globaliza-
tion gave us welfare and a feeling of freedom because we can tra-
vel around the world if and when we want to. On the other hand,
many people fear that individualization and globalization threaten
society because they negatively affect social cohesion and decrease
the level of solidarity.
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In this book we investigate to what extent solidarity is related to
individualization and globalization. Coining one of these terms is
likely to lead to wide discussions about the current state of society.
Although such discussions are interesting in themselves, they are
usually characterized by a very general use of the different terms,
and most of all lack an empirical test of the statements. In the
present book we choose a different approach that is both broad
and limited. The book is broad because we pay attention to the
different aspects of individualization, globalization, and solidarity.
Otherwise we would run the risk of describing the developments
too narrowly and one-sidedly. If a certain element of individualiza-
tion or globalization has an impact on a certain kind of solidarity,
this does not necessarily mean that this also holds for other as-
pects. Therefore, we have tried to include many different indica-
tors of individualization, globalization, and solidarity to provide an
image that is as complete as possible. Nevertheless, this book is
also limited because the conclusions we draw about the develop-
ments of individualization, globalization, and solidarity and the
relationship between them are solely based on quantitative em-
pirical data. The aspects for which there are no data available are
not included in this book. One might think, for instance, of the
balance between civility and rudeness in everyday behavior, the
strength of personal ties within families, the amount of tax eva-
sion, etc.
We direct a lot of attention towards the measurement of the
different entities, to what extent they differ between countries,
and how they develop over time. To answer these questions, we
use a number of sources. A common feature of these datasets is
that they include information about several countries, allowing for
international comparisons. We include empirical data at two dif-
ferent levels of analysis, namely the individual and the national
level. Most of the individual level data are available through the
European Values Study and World Values Study (EVS/WVS).
These surveys aim at measuring people’s opinions on various is-
sues and have been gathered at different points in time from the
1980s onwards. Ever since the first wave, the EVS/WVS has fo-
cused on generating data to answer questions that are relevant for
social scientific research combined with methodological strictness
to guarantee the quality and cross-country comparability of the
data. At the national level, we use information from datasets such
as the KOF Index of Globalization, the OECD and the IMF, pro-
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viding measures of solidarity, of the welfare state and of the extent
to which a country is open to international developments. Some of
the chapters examine the relationship between national level vari-
ables and variables at the individual level, implying that the usual
analysis techniques, such as ordinary least squares regression,
cannot be applied. In these instances, multilevel analysis is used,
providing the possibility to examine the variables at the two levels
simultaneously.
Each of the themes of this book is analyzed in a separate chap-
ter. Solidarity refers to a situation in which the well-being of one
person or group is positively related to that of others. People need
each other in different situations, indicating their mutual interde-
pendence. Here we can make a distinction between two kinds of
situations in which people need others. They may depend on
others because they cannot provide for themselves or because
they need each other to reach common goals. The first kind of
interdependence is illustrated by a person that is unemployed and
needs assistance from others to get sufficient resources. The sec-
ond kind of interdependence means that people try to achieve
something together that they are not capable of reaching individu-
ally, as is the case, for instance, with public goods that benefit
everyone in society. We distinguish between different types of
solidarity. First we differentiate between one-sided and two-sided
solidarity. One-sided solidarity means assisting someone else
without expecting anything in return, whereas there is such an
expectation in the case of two-sided solidarity. Furthermore, soli-
darity can be organized in different ways. If people help others on
their own initiative, we speak of voluntary solidarity as opposed to
compulsory solidarity organized through the state. With regard to
this latter kind of solidarity, a distinction can be made between the
actual level of compulsory solidarity and the level of public sup-
port it receives and people’s willingness to pay for it through taxes.
In Chapter 2 we discuss these kinds of solidarity and investigate to
what extent they differ between 29 developed countries and how
they evolved between the 1980s and 2000s. The welfare state
comprises one of the main forms of organized solidarity in mod-
ern society. Chapter 3 deals with the question of whether the will-
ingness of people to assist others is related to the size and the
content of the welfare state.
In the next chapters we focus on the relationship between indi-
vidualization, globalization, and compulsory and voluntary soli-
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darity. Individualization and globalization share a number of fea-
tures. Both of them are regarded as among the most important
characteristics of modern societies, and it has been argued that
they have developed only recently. Also, they are both used in very
general terms when they are debated. People often speak of indi-
vidualization and globalization without specifying exactly what
they mean by it. The main problem with this is that it is unclear
what is being discussed and how these developments relate to so-
lidarity. To start with, it is necessary to distinguish individualiza-
tion from globalization since the mechanisms through which they
have an impact on solidarity differ. Processes of individualization
work from the inside out, whereas globalization refers to pro-
cesses that work from the outside in. We discuss individualization
and globalization by giving a short overview of the current litera-
ture on these two subjects, identifying their main characteristics,
showing how they differ across countries and through time, and
finally explaining how they are related to different kinds of solidar-
ity. In Chapter 4, we show that three dimensions capture the
process of individualization, which we term detraditionalization,
heterogeneity, and emancipation. We examine the effects of indi-
vidualization in Chapter 5 by investigating whether the three di-
mensions of individualization influence solidarity. Chapter 6
deals with globalization. We define globalization as increasing
cross-border interactions and again distinguish three dimensions,
namely the economic, social, and political openness of countries.
Chapters 7 and 8 analyse the relationship between globalization
and solidarity. Most of the studies carried out in that field of in-
quiry have focused on one dimension of globalization, economic
openness, and one kind of solidarity, compulsory solidarity pro-
vided through the welfare state. We extend these studies by in-
cluding the social and political openness of countries in our ana-
lyses and by examining both compulsory and voluntary solidarity.
We integrate the results of our research in Chapter 9 to see if
people are still sticking together or whether societies are falling
apart. Based on our analyses we try to show how the time that we
live in at the moment is related to the past. Have individualization
and globalization taken over, as some people argue? Has solidarity
eroded? And if so, can this be explained by the influence and ef-
fects of individualization and globalization? In the final chapter
we take a look at the future by exploring some alternative direc-
13
tions in which the welfare state may develop, based on the out-
comes of our empirical investigations.
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2 Taking care of each other
Trends in social solidarity
It is not uncommon these days to claim that social solidarity is
declining. Modern citizens are often said to be less willing to act
unselfishly and support each other or to contribute to their com-
munity than they were in the past. A common complaint is that
our fellow citizens aim for their self-interest at the expense of col-
lective well-being. To many, this claim seems self-evident, making
it unnecessary to provide any further evidence for it. However,
there are many interpretations of solidarity, and it is often unclear
to which of the many kinds they are referring. Not all interpreta-
tions of solidarity undergo the same development. Therefore, this
chapter starts with a discussion of the various meanings and inter-
pretations of solidarity. Next, it describes the state of social solidar-
ity in a number of western countries. Finally, the evolution of so-
cial solidarity in past decades is described, to establish whether or
not solidarity is really declining.
To this end, this chapter is primarily descriptive. In the follow-
ing chapters will we analyze the factors that might contribute to an
erosion of solidarity.
2.1 What is social solidarity?
In everyday language, the word solidarity refers to the willingness
to help others or to support the group one belongs to, without im-
mediately getting something in return. In sociology, social solidar-
ity has a broader meaning, although there is certainly no general
agreement on the exact meaning of the word. In this book we will
define solidarity, very generally, as the positive bond between the
fates of different people. The adjective “positive” is meant to dis-
tinguish solidarity from the negative relation between people who
are fighting each other. Solidarity means that the well-being of one
person or of one group is positively related to the well-being of
another person or group (cf. Van Oorschot 1991).
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To clarify the concept of solidarity, we first discuss the differ-
ences between social solidarity and similar concepts, such as so-
cial cohesion and social capital. Next, we make the important dis-
tinction between solidarity as an attitude and solidarity as an act.
After that, we argue that there are many sorts of solidarity that can
be categorized along various dimensions.
2.1.1 Social solidarity, social cohesion and social capital
The term social solidarity is similar, but not identical, to the socio-
logical concepts of social cohesion and social capital. In fact, one
of the founding fathers of the social sciences, the nineteenth-cen-
tury Frenchman, Émile Durkheim, used solidarity in a way that
we often now term “social cohesion”, i.e. the coherence or unity
of a society. In this sense, social cohesion has a broader meaning
than solidarity. If the members of a community act out of solidar-
ity, that is proof of social cohesion, but social cohesion need not be
the result of an attitude of solidarity or deliberately solidaristic be-
havior. For example, a football club may have a high level of social
cohesion – because the members meet and interact frequently
and share a common culture – yet they do not show much solidar-
ity in their support of one another.
While social cohesion and social capital are primarily “objec-
tive” concepts, in the sense that they refer to an actual situation,
solidarity often refers to a feeling or an attitude and can also have
a normative interpretation, i.e. a goal or a desirable situation.
While solidarity is embodied in individual persons, social cohe-
sion and social capital are characteristics of a group, a community.
That is why individuals can be solidary and show solidarity, but
they cannot be “socially cohesive” or “social capitalists” (although
Putnam, 2000, does use this latter term).
Durkheim (1893/1997) considered the social division of labour
to be the main source of social cohesion (for which he used the
term solidarity). The fact that every individual performs a specific
task in society, making people mutually dependent on each other,
in his view produces the mortar that sticks society together. Per-
forming specialized tasks, as Adam Smith already explained more
than a century earlier in The Wealth of Nations (1776), can however
be a purely selfish act, lacking any feeling of benevolence or soli-
darity towards those who benefit from the fruits of your labour. As
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we will discuss in Chapter 5, this mutual dependency can never-
theless be a source of solidaristic attitudes or solidaristic behavior.
The concept of social capital is closely related to social cohesion.
The term social capital has been introduced a number of times, by
the sociologists James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu, among
others, as a counterpart to the economic concepts of physical capi-
tal and human capital. Whereas physical capital refers to the phy-
sical resources that sustain one’s productivity, such as machines
and computers, and human capital refers to the cognitive skills
and competences that enhance one’s productivity, such as knowl-
edge and experience, social capital refers to the social relations
that improve one’s productivity or, in a broader sense, one’s fate
in society. In the words of Putnam (2000: 19): “Just as a screwdri-
ver (physical capital) or a college education (human capital) can
increase productivity (both individual and collective), so too social
contacts affect the productivity of individuals and groups.”
Whereas social cohesion points to the coherence or unity of a
group or a system as a whole, social capital refers to the concrete
social relations between individual persons. Social capital is, how-
ever, not a purely individual characteristic. Apart from its individ-
ual members, a group or a community as a whole can also have a
stock of social capital. Since social capital can render (often unin-
tended) positive external effects for others, the stock of social capi-
tal of a group is larger than the sum of the social capital of its
members. This can be due, for example, to network externalities.
If a member of a group maintains a relation with a member of
another group (Putnam calls this bridging social capital), this
might also benefit the other members of their group, for example
by allowing them to acquire information from the other group.
Social capital differs from social solidarity in that it is not aimed
at supporting or helping others. As Putnam (2000: 117) puts it:
“Doing good for people, however laudable, is not part of the defini-
tion of social capital” (italics in original). Usually, people maintain
a relationship because it is mutually beneficial. Obvious examples
are activities for which one needs others, such as playing football,
acting or campaigning, or activities which are more pleasant to do
in company, such as going to the movies or hiking. However, this
does not exclude the possibility that social capital breeds solidarity.
Putnam (2000: 28) gives the example of a member of a bowling
club who donated his kidney to another member when he found
17
out that the latter had been on a waiting list for a transplant for
years.
2.1.2 Attitudes and acts of solidarity
The term solidarity is associated both with feelings and attitudes
and with action. An act of solidarity makes a solidaristic attitude
tangible in a sense. “A shows solidarity towards B” might mean
both that A morally and verbally supports the interest of B, and
that A actually does something to further B’s interest. However,
feelings of solidarity and acts of solidarity need not coincide. It is
possible to have a solidaristic attitude without really acting in a
solidaristic manner. It may also happen that someone engages in
an act of solidarity without possessing any feelings of solidarity
towards the one they support. The next section elaborates on the
concept of solidarity as an act, the following section analyzes soli-
daristic attitudes.
2.1.3 Acts of solidarity
The defining characteristic of a solidaristic act is that there is no
equivalence between what one contributes to others or to the
group as a whole and what one gets in return. Those who are best
off will generally contribute the most, those who are worst off will
benefit from the others. Acts of solidarity thus reduce the gap be-
tween the fortunate and the unfortunate.
This definition restricts acts of solidarity to relations between
people. The term is also used to describe the contribution of indi-
viduals to a public good or an ideal. For instance, a financial con-
tribution (by means of taxes) to the construction of roads, or tak-
ing part in the activities of a political party or an environmental
organization can also be called acts of solidarity. We will, however,
leave these kinds of actions aside and will focus on solidarity be-
tween people (although in our empirical analysis it is not always
possible to make a rigorous distinction between them). Many
kinds of solidaristic acts exist, some of which might not even be
recognized as such at a glance. At least five relevant dimensions of
solidaristic acts can be determined:
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1. The extent of reciprocity
2. The organization
3. The (in)voluntariness
4. The scope
5. The form
Reciprocity: one-sided vs. two-sided solidarity
One-sided solidarity, occasionally called unilateral or vertical soli-
darity, means that an act of solidarity operates in one direction;
two-sided solidarity (also bilateral or horizontal solidarity) operates
in two directions.
In the case of two-sided solidarity, someone who acts on the
principles of solidarity expects, on balance, to benefit just as
much from others as they themselves are contributing. It should
be stressed that this refers only to the expected, ex ante, balance
between contribution and receipt. The actual, ex post, contribution
and receipt will, in general, not be equal. Indeed, this is the distin-
guishing feature of solidarity. Two-sided solidarity implies that
one does not know beforehand whether one will end up being a
net contributor or a net receiver. For example, on entering into a
health insurance policy, most people expect that the benefits will
outweigh the costs. However, if you hardly ever get sick and incur
no health cost, you will ultimately have contributed much more to
the insurance scheme than you have received. If, on the contrary,
you need a lot of medical treatment, you will benefit much more
from the insurance than you contribute. All the same, in both
cases the health insurance is a matter of two-sided solidarity since
you do not know the outcome beforehand.
The uncertain outcome distinguishes two-sided solidarity from
an “ordinary” market transaction, in which there is an immediate,
balanced exchange between what you contribute (e.g. money) and
what you receive (e.g. a service or a product). With a market trans-
action, both ex ante and ex post contribution and receipt balance
each other. A market transaction and two-sided solidarity are simi-
lar in that they are both based on the principle of quid pro quo.
Someone is prepared to act in the interests of someone else only
because they expect to get something of equal value in return. A
(voluntary) insurance policy is perhaps the best-known example of
two-sided solidarity.
In the case of one-sided solidarity, a person expects beforehand,
ex ante, that their contribution and what they receive will not be
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equal; for example, they expect nothing in return for their contri-
bution. In giving alms to a beggar or in donating money for the
victims of an earthquake in a faraway country, you cannot reason-
ably expect to get anything in return. In this sense, one-sided soli-
darity is always unselfish, although you may of course feel a sense
of satisfaction or get a “warm glow” from showing solidarity. The
taxes levied on rich persons for financing social assistance, from
which they most likely will never benefit themselves, are also a
form of one-sided solidarity.
In real life, purely one-sided solidarity, in which it is clear from
the start that some persons will only contribute and others will
only benefit, occurs rarely. More often, it is quite likely that some
groups will contribute more than they receive, while others will
receive more than they contribute, although this is not certain.
Someone who expected to be a net contributor might turn out to
be a net receiver – or the other way around. For instance, if the
premium of a health insurance policy depends on your income,
then the higher income groups will, on average, contribute more
to the insurance scheme than they receive. Nevertheless, a rich
person who catches a serious disease might ultimately receive a
larger compensation for their medical treatment than the pre-
miums they paid, while a poor individual who never gets ill will
have contributed more than they ever receive.
In summary, the fundamental difference between one-sided
and two-sided solidarity is that with two-sided solidarity, only the
actual, ex post, contributions and receipts differ, while with one-
sided solidarity both the expected, ex ante, and the actual, ex post,
contributions and receipts differ. As a contrast, market exchange
is characterized by equality of both ex ante and ex post contribu-
tions and receipts.
Organization: formal vs. informal solidarity
In this second dimension we distinguish the extent to which soli-
darity is organized or is a spontaneous act, i.e. whether solidarity
is formal or informal. Informal solidarity, which one might also
call “warm” solidarity, springs from a direct involvement and sym-
pathy with other persons, for whom one has “warm feelings”. The
most intense forms of informal solidarity are usually found within
the family: between husband and wife, and between parents and
children. This solidarity can be so strong that one is prepared to
sacrifice one’s life to save another, e.g. a mother risks her life in
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trying to save her drowning child. Less intense forms of informal
solidarity are often found between good friends, neighbors or col-
leagues. The compassion expressed by giving alms to a beggar is
also an example of informal solidarity.
Formal or “cold” solidarity originates from commitment to
anonymous others, whom you do not know personally, but to
whom you are nevertheless connected through a formal bond. An
example is solidarity with fellow citizens living in poverty, who are
supported by a social benefit system to which everybody contri-
butes. Another example is solidarity with the unfortunate person
whose house burns down and who is compensated by the insur-
ance company to which you regularly pay an insurance premium.
A third example is the solidarity with less fortunate people in de-
veloping countries to which your government pays development
aid, which is financed from your taxes.
Whereas informal solidarity is expressed by the direct relation-
ship between people, the formal solidarity between people who do
not know each other is always mediated by an institution, such as
the state or an insurance company.
Voluntary vs. compulsory solidarity
The third dimension along which we distinguish different forms
of solidaristic acts is voluntary versus compulsory solidarity.
Showing solidarity voluntarily is a choice; compulsory acts of soli-
darity are enforced, usually by the state. Compulsory solidarity
does not rule out that one is actually prepared to act willingly and
with feelings of solidarity, but this is not a prerequisite, in contrast
to voluntary solidarity.
There is often a close relationship between the (in)voluntariness
of solidarity and the organization of solidarity. However, not all
informal acts of solidarity are voluntary and not all formal acts of
solidarity are compulsory. A fire and theft insurance policy is an
example of formal voluntary solidarity, and the solidarity of par-
ents with their children is informal but compulsory, since they
are legally obliged to take care of their children.
The scope: local, national or global solidarity
The fourth dimension of solidarity is its scope. How far does soli-
darity reach? How large is the circle of people with whom one
shows solidarity? One can think of the scope of solidarity as a ser-
ies of concentric circles: family – relatives – neighborhood – town
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– country – league of nations (e.g. the EU, NATO, OECD) – the
world. However, this list is not exhaustive. The scope of solidarity
is not always geographically marked, but can also include a circle
of friends, the co-workers of a company, the members of a church,
etc.
There need not be a close relationship between the – geographi-
cal or social – distance to the people to whom the solidarity applies
and the strength or size of the solidarity. Even though solidarity
within the family is usually very strong, the solidarity with fellow
citizens whom you do not know in person – through taxation and
social contributions – might be much stronger than the solidarity
with your neighbours and friends. Generally, the larger the scope
of solidarity, the more likely it is that it is formally organized
through official bodies. Nevertheless, even “global” solidarity can
be informal and spontaneous, for example when individuals start
their own small-scale development project in a village in a devel-
oping country.
An often neglected consequence of solidarity is that the inclu-
sion of those people who belong to the circle of solidarity inevita-
bly means the exclusion of others who fall outside this circle. In-
clusion and exclusion are inextricably linked to each other. The
only exception would be solidarity that encompasses the whole
world population – but one might argue that solidarity with all
world citizens effectively means no solidarity at all. Thus, in prac-
tice, showing solidarity always means dividing people and treating
them differently.
The form: time, money or in kind
The last dimension along which we distinguish different kinds of
solidarity is the form in which it is shown. Time and money are
the best-known forms of solidaristic action. Although giving
money is probably the first association people have with acts of
solidarity, the most common form is actually the time spent sup-
porting others. Consider, for instance, the many hours that par-
ents spend in caring for their children, or doing voluntary work.
Time is perhaps the best way to express informal solidarity. For-
mal solidarity is usually expressed by giving money: income trans-
fers between persons through a formal organization, such as the
government or an insurance company. Sometimes informal soli-
darity is also expressed financially, for example when parents sup-
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port their children financially or when you give money to a home-
less person.
A third form through which an act of solidarity might be per-
formed is the offering of a gift in kind. The pocket money children
receive is usually dwarfed by what their parents give them in kind:
food, clothes, shelter, etc. For the donor, giving in kind has the
advantage of affording them control over the allocation of the gift.
This can be an attractive option, if you consider the recipient to be
incapable of making a responsible decision. Moreover, a gift in
kind makes it less attractive for the beneficiary to claim unde-
served or unnecessary support. For example, a wheelchair is of
little use if one is not really physically handicapped, but a mone-
tary gift is useful.
A special form of solidarity in kind is the donation of an organ.
Usually, this occurs after one’s death, but some people donate a
kidney in vivo. A much more widespread form of solidarity in
kind is, of course, blood donation.
2.1.4 Attitudes of solidarity
The fact that someone shows solidarity does not inform us directly
about his or her motives. Behavior can, of course, spring from a
feeling of solidarity or sympathy with the person being supported.
The person who gives a charitable donation to a beggar probably
does it out of pity. However, such a feeling of sympathy or pity is
not self-evident in all cases of solidaristic action. There are prob-
ably not many people who enter into fire insurance policies out of
pity for the unlucky souls whose house burns down. Likewise, the
motive for giving money to a beggar on the street might be to
avoid being pestered.
In general, two kinds of attitudes can be motivated by solidarity
and might (but need not necessarily) form the basis for the var-
ious kinds of solidaristic action discussed above. These two kinds
of attitudes resemble the distinction between one-sided and two-
sided solidarity. In order to prevent confusion we will, however,
refer to them as “affective” and “calculating” solidarity, respec-
tively.
Affective solidarity is founded on a feeling of affection, responsi-
bility or duty towards another person. The affective solidarity of
ego with respect to alter does not presuppose that alter feels the
same with respect to ego. Ego does not expect anything in return
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for its solidarity. Affective solidarity is, therefore, closely related to
values like altruism, charity, benevolence and community spirit.
The basic assumption is that solidarity is not inspired by self-inter-
est, but by moral duty, sympathy or commitment.
Calculating solidarity, on the contrary, is based on an awareness
of mutual dependence. Ego realizes that its fortune is partly de-
pendent on that of alter, and alter realizes the same with respect to
ego. If both expect their solidarity to be returned by the other, cal-
culating solidarity perfectly agrees with self-interest, and even
with selfishness. However, it is incompatible with opportunism,
which would mean that alter benefits from the solidarity of ego,
but is not prepared to reciprocate that solidarity.
2.2 The actual state of social solidarity
It is well known that countries differ largely in the extent to which
they offer social protection to their citizens. This has been an im-
portant theme of the comparative welfare state literature, strongly
influenced by Esping-Andersen’s seminal 1990 book, The Three
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. However, it is far from clear to what
extent the variation in welfare states reflects differences in the lev-
el of social solidarity between countries. Roughly speaking, there
are two opposing views in the literature regarding the relationship
between the social protection offered by the welfare state and the
extent of social solidarity. In one view, the welfare state embodies
the most important and extensive form of social solidarity and,
thus, differences in formal social protection reflect differences in
social solidarity between countries. For example, Esping-Andersen
(1990) introduced the concept of decommodification to measure
the extent to which welfare states protect their citizens against the
vagaries of the free market. According to his analysis, the social-
democratic Nordic countries offer the most social protection, and
are therefore most solidaristic, while the liberal Anglo-Saxon
countries offer the least protection. Recently, Alesina and Glaezer
(2004) argued that the absence of a well-developed welfare state in
the United States reflects a fundamental difference in attitudes
between Americans and Europeans. While most Europeans be-
lieve that the government should protect its citizens against social
risks, most Americans regard this as a personal responsibility in
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which the state should interfere as little as possible (see also Chap-
ter 3).
There is, however, an alternative view, which is sometimes
named the crowding-out thesis (e.g. Van Oorschot & Arts 2005).
According to this view, the variation in social protection provided
by the welfare state does not reflect real differences in social soli-
darity between societies, but only the extent to which social soli-
darity is organized and formalized by the state. In extensive wel-
fare states, like those of the Nordic countries, the state has simply
taken over much of the informal solidarity of individual citizens or
civil society, which still plays an important role in other countries.
As an example, the extensive provision of childcare facilities by
the state in the Scandinavian countries has replaced much of the
informal, unpaid childcare by mothers in the conservative welfare
states or the paid childcare provided through the market in the
liberal welfare states. Thus, the total amount of childcare and,
thence, the solidarity of parents towards their children may not
differ much between these countries, but the actual form it takes
does.
To get a better insight in the variation in social solidarity be-
tween countries, we will present figures on various forms of soli-
darity for a number of developed countries. Since there is not one
comprehensive database that covers the diversity of acts of solidar-
ity, we have collected figures from a number of sources. As a con-
sequence, we will not be able to give a full description of solidarity
for all countries of concern. Since the data originate from various
sources, they may not be mutually consistent and compatible in
all respects.
Ideally, we would give figures on all combinations of the dimen-
sions of solidaristic acts that were discussed in Section 1.3. Evi-
dently, this is impossible. Therefore, we will focus on two dimen-
sions, viz. compulsory versus voluntary solidarity and, within the
second category, formal versus informal solidarity. Additionally,
we will vary the scope of solidarity, especially by distinguishing
between national and supranational solidarity. Unfortunately, it is
not possible to distinguish consistently between one-sided and
two-sided solidarity, since both kinds of solidarity are often mixed
in the actual arrangements.
Table 2.1 shows the level of various forms of compulsory soli-
darity in the year 2003 (or the year closest to this year for which
data are available) in 29 industrialized countries. We distinguish
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Table 2.1 Compulsory solidarity, c. 2003
National Supranational
gross public
social
expenditure
net public
social
expenditure
benefit
generositya
ODAb inflow of
asylum-
seekersc
recognition
of asylum-
seekersc,d
% of GDP % of GDP % of GDP
per capita
% of GDP per 100,000
of population
per 100,000
of population
Australia 17.9 17.2 12.9 0.22 35.3 8,1
Austria 26.1 20.6 33.1 0.21 316.7 33,5
Belgium 26.5 22.9 24.8 0.61 208.7 16,7
Canada 17.3 17.2 19.0 0.27 99.3 44,1
Czech Republic 21.1 19.5 20.4 0.10 85.9 1,7
Denmark 27.6 20.3 30.2 0.89 113.9 13,6
Finland 22.5 17.7 20.3 0.34 58.2 0,3
France 28.7 25.5 29.1 0.51 92.4 15,8
Germany 27.3 25.8 28.5 0.33 66.5 7,2
Greece 21.3 . 24.2 0.19 62.3 0,7
Hungary 22.7 . 17.3 0.03 44.3 1,4
Iceland 18.7 16.6 17.4 0.16 23.4 0,4
Ireland 15.9 14.0 11.7 0.32 207.4 12,3
Italy 24.2 20.6 26.0 0.18 20.9 2,1
Japan 17.7 17.6 23.4 0.31 0.4 0,0
Korea 5.7 5.9 4.7 0.07 0.3 0,1
Luxembourg 22.2 . 16.3 0.67 232.7 1,9
Netherlands 20.7 17.9 19.7 0.78 128.7 127,0
New Zealand 18.0 15.1 14.4 0.20 23.2 1,4
Norway 25.1 20.2 23.1 0.91 259.5 10,1
Poland 22.9 . 23.4 0.01 15.7 5,9
Portugal 23.5 20.8 28.3 0.21 1.6 0,0
Slovak Republic 17.3 16.1 15.0 0.07 126.3 0,3
Spain 20.3 17.6 20.3 0.25 15.6 0,6
Sweden 31.3 24.3 30.8 0.77 269.6 4,0
Switzerland 20.5 . 24.9 0.40 247.5 27,3
Turkey 13.2 . 14.7 0.03 6.4 3,2
United Kingdom 20.6 19.3 15.4 0.35 113.2 16,4
United States 16.2 17.3 18.3 0.17 14.6 5,5
unweighted
average
21.1 18.3 21.0 0.33 99.7 12,5
a Share of gross income replacement benefits (old age, survivors, unemployment, incapacity) in GDP
divided by the share of non-working persons in the total population.
b Official development aid.
c Average of the years 2000-2006.
d Recognition of asylum-seekers under the 1951 Convention at the first instance.
Source: OECD, UNHCR (calculations by the authors)
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three indicators that refer to national solidarity and three that refer
to supranational solidarity. The best-known indicator of social pro-
tection by the welfare state is the amount of (gross) public social
expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), for
which data are collected by the OECD in its social expenditures
database (SOCX, OECD 2007). The second column of Table 2.1
shows that the share of GDP spent on public social protection
ranges between 5.7 and 31.3 percent. Social expenditures are the
highest in the welfare states of northwest Europe, especially Swe-
den, France, Denmark, Germany and Belgium, and the lowest in
the Anglo-Saxon countries (USA, Canada, and Ireland) and in the
non-western developed world (Japan, Korea, and Turkey).
However, for various reasons this indicator has been criticized
in the literature, and alternative indicators have been proposed.
One reason is that the tax treatment of social benefits and other
income transfers varies between countries. A country that levies
taxes and/or social contributions on social benefits must spend a
larger share of its GDP on social security in order to realize the
same level of income protection as a country that does not tax ben-
efits. For this reason, the OECD has calculated the net (after tax)
social protection expenditure in a number of member states (Ade-
ma & Ladaique 2005). The third column of Table 2.1 displays
these figures. Now the range of social expenditure is considerably
smaller, since the expenditure ratio of some of the big spenders,
especially Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden, drops by four
to seven percentage points, while the expenditure ratios of some
of the smaller spenders hardly change at all.
Another point of criticism is that high social expenditures may
not point to effective social protection, but rather to a lack of em-
ployment opportunities, as a result of which a large share of the
population claims social benefits. A better indicator might, thus,
be the protection offered by the social security system to those
who are out of work. The smaller the number of people out of
work, the less a country has to spend on social benefits in order to
provide the same amount of social protection. Various indicators
for the social protection offered to people out of work have been
suggested in the literature, most of which are some aggregate of
income replacement rates (e.g. Scruggs & Allan 2006b). In Table
2.1 we present an alternative indicator, which also takes account of
the share of the non-working population that is entitled to bene-
fits. Our benefit generosity indicator is a combination of the repla-
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cement rate (relative benefit level) and the eligibility conditions of
the social security system. It is calculated as the share of social
security expenditure in GDP divided by the share of the non-work-
ing population in the total population and can be interpreted as
the average income protection offered to all non-working citizens
as a percentage of average GDP per capita. The fourth column of
Table 2.1 shows that the ranking of countries with respect to this
generosity indicator does not differ strongly from their ranking
according to total public social expenditure, although there are
some notable exceptions. Austria turns out to have the most gen-
erous social security system, although it spends considerably less
on social protection than Sweden. Social protection in Japan is
also much more generous than one would expect on the basis of
its social expenditures.
The measures of solidarity discussed above strictly focus on na-
tional citizens and therefore reflect compulsory solidarity at the
national level. They embody a mixture of one-sided and two-sided
solidarity, since part of the benefits of public social protection is
spread more or less equally across the population (e.g. old age
benefits or family benefits), while another part is concentrated
among particular groups (e.g. social assistance and disability ben-
efits). The next three measures refer to supranational solidarity.
These have an unambiguously one-sided character, since native
citizens cannot expect to benefit from them. The first is official
development aid (ODA) as a share of GDP. This kind of solidarity
does not amount to more than one percent of GDP in any of the
countries. On average, ODA expenditure is only 0.33 percent of
GDP. If we compare this to an average of 21 percent of public
social expenditure, it is evident that in all countries, not surpris-
ingly, national solidarity is much stronger than supranational soli-
darity. Nevertheless, there are large differences in ODA expendi-
tures between the countries considered. The Scandinavian
countries and the Netherlands spend the most on development
aid (more than 0.75 percent of GDP), while the East and Central
European countries, Turkey, and Korea spend the least.
Another indicator for supranational solidarity is the willingness
to receive asylum-seekers who have fled their country to seek re-
fuge against persecution for racial, religious or political reasons.
Although the numbers of asylum-seekers applying for refuge in
various countries is only partly determined by the hospitality of
the host countries, the asylum policies of national governments
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are nevertheless likely to influence the number of asylum-seekers.
This is especially likely for the developed countries, most of which
are not close to the countries from which the refugees come. This
means that refugees have to choose explicitly in which country
they will seek asylum. However, to prevent random fluctuations
from having a large effect on the indicator for hospitality, Table
2.1 displays average figures for a period of seven years (2000-
2006). We computed the average number of asylum-seekers that
arrived annually per 100,000 inhabitants of the host country.
Since many asylum-seekers are not allowed to stay for an extended
period of time in the host country, we also give figures for the
relative number of refugees that are granted official status accord-
ing to the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees. On
average, the countries in Table 2.1 received one asylum-seeker for
every thousand inhabitants, annually. This number is at least
twice as large for Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland, but negligible in countries like Japan,
Korea and Portugal. The numbers of asylum-seekers that get for-
mal refugee status is much smaller. This share also varies enor-
mously, from over one per thousand inhabitants in the Nether-
lands to virtually nil in Japan, Korea and Portugal.
Table 2.2 gives information on various forms of non-state, vol-
untary solidarity. The first three columns refer to formal forms of
voluntary solidarity. First, we present gross and net private social
expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Private social expenditure
includes benefits from privately operated programmes, such as
occupational pensions, childcare support, and, in the US, employ-
ment-related health plans. It also includes mandatory social sup-
port stipulated by legislation but operated through the private sec-
tor, e.g. direct sickness payments by employers to their absent
employees (OECD 2007: 10). As with public social expenditure,
net private expenditure is the better indicator for social protection,
but these figures are available only for a limited number of years
and not for all countries. Private social expenditure is quite large
in some countries that spend relatively little on public social ex-
penditure, such as the USA, Australia, Canada and Iceland, but
also in Finland, the Netherlands and Switzerland, which are just
about average with respect to public social expenditure.
Whereas private social expenditure primarily refers to collective
and sometimes mandatory, non-state forms of solidarity, insur-
ance premiums refer to actions taken by individuals to protect
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Table 2.2 Voluntary solidarity, c. 2003
Formal Informal
gross private
social
expenditure
net private
social
expenditure
private
insurance
volun-
teering
volun-
teering
volun-
teering
giving child-
care
% of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of adult
population
hours
per week
% of
GDP
% of
GDP
hours
per
week
Australia 4.5 3.7 6.4 . . 1.5 0.5 .
Austria 2.1 1.5 5.7 28.3 . 0.6 0.2 .
Belgium 3.9 3.1 9.2 31.4 0.6 1.6 0.5 1.9
Canada 5.4 4.3 7.6 46.8 2.1 1.3 1.2 2.8
Czech Republic 0.4 0.3 4.1 29.8 . 0.4 0.3 .
Denmark 2.5 1.2 8.0 33.2 . . . .
Finland 4.6 2.9 3.8 36.5 0.6 2.2 0.4 2.3
France 2.7 2.5 8.8 21.9 0.1 3.1 0.3 2.1
Germany 3.0 2.2 7.1 19.5 0.9 2.6 0.1 2.0
Greece 2.4 . 2.1 38.0 . . . .
Hungary 0.0 . 3.0 14.3 . 0.1 0.6 .
Iceland 5.1 3.3 3.3 31.9 . . . .
Ireland 0.5 0.5 15.5 28.2 . 1.2 0.9 .
Italy 2.3 1.9 7.3 25.1 0.2 0.8 0.1 2.2
Japan 3.3 3.0 7.2 15.6 0.6 0.6 0.2 1.6
Korea 2.4 2.1 9.8 47.1 . 0.8 0.2 .
Luxembourg 2.7 . 25.9 30.0 . . . .
Netherlands 7.7 5.6 9.5 47.3 0.8 4.9 0.5 3.8
New Zealand 0.5 0.5 2.2 . . . . .
Norway 2.6 1.5 5.6 33.3 0.2 3.3 0.4 3.0
Poland 0.0 . 2.9 12.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 3.3
Portugal 1.5 1.3 6.7 11.6 . 0.5 0.5 .
Slovak Republic 1.3 1.1 3.6 48.6 . 0.0 0.4 .
Spain 0.3 0.3 5.3 16.0 0.1 1.3 0.9 2.5
Sweden 3.0 1.8 7.8 53.9 0.5 4.2 0.4 2.6
Switzerland 8.3 . 12.4 . . . . .
Turkey . . 1.4 1.5 . . . .
United Kingdom 6.8 5.4 15.3 43.1 0.4 3.1 0.8 2.7
United States 10.0 9.2 11.4 64.7 0.9 2.2 1.9 2.9
unweighted
average
3.2 2.3 7.5 31.1 0.6 1.7 0.5 2.5
Source: OECD (private social expenditure and insurance), Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector
Project (volunteering and giving in % GDP), EVS/WVS (volunteering in % pop.), Harmonised European
Time Use Survey (informal help and childcare in hours per week) (calculations by the authors)
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themselves against various risks. The third column of Table 2.2
gives the total sum of insurance premiums paid as a percentage of
GDP. This includes both life insurances and indemnity insur-
ances. Since these figures are based on information from each
country’s insurance industry, they refer to all premiums collected
by insurance companies in the respective countries, including
premiums from abroad. These figures may, thus, not be an accu-
rate indicator of the payment of insurance premiums by the citi-
zens of each country. For Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland,
in particular, this probably results in an overestimation of insur-
ance spending. Apart from these countries, the American and
British people spend relatively more on private insurance, while
the Turks, Greeks and Poles spend little.
The last five columns of Table 2.2 collect the available informa-
tion on informal solidarity. These data are much more scattered,
since informal solidarity is not officially registered, and informa-
tion has thus to be derived from various representative surveys.
Since not all countries conduct these surveys, there are a number
of blank cells in the table where no information is available.
Acts of solidarity in the form of unpaid, voluntary work can be
measured in various ways. The easiest way is to ask respondents
in a survey whether they take part in such activities. This question
has been posed in each of the four waves of the European Values
Survey (EVS) and the World Values Survey (WVS). Column four
shows that participation rates in volunteering ranges from eleven
to 65 percent of the adult population, if we exclude Turkey, where
only 1.5 percent of the population does voluntary work. The high-
est number of volunteers by far is to be found in the USA, fol-
lowed by Sweden, Slovakia, Korea, the Netherlands and Canada.
These data inform us about the share of the population participat-
ing in voluntary work, but not about the actual amount of volun-
teering. This can be measured in so-called time-use surveys,
which request the respondents to fill in a diary in which they re-
cord all activities they perform in the duration of a week. Basically,
this gives a reliable estimate of the time spent on voluntary work.
However, since filling in such a diary is very laborious (and time
consuming!), the number of respondents is usually quite small,
and the response may be selective, affecting the representative-
ness of the survey negatively. The fifth column of Table 2.2 shows
that, for the countries for which figures are available, the average
number of hours per week spent by adults on voluntary work
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varies between 0.1 and 2.1. Canadians spent by far the most hours
on volunteering, but this may be due to a different definition of
voluntary work in the Canadian survey, which includes “civic
work”. Next, Americans and Germans devote relatively more time
to volunteering, while Frenchmen, Poles and Spaniards spend
very little.
The sixth column shows the estimates of the Johns’ Hopkins
Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project of the value of voluntary
work expressed as a percentage of GDP. This estimate is based on
national surveys on volunteering and the assumption that one
hour of voluntary work is valued at the average wage in the respec-
tive country in the fields in which volunteering takes place (Sala-
mon, Sokolowski & List 2003: 55, note 25). Now the Netherlands
and Sweden turn out to have the largest share of voluntary work in
GDP and three Eastern European countries, Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia, the smallest. The Johns’ Hopkins Comparative Nonpro-
fit Sector Project has also gathered information on voluntary giv-
ing to charitable organizations. The estimates vary between 0.1
and 1.9 percent of GDP. The Americans appear to be by far the
most generous people, followed by Canadians, while the Germans
and French give the least.
Finally, the last column of Table 2.2 includes figures on the
average number of hours spent per week on unpaid childcare.
These figures are also drawn from time-use surveys and include
childcare as the primary activity only. The time spent on childcare
ranges from 1.6 hours per week in Japan to 3.3 hours in Poland.
To what extent are the various forms of solidarity correlated?
Are they substitutes or complements? Table 2.3 displays the Pear-
son correlation coefficients between all pairs of solidarity pre-
sented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The shaded triangle in the table’s
upper left quadrant shows the correlations between the various
forms of compulsory solidarity. All correlations are positive, show-
ing that a country that scores highly on one of the indicators for
compulsory solidarity tends to score highly on other indicators,
too. Not surprisingly, gross public social expenditure, net public
social expenditure and the generosity of public income protection
are strongly correlated. But there is also a significant positive cor-
relation, albeit weaker, between public social expenditure and
spending on development aid and the inflow of asylum-seekers.
National and supranational forms of solidarity thus do not appear
to be substitutes, but to some extent complements: countries that
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Table 2.4 Trends in solidaritya, 1980s-2000s
Compulsory Voluntary
gross public
social expend.
benefit
generosity
ODA inflow of
asylum
seekers
recognition
of asylum-
seekers
gross
private
social
expend.
private
insurance
volun-
teering
Australia 0.33 0.21 -0.009 -1.44 0.31 0.24 0.14 .
Austria 0.14 -0.63b 0.002 6.19 0.94 0.06 0.04 0.44b
Belgium 0.05 -0.06 -0.003 6.26 0.45 0.11 0.27 0.59
Canada 0.09 0.07 -0.009 -2.34 0.97 0.19 0.12 0.76
Czech Rep.b 0.36 -0.10 0.012 5.13 -0.03 0.04 0.18 0.49
Denmark 0.13 -0.17 0.009 -1.11 -0.83 0.06 0.22 0.88
Finland 0.15 -0.37 0.000 1.86 0.01 0.23 -0.08 -0.68b
France 0.32 0.14 -0.006 1.60 -0.22 0.10 0.27 0.35
Germany 0.20 0.11 -0.006 -13.45 -0.51 0.01 0.10 -0.08
Greece 0.32 0.18 0.003b 1.39b -0.09 0.02b 0.07b .
Hungaryb . 1.97 . -1.79 -0.04 . 0.09 -0.21
Iceland 0.21b -0.12b . 2.72b . 0.13b 0.02 0.14
Ireland -0.21 -0.35 0.008 15.75 1.19b -0.03 0.46 0.32
Italy 0.19 0.13 -0.003 0.71 0.09 0.09 0.28 0.41
Japan 0.30 0.41 0.000 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.34b
Korea 0.26b 0.29 0.004 0.06b 0.02 0.16b -0.11b -4.28b
Luxembourg -0.13 -0.52 0.027 3.58b 0.20b 0.09 1.65 .
Netherlands -0.27 -0.24 -0.008 -0.08 -32.66 0.17 0.08b 1.28
New Zealand 0.05 -0.83 -0.002 -0.04b 0.06b 0.02 -0.14 .
Norway 0.28 0.79 -0.002 9.75b 0.41 0.08 0.06 1.11
Polandb 0.11 -1.28 0.009 1.16 0.74 . 0.10 -1.39
Portugal 0.57 0.71 0.012 -0.24 0.00 0.04 0.29 -0.66b
Slovak Rep.b -0.16 0.31 . 13.98 -0.15 0.06 0.10 2.86
Spain 0.22 0.17 0.010 -0.15 -0.06 0.00 0.16 -0.38
Sweden 0.07 -0.11 0.000 -6.63 -1.55 0.10 0.18 1.66
Switzerland 0.27 -0.19b 0.006 -5.14 1.22 0.35 0.29 .
Turkey 0.41 0.63 0.014b -0.32b -0.04b . 0.05b .
United Kingdom 0.09 -0.22 0.000 4.24 0.90 0.16 0.39b 1.35
United States 0.12 0.00 -0.005 -2.36 0.19 0.22 0.17 1.92
Unweighted
average
0.16 0.03 0.002 1.36 -1.02 0.11 0.19 0.31
# increase 24 15 15 16 16 25 26 16
# decline 4 14 11 13 12 1 3 7
a Based on a linear regression of the indicator on the calendar year.
b 1990s-2000s.
Source: see Table 2.1 and 2.2
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display a strong solidarity with their own population tend to show
solidarity with people in need from abroad, too.
The shaded triangle in the bottom right quadrant shows that
there is also a positive correlation between the various forms of
voluntary solidarity. Private social expenditure is positively corre-
lated with private insurance, volunteering and giving to charities,
and there is also a positive correlation, albeit insignificant, with
childcare.
Finally, the shaded bottom left quadrant shows the correlations
between various forms of compulsory and various forms of volun-
tary solidarity. Now, a fair number of correlations is negative,
although none of them is statistically significant. Thus, there
seems to be a weak negative correlation between public social ex-
penditure and social protection generosity on the one hand, and
private social expenditure, private insurance, volunteering, giving
to charities and childcare on the other. However, the few correla-
tion coefficients in this quadrant that are significant are all posi-
tive: development aid and the inflow of asylum-seekers are posi-
tively correlated with private insurance and volunteering (as a
percentage of GDP), while there is also a positive correlation be-
tween the recognition of asylum-seekers on the one hand and pri-
vate insurance and childcare on the other.
These figures suggest that compulsory national solidarity and
voluntary solidarity might be weak substitutes, while compulsory
supranational solidarity and voluntary solidarity appear to be com-
plementary.
2.3 Trends in social solidarity
As we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, many people
seem to believe that social solidarity is declining. To examine
whether this worry is justified, we give an overview of trends in
social solidarity in past decades. Because the levels of specific
kinds of solidarity may fluctuate from year to year, we do not sim-
ply calculate the change between the first year and the last year for
which we have figures, but we estimate the annual trend for all
years for which data are available. These estimated trends are
shown in Table 2.4. Unfortunately, we are not able to estimate
these trends for all kinds of acts of solidarity that were reported in
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. We do not have a sufficiently long time
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series for net social expenditure and for most forms of informal
solidarity to estimate robust trends. With respect to informal soli-
darity, we only have multiple observations for the share of the
adult population doing voluntary work from three waves of the
EVS/WVS. It should be noted, however, that the numbers of
adults who volunteer are not strongly correlated with the average
hours of voluntary work and the share of voluntary work in GDP
(see Table 2.3). It is, thus, uncertain how robust the figures for
volunteering in Table 2.4 are. Whenever possible, the trends in
Table 2.4 refer to a time series that starts in the 1980s and ends
in the 2000s. In a number of cases, however, the earliest data
available are from the 1990s (these instances are indicated in Ta-
ble 2.4).
If we first take a look at the bottom three lines of Table 2.4, a
remarkable finding is that on average, with the exception of the
recognition of asylum-seekers, all forms of solidarity show a posi-
tive trend. This means that almost all kinds of solidarity have been
on the rise since the 1980s and that there is no general tendency
of declining solidarity. Although there is quite a degree of varia-
tion in the trends between the countries, the bottom two lines
show that for all kinds of solidarity, the number of countries that
experienced a rise is larger than the number of countries that wit-
nessed a decline. In the case of gross public social expenditure
and the three forms of voluntary solidarity, there is even an over-
whelming majority of countries that experienced a rise in solidar-
ity. The only kind of solidarity that, on average, has declined is the
recognition of asylum-seekers. This is, however, entirely due to
the large decline in the Netherlands, which recognized an extre-
mely large number of asylum-seekers in the beginning of the
1990s and, although the number fell strongly in recent years, was
still by far the most generous country in awarding asylum-seekers
refugee status in 2006. If we exclude the Netherlands, the average
trend with respect to this kind of solidarity also becomes positive
(+0.15).
It is quite remarkable that, despite the widespread worries of a
race to the bottom and social dumping, in a large majority of
countries public social expenditures as a share of GDP has risen
over the past two decades. On average, this share has risen by 1.6
percentage points over ten years (note that the trends in Table 2.4
refer to annual changes). Expenditures on development aid have
also risen, albeit very slightly (on average only 0.02 percentage
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points over ten years). At the same time, private spending on so-
cial security and on insurances increased, too, on average by 1.1
and 1.9 percentage points, respectively, over a ten-year period.
This means that total spending on compulsory and voluntary soli-
darity as a share of GDP has, on average, risen by almost five per-
centage points over ten years. Furthermore, the share of adults
that perform voluntary work has also increased.
Table 2.5 Correlations between trends in solidarity
gross public
social
expenditure
benefit
generosity
ODA inflow of
asylum-
seekers
recognition
of asylum-
seekers
gross
private
social
expenditure
private
insurance
volun-
teering
Pearson Correlation
gross public social
expenditure
1 0.51** 0.06 -0.35# 0.43* 0.07 -0.31 -0.41#
benefit generosity 0.51** 1 -0.12 -0.09 0.07 -0.02 -0.16 0.00
ODA 0.06 -0.12 1 0.24 0.25 -0.32 0.58** -0.37
inflow of asylum-seekers -0.35# -0.09 0.24 1 0.09 -0.30 0.15 0.21
recognition of asylum-
seekers
0.43* 0.07 0.25 0.09 1 -0.12 0.08 -0.16
gross private social
expenditure
0.07 -0.02 -0.32 -0.30 -0.12 1 -0.07 -0.02
private insurance -0.31 -0.16 0.58** 0.15 0.08 -0.07 1 0.38#
volunteering -0.41# 0.00 -0.37 0.21 -0.16 -0.02 0.38# 1
Kendall's tau_b
gross public social
expenditure
1 0.45** 0.15 -0.15 -0.11 0.02 -0.10 -0.34*
benefit generosity 0.45** 1 -0.07 -0.13 -0.17 -0.04 -0.15 -0.06
ODA 0.15 -0.07 1 0.13 -0.01 -0.31* 0.14 -0.28#
inflow of asylum-seekers -0.15 -0.13 0.13 1 0.21 -0.21 0.00 0.07
recognition of asylum-
seekers
-0.11 -0.17 -0.01 0.21 1 0.19 0.11 -0.10
gross private social
expenditure
0.02 -0.04 -0.31* -0.21 0.19 1 -0.06 0.13
private insurance -0.10 -0.15 0.14 0.00 0.11 -0.06 1 0.17
volunteering -0.34* -0.06 -0.28# 0.07 -0.10 0.13 0.17 1
# significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
* significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Source: see Table 2.4
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Table 2.5 shows the correlations between trends in the various
kinds of solidarity. The figures in the upper panel (Pearson corre-
lation) refer to the correlations between the original figures. Be-
cause some series include outliers, which may distort the calcula-
tion of the correlation coefficient, the lower panel gives rank order
correlations (Kendall’s tau_b) which are not sensitive to outliers.
Most correlation coefficients are small and not significant, which
means that there is no clear relationship between the trends of
various kinds of solidarity. Thus, with a few exceptions, there is
no indication of either a complementary relationship or a substi-
tution between changes in solidarity. The main exception is the
strong correlation between the trend in public social expenditure
and in benefit generosity, which was to be expected, since both are
indicators of the same kind of solidarity. There is also a significant
positive correlation between the trend in development aid and pri-
vate insurance, but this is probably spurious, since the rank order
correlation between these two indicators is insignificant. The
same probably applies to the correlation between the trends of
public social expenditures and both the inflow and the recognition
of asylum-seekers.
The change in volunteering appears to be weakly negatively cor-
related with public social expenditure and positively with private
insurance. When we look at rank orders, only the first correlation
is still significant, but now there is also a marginally significant
negative correlation with development aid. These correlations are
hard to interpret, but there is some hint of a substitution between
changes in compulsory solidarity and changes in informal volun-
tary solidarity. For example, some of the countries that expanded
their public social expenditure the most, such as Portugal and Kor-
ea, witnessed a fall in volunteering, while volunteering increased
in three countries that curtailed their public expenditures (Ireland,
the Netherlands and Slovakia).
Additionally, there is a significant negative rank correlation be-
tween development aid and private insurances. This is hard to ex-
plain, unless one assumes internal, national solidarity and exter-
nal, global solidarity are substitutes.
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2.4 Conclusion
The data presented in this chapter show that most of the fears of
an erosion of solidarity are unwarranted. We found that, on aver-
age, in 29 industrialized countries, the various kinds of solidarity
for which we were able to collect data have risen since the 1980s.
This result applies both to compulsory, state-organized solidarity
and voluntary solidarity – either formal or informal. Around the
year 2000, most countries spent a larger share of their gross do-
mestic product on social protection and development aid and ac-
cepted more asylum-seekers than twenty years earlier, while their
citizens spent more on private social expenditure and insurance
premiums, and a larger share of their population was doing vol-
untary work.
We also showed that, contrary to what is often suggested, there
is not much evidence of a substitution between compulsory, state-
organized solidarity and voluntary solidarity, although there ap-
pears to be a weak and insignificant negative correlation between
public social protection and some measures of voluntary solidar-
ity. Supranational solidarity, in the form of development aid and
hospitality to refugees, seems to be positively correlated with var-
ious forms of voluntary solidarity, in particular private insurance
and volunteering.
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3 Altruism or self-interest?
Solidarity and the welfare state
The basic assumption of this book is that social solidarity constitu-
tes the foundation of the welfare state. If individualization or glo-
balization erodes solidarity, this will inevitably undermine the wel-
fare state. At face value, this might seem self-evident, since the
welfare state embodies the greater part of organized solidarity.
However, on closer inspection, the relationship between social so-
lidarity and the welfare state is more complex. This chapter exam-
ines this relationship. First, we define what we consider to be the
core of the welfare state. Next, we argue that the income transfers
via the welfare state can rightly be called acts of social solidarity.
The extent to which these income transfers are motivated by atti-
tudes of affective or calculating solidarity is the subject of the next
two sections. The motives of the elite and the ruling class and the
motives of the public at large are considered separately. We con-
clude the chapter with a brief discussion of the welfare state as a
source of solidarity itself.
3.1 What is the welfare state?
In the academic literature there are numerous definitions and
characterizations of the welfare state. We do not want to dive into
the intricacies of the boundaries of the welfare state here but will
instead focus on the common denominator of all definitions, viz.
a system of income transfers – possibly in-kind – between individ-
ual citizens or households organized by the state or a public body.
The distinguishing feature of these transfers is that the individ-
ual’s contribution is not directly related to what they receive.
Some citizens contribute more than they receive in return, while
others receive far more than they contribute.
Two kinds of transfers can be identified. First, social benefits
and subsidies are intended to replace or supplement incomes that
have dwindled or are insufficient to cover indispensable expenses.
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Second, social services, such as healthcare and education, are pro-
vided free of charge or at a lower price than they cost. However, in
practice, it is often difficult to draw a sharp line between these two
kinds of transfers. Housing subsidies, for instance, are a way of
providing affordable housing, but also supplement the disposable
income of the household.
Another distinguishing feature of the income transfers by the
welfare state is the central role of the state. This means that the
state either administers the transfer itself or delegates the admin-
istration to another public body. The state also compels the citi-
zens to contribute to the transfers by levying taxes and social secu-
rity contributions. Moreover, the state determines the entitlement
and eligibility conditions for receiving a benefit, subsidy or social
service.
Other sources might also provide income transfers between ci-
tizens. Some examples are occupational pension schemes, em-
ployee benefits and private insurance plans. There is no consen-
sus on whether these transfers should be considered part of the
welfare state or not. Other areas of social policy, such as labor
market regulation (on statutory minimum wage, employment pro-
tection legislation, working hours), are sometimes also included
in the definition of the welfare state. However, in this book we
will leave these kinds of non-state transfers and other areas of so-
cial policy aside.
3.2 The solidarity of the welfare state
From the definition of the welfare state in the previous section,
two consequences for the relationship between solidarity and the
welfare state arise immediately. First, the income transfers be-
tween citizens that run via the welfare state are, by definition, acts
of solidarity, since the contributions and the receipts of individual
citizens are, in general, not equal. A fully developed welfare state,
like those in Northern and Western Europe, is by far the most ex-
tensive form of organized solidarity in a country. Second, since
these transfers are organized by the state and the contributions
are mandatory, the actual solidarity embodied by the welfare state
need not correspond with people’s attitudes of solidarity in gener-
al. Individuals who do not feel any solidarity towards their fellow
citizens are nevertheless forced to contribute to this solidarity by
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paying taxes and social contributions. This section focuses on the
actual solidarity embodied in the welfare state. The next two sec-
tions discuss the solidarity attitudes that lay the foundation for the
welfare state.
We can identify two typical kinds of income transfers, viz. social
insurance and welfare provisions, that embody two kinds of soli-
darity. The key principle of social insurance – and of any other
insurance, for that matter – is that people cover themselves
against the hardship of a calamity by pooling their risks. In ex-
change for a relatively small premium, one obtains a guaranteed
compensation in the event of a calamity. Regarding social insur-
ance, the most important calamities are loss of income due to
sickness, disability and unemployment, and unforeseeable and in-
dispensable large costs, e.g. for medical treatment. Such an insur-
ance is based on the principle of two-sided or bilateral solidarity:
beforehand, ex ante, the contribution (the insurance premium)
and the expected receipt (a social benefit in case of income loss)
are equivalent. Ex post, the actual receipts and the contributions
paid usually diverge. Those who experience sickness, disability or
unemployment will probably receive more than they contribute to
the insurance scheme, while those fortunate enough to never get
sick or to experience disability or unemployment will contribute
more than they receive.
Typical of welfare provisions is that contributions and receipts
are unrelated, both ex ante and ex post. The income transfer only
depends on the needs of the beneficiary. Quite often, it is already
known beforehand that particular groups will benefit more than
they will contribute, while other groups will contribute more than
they are expected to receive. Ex ante, there is no equivalence be-
tween contributions and receipts. Consequently, this is a form of
one-sided (unilateral) solidarity.
Possibly, one could distinguish a third category of transfers,
based on savings. The best-known example would be savings for a
pension scheme. In a typically defined contribution pension
scheme both ex ante and ex post contributions and receipts are
equivalent. Consequently, such a system does not include trans-
fers between citizens, but only intra-personal transfers over a life-
time. Thence, a defined contribution pension scheme does not
embody solidarity between citizens. A defined benefit pension
scheme, which guarantees a particular pension benefit irrespec-
tive of the return on the invested pension premiums, usually does
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include some inter-personal income transfers, caused by varia-
tions in the returns on invested capital. However, since the main
purpose of a fully funded pension scheme is to save for your own
future income, we will leave these pension schemes aside.
In practice, the dividing line between social insurances and wel-
fare provisions, based on two-sided and one-sided solidarity,
respectively, is often unclear. Many social insurances include ele-
ments of one-sided solidarity, for example, because the contribu-
tions are independent of the specific risk one runs. Thus, the in-
surance incorporates one-sided solidarity between the ‘good’ risks
and the ‘bad’ risks. Some social insurances also include an ele-
ment of income solidarity, for example, if there is a flat-rate bene-
fit while the contribution is a fixed percentage (up to some limit)
of one’s income. Welfare provisions, too, are often a mix of one-
sided and two-sided solidarity, because those who are expected to
be net contributors, ex ante, might nevertheless benefit to some
extent from the particular scheme. An example of this might be
health provisions, which are tax-financed but provide support to
all persons who need medical treatment, independent of their in-
come.
3.3 What motivates the welfare state?
The mix of one-sided and two-sided solidarity embodied in the
income transfers of the welfare state does not necessarily reflect
the motives behind it. Income transfers from the rich to the poor
(one-sided solidarity) need not be proof of altruistic feelings or
affective attitudes of solidarity – the term we used in Chapter 2 –
among the rich. On the contrary, the dominant thesis in sociology
and political science is that the genesis and evolution of the wel-
fare state are primarily explained by the well-considered self-inter-
est of the well-to-do and, thus, basically stem from calculating atti-
tudes of solidarity.
A well-known representative of this school of thought is Abram
de Swaan, who emphasizes enlightened self-interest as the foun-
dation of the welfare state, in his book In Care of the State (1988).
During the nineteenth century middle-class and upper-class peo-
ple increasingly experienced the nuisance of the stench, infectious
diseases, beggary, crime and riots caused by the poor. This nui-
sance power was an important motivation for the privileged
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classes to improve the lot of the poor and the destitute. Improving
the conditions of the poor, accompanied by measures to discipline
them, could reduce these troubles and was thus also beneficial to
the well-to-do. “The main impetus for collectivization came from
struggles between elites which sought to ward off the threats aris-
ing from the presence of the poor among them, and, to exploit the
opportunities which the poor also presented” (De Swaan 1988:
218).
Peter Lindert (2004) emphasizes the importance of labor mar-
ket considerations. Farm workers that lost employment in winter-
time tended to migrate to the cities, thus causing a shortage of
workers in the countryside in springtime, as the demand for labor
increased again. It was therefore in the interest of the landowners
to support the unemployed laborers by giving them a modest in-
come during the off-season.
However, when improving the lot of the poor is a private endea-
vor, as it has been for ages, it is vulnerable to free-riding behavior.
Traditionally, the willingness of private charities, such as local
parishes, to contribute to poor relief depended on the willingness
of others to make their contribution. Municipalities which pro-
vided generous support to their poor ran the risk of being flooded
by poor people from neighboring towns and cities that were less
generous, rendering that generous support unsustainable. In the
end, the only way out of this prisoner’s dilemma was to make the
national state responsible – at least financially – for poor relief.
Consequently, poor relief was funded from tax receipts, ensuring
that all citizens paid their due. This resulted in public services,
such as general health care, compulsory education, council hous-
ing and social assistance (De Swaan 1988).
A second source of the welfare state is often sought in the self-
interest of the working class. In the past, to cover the risks of wage
laborers in a capitalist economy, collective insurances were
needed. First, associations of workers – the first trade unions –
organized mutual funds or ‘friendly societies’ to insure their
members to cover the costs of sickness and burial, and, later on,
widowhood and unemployment (cf. De Swaan 1988). However,
these mutual funds met many problems. Due to their small scale
and homogeneous membership (often workers with the same oc-
cupation) they were exposed to occupation-specific risks (the prob-
lem of interdependent risks). To prevent the enrolment of many
bad risks, which would cause the insurance premium to rise,
45
weak groups were excluded, resulting in adverse selection. Hence,
the most vulnerable groups were not covered by these insurances
and had to fall back on poor relief. In some countries, e.g. the
Netherlands, municipalities or the national government stepped
in to support the unemployment funds of the trade unions, on
the condition that they did not exclude the underprivileged
groups. Eventually, in most countries the government took over
the risk of unemployment insurances, although the trade unions
maintained an important role in the administration of unemploy-
ment insurance in countries such as Belgium, Sweden and Den-
mark.
There is little room for altruism or affective solidarity in the
analysis of De Swaan, Lindert and other scholars. Even though
many welfare provisions include income transfers from the bet-
ter-off to the worse-off, in a dynamic perspective the better-off
also benefit from them. This line of reasoning seems plausible to
explain the creation of the first welfare schemes at the end of the
nineteenth and the start of the twentieth century. This argument
is, however, less convincing in explaining the rapid expansion of
the welfare state in many developed countries after the Second
World War. Once the whole population was guaranteed a subsis-
tence level, it became much harder to convince the wealthy that a
further improvement of the lot of the poor would be in the former
group’s interest. When the most appalling poverty was eradicated,
vagrancy and beggary had become rare, most slums were replaced
by council houses with running water and sewerage systems, con-
tagious diseases, such as tuberculosis, had largely disappeared,
and all children went to school until the age of fifteen, the threat
and nuisance of the poor had dwindled. Nevertheless, most coun-
tries introduced new social services or improved existing ones in
the decades after World War II, which most benefited the least
wealthy.
It is unlikely that this expansion of the welfare state was primar-
ily motivated by the self-interest of the well-off. Initially, the wide-
spread fear of the appeal of communism to the workers might
have played a role with the elite, as De Swaan (1988: 224) sug-
gests. But communism soon lost its attraction to the masses
when the state terror under Stalin was revealed and the uprising
of the Hungarian people in 1956 was brutally suppressed. More-
over, many welfare services were targeted at groups that were
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neither particularly likely to revolt nor an indispensable labor re-
serve, such as pensioners and widows.
That the expansion of the welfare state was not mainly moti-
vated by the enlightened self-interest of the elite but by a domi-
nant attitude of social solidarity can be illustrated by the argu-
ments from the famous British Beveridge report, Social Insurance
and Allied Services (Beveridge 1942), which served as an inspira-
tion for social security policies in many other countries. In his re-
port Beveridge clearly stated that “The Plan for Social Security
takes abolition of want (…) as its aim” (idem: 8). Although social
security should be based on the contributory principle and there-
fore “includes as its main method compulsory social insurance”
(ibidem), it should also include national assistance. Besides, the
premiums paid by employees should preferably not be adjusted to
differences in risk, thus introducing an element of one-sided soli-
darity between the good risks and the bad risks.
3.4 Public support for the welfare state
In a democratic society one would expect the motives of politi-
cians for setting up and shaping the welfare state to reflect the
opinion of the population. To find out whether there is indeed a
positive relationship between public opinion and the welfare state,
one can study this relationship from either an international com-
parative or an historical perspective. Unfortunately, for most of the
post-war period we know hardly anything about public opinion on
social services. Only in recent history have systematic surveys of
public opinion on issues related to the welfare state become com-
mon, but by that point most welfare states had already reached
maturity. Hence, these surveys do not inform us about the mo-
tives for the expansion of the welfare state after the World War II.
Since there are still large differences between current welfare
states, a second option is to analyze the relationship between pub-
lic opinion and the welfare state by cross-country comparisons.
Recently, a number of studies have examined whether differences
between welfare state regimes reflect variations in public opinion
with respect to solidarity. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) find a rela-
tively strong correlation between the prevailing opinions in a
country and social expenditures as a percentage of GDP. The
opinion that income disparities are strongly determined by luck
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and that poverty is not caused by laziness go together with higher
social expenditures. Alesina and Glaeser argue that the large dif-
ferences between most European welfare states on the one hand
and the American welfare state on the other reflect a fundamental
difference of attitudes between Americans and Europeans towards
poverty and social inequality. Americans attribute social differ-
ences primarily to individual effort and Europeans to luck. This
would mean that, in fact, both Europeans and Americans got the
welfare state they “deserve”.
Figure 3.1 Social expenditure (% GDP) by opinion on poverty (1995-
1998)
Source: WVS (1995/1998); IMF
Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between opinions on the causes
of poverty and social protection expenditures for a somewhat lar-
ger sample of (democratic) countries than Alesina and Glaeser
used to reach their conclusion. The scale for poverty (ranging
from 0 to 4) is constructed from the opinion that there are people
who live in need because society treats them unfairly (rather than
because of laziness and lack of willpower), that poor people have
very little chance of escaping from poverty, and that the govern-
ment is doing too little for people in poverty. Figure 3.1 confirms
the positive relationship between opinions on poverty and social
expenditures for a number of “older” democracies (US, JP, AUS,
NO, NZ, FI, SE, DE). However, there is no positive correlation for
the “new” Central and Eastern European democracies (CZ, SK, SI,
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EE, ES, RO, LV, LT and HU). This suggests that, in the latter coun-
tries, the welfare state does not reflect the opinion of the popula-
tion because the democratization process is not yet fully matured.
Svallfors (1997) compared popular attitudes to redistribution in
eight countries and concluded that people in countries with a
comprehensive welfare state are more often in favor of the govern-
ment reducing income differences and providing everyone with a
job than people in countries with a liberal welfare state. More re-
cently, Jæger (2006) analyzed the attitudes of the population in
thirteen Western European countries with respect to income re-
distribution. He found that the share of the population that agreed
with the statement “the government should take measures to re-
duce differences in income levels” correlated positively with the
share of public social expenditure in GDP (although this support
leveled off for very high levels of social expenditure).
We can thus conclude that there is sufficient empirical evidence
that the preferences of the population are positively correlated
with the size of the welfare state and that the welfare state, at least
partly, reflects the people’s attitude of solidarity. However, there is
also an alternative interpretation of this finding, which is dis-
cussed in the next section.
3.5 The welfare state as a source of solidarity
Although it seems obvious that, in democratic countries, the pre-
vailing opinion of the population and the degree of solidarity af-
fect the welfare state, it is also conceivable that the opposite rela-
tionship holds. The institutions of the welfare state may also
influence public opinion (cf. Rothstein 1998). Instead of being
the result of solidaristic attitudes, the welfare state might also fos-
ter solidaristic attitudes. This idea is similar to the Marxist
thought of a substructure (economic) that determines the super-
structure (ideological). Although this way of thinking may have
lost most of its popularity, it is plausible all the same that the exist-
ing societal institutions have some impact on the dominant opi-
nions. As Jæger (2006) formulates it: “welfare regimes tend to
reproduce their legitimacy in both quantitative (i.e. overall level of
support) as well as qualitative terms (i.e. some aspects of social
policy are more accepted than others).”
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How can the welfare state affect attitudes of solidarity and the
willingness to support others? Perhaps a good starting point is
Émile Durkheim’s theory of organic solidarity (see Chapter 2). Ac-
cording to Durkheim, the interdependence between (anonymous)
citizens in a society that is based on a division of labor is an im-
portant source of social cohesion and social solidarity. Arguably,
the creation and expansion of the welfare state have intensified
this mutual interdependence. Knowing that, in case of sickness,
unemployment and old age, one is dependent on the support of
so many anonymous fellow citizens can create a feeling of solidar-
ity towards them. Since the income transfers of the welfare state
are mainly organized at the national level, the welfare state might
also have contributed to creating a feeling of national identity. Be-
fore a national system of social security came into being, there
was little that connected a farmer to a wage laborer in a factory or
to a civil servant. The welfare state, however, made them mutually
dependent.
How important the welfare state was and still is in nourishing
attitudes of solidarity among the population is very hard to estab-
lish. The fact that there is a positive correlation between public
opinion and the size of the welfare state does not inform us about
the causal direction. Most likely, public opinion and the welfare
state affect each other mutually. Although, for the sake of conveni-
ence, we will stick to the assumption that solidarity affects the wel-
fare state in the rest of the book, the reader should keep in mind
that the causal relationship might also run in the opposite direc-
tion.
3.6 Conclusion
Although social solidarity and the welfare state are closely related
concepts, their mutual relationship is more complex than one
might think at first sight. In this chapter we showed that the in-
come transfers and social services that are provided by the welfare
state are a mix of one-sided and two-sided solidarity. They are an
expression of solidarity because there is no direct relationship be-
tween individual contribution and receipt. This solidarity is partly
two-sided, because, ex ante, it can be expected that contributions
and (expected) receipts will roughly balance, as is the case, for ex-
ample, with most social insurances. Partly, the solidarity of the
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welfare state is one-sided, because it is known in advance that par-
ticular groups will be net contributors and other groups will be net
beneficiaries, as is the case, for example, with social assistance.
Although it is plausible that the enlightened self-interest of the
elite played an important role in the initial phases of the welfare
state, the expansion of the welfare state in the post-World War II
period was probably motivated mainly by moral attitudes of affec-
tive solidarity towards the least well-off. Thence, the present wel-
fare state is the product of both affective and calculating solidarity.
It is not completely clear how these motives of policy-makers
relate to the dominant opinions among the population. Although
international comparative research shows that there is a positive
correlation between public opinion on income equality and the
causes of poverty on the one hand and welfare state expenditure
on the other hand, the causal relationship might run in both direc-
tions. Broad public support for income transfers and social ser-
vices is a necessary condition for sustaining a generous welfare
state in the long run, but a welfare state that is generally consid-
ered as fair might also foster feelings of social solidarity among
the population.
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4 Falling apart?
The many meanings of individualization
The process of individualization is regarded by many as one of the
most important social-cultural developments of the postwar peri-
od. For the most part, however, the growing literature on individu-
alization lacks firm empirical underpinning. Most authors on in-
dividualization, among whom are renowned sociologists such as
Beck, Giddens and Bauman, confine themselves to describing
some broad, general trends that, in their opinion, should suffice
to show that a process of individualization is taking place. This
approach makes it rather difficult to judge the importance of the
individualization process, and indeed, whether there really is a
process of individualization taking place. In this chapter we will
present the available evidence for a trend of individualization in a
number of industrialized countries.
In order to test the phenomenon of individualization empiri-
cally, one must, of course, first define individualization. Because
of the widely diverging interpretations of individualization, this is
more than a cursory exercise. Hence, the first part of this chapter
discusses different interpretations of individualization. We argue
that individualization can be characterized by a combination of
three trends, namely detraditionalization, emancipation and het-
erogenization. In the second part of this chapter we examine
whether these three trends can be traced in reality. We find that,
contrary to expectations, in the 25 developed countries that we
analyze, there was no trend of individualization during the 1990s.
Only in a quarter of these countries could we trace a trend of de-
traditionalization, in no country did we find evidence for hetero-
genization, and only in a third of the countries does a process of
emancipation seem to have occurred.1
53
4.1 What is individualization?
Far from being a recent development, as is sometimes suggested,
individualization was in fact one of the main issues with which
the founding fathers of social science were concerned. Émile
Durkheim, Georg Simmel and Max Weber all studied the influ-
ence of the industrialization process on social cohesion and soli-
darity and the changes in the bond between individuals and com-
munity that took place in their era, i.e. around the turn of the
twentieth century. For example, the gradual transformation from
mechanic solidarity to organic solidarity, which Durkheim de-
scribed in The Division of Labour in Society (1893), was in fact a
process of individualization.
Recently, however, some authors claim that the present process
of individualization differs in important aspects from the mod-
ernization process that took place a century ago. Authors like Ul-
rich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash contend that moder-
nity itself is undergoing profound changes. We are entering a new
phase, which they call late modernity, reflexive modernity or sec-
ond modernity (Giddens 1991; Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994; Beck
& Beck-Gernsheim 2002). They claim that individualization is
one of the defining characteristics of this new phase of modernity.
According to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002: xxii, emphasis in
original), “individualization is becoming the social structure of sec-
ond modernity itself ”.
Although these authors stress the overriding importance of in-
dividualization for the present phase of modernity, it is not easy to
derive a clear definition of individualization from their writings.
For example, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002: xxii) write: “So –
to give a simple definition – ‘individualization’ means disembed-
ding without re-embedding.” Bauman (2002: xv) states: “‘indi-
vidualization’ consists in transforming human ‘identity’ from a
‘given’ into a ‘task’ – and charging the actors with the responsibil-
ity for performing that task and for the consequences (also the
side-effects) of their performance.” These “definitions” are not
easily converted into a formalization of individualization that
lends itself to empirical testing. Hence, we will try to infer some
concrete elements from the discussion of individualization by the
authors mentioned.
For a start, individualization should clearly be distinguished
from individualism. While individualism is commonly under-
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stood as a personal attitude or preference, individualization refers
to a macro-social phenomenon, which may – but just as well may
not – reflect changes in the attitudes of individual persons. Beck,
Bauman and Giddens emphasize that individualization is not a
process that originates from a conscious choice or even a prefer-
ence of the individual. To the contrary, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim
point out: “individualization is a social condition which is not ar-
rived at by a free decision of individuals. […] people are con-
demned to individualization” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 4).
Zygmunt Bauman states concisely: “individualization is a fate, not
a choice” (Bauman 2002: xvi), and Giddens (1991: 81) says: “we
have no choice but to choose.”
These remarks underline the fact that individualization is not
closely connected to individual attitudes or preferences with re-
spect to freedom of choice. According to these authors, individual-
ization is in fact imposed on individual citizens by modern insti-
tutions. The welfare state, in particular, has replaced many
traditional institutions, like the family, the local community,
church and class, as the defining collectivity of people’s identity.
Hence, a first interpretation of individualization is that it refers to
a process of “detraditionalization”: the gradual loss of adherence
of individuals to traditional institutions. Beck and Beck-Gerns-
heim argue that “the post-war development of the welfare state
brought with it a social impetus toward individualization of un-
precedented scale and dynamism. […] a break in historical conti-
nuity released people from traditional class ties and family sup-
ports and increasingly threw them onto their own resources and
their individual fate” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 30). This
does not mean that the traditional institutions vanish into thin air,
but they lose their strong hold on the individual. They still live on,
but more or less like “zombie categories” (Beck & Beck-Gerns-
heim 2002: 27). About the nuclear family, Beck contends: “To be
sure, families are still to be found, but the nuclear family has be-
come an ever more rare institution” (Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994:
8).
A second implication of individualization that can be derived
from the writings of these authors is emancipation, i.e. a declining
influence of social groups and institutions on individual attitudes
and behavior, resulting in a greater freedom of choice. Beck and
Beck-Gernsheim state this quite clearly: “traditional guidelines of-
ten contained severe restrictions or even prohibitions on action
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[…]. By contrast, the institutional pressures in modern Western
society tend rather to be offers of services or incentives to action”
(Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 2, 3). Further on they say: “Indi-
vidualization liberates people from traditional roles and con-
straints” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 203). Giddens argues:
“The self is not a passive entity, determined by external influences;
in forging their self-identities […] individuals contribute to and di-
rectly promote social influences that are global in their conse-
quences and implications” (Giddens 1991: 2).
A third implication of individualization is heterogenization, i.e.
increasing heterogeneity. If people no longer appeal to traditional
institutions for guidelines for their conduct and increasingly
make their own choices, they will most likely make different
choices. In Beck’s words, “standard biographies become elective
biographies, ‘do-it-yourself biographies’, risk biographies, broken
or broken-down biographies” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 24).
This means “the end of fixed, predefined images of man. The hu-
man being becomes […] a choice among possibilities, homo optio-
nis” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 5). If the standard biography
is replaced by an elective biography, as Beck puts it, then one
would hardly expect these biographies to become more alike.
The account of individualization by Beck, Giddens and Bauman
is certainly not the only conceivable one. There are, for instance,
interesting similarities and contrasts between the approach of
these authors and the discussion of the succession of social char-
acters by David Riesman in his 1950 book, The Lonely Crowd. The
individualized person of Beck and Giddens shares some charac-
teristics with Riesman’s “other-directed” person, who is free to
make his own decisions, independent of his family or social back-
ground. As Riesman stated: “The family is no longer a closely knit
unit to which he belongs but merely a part of a wider social envir-
onment to which he early becomes attentive” (Riesman 1950: 26).
However, the other-directed person is acutely aware of the need of
consent by others. They conform strictly to the expectations and
preferences of their peer-group. So, although Riesman would
probably agree with the first interpretation of individualization,
namely detraditionalization, he would have more doubts about
emancipation and heterogenization. Freedom of choice will not
necessarily result in people making different choices. It is there-
fore not self-evident that people’s behavior will become more het-
erogeneous and less predictable.
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4.2 Methodology: how to test for individualization?
In order to determine whether there is a process of individualiza-
tion going on, we have to look for empirical evidence for the three
implications of individualization discussed in the preceding sec-
tion. In this section, we present the indicators that we constructed
to perform this empirical test.
Since detraditionalization means that people’s ties with tradi-
tional institutions are loosening or even disappearing, an obvious
indicator is the membership of traditional institutions. Naturally,
we have to confine ourselves to the membership of institutions for
which data are available. Consequently, we focus on the member-
ship of the nuclear family, of churches, of trade unions and of
political parties. Although these institutions only constitute part
of the numerous traditional institutions that might be subject to a
process of detraditionalization, they are perhaps the most typical
examples of these institutions and are often mentioned in discus-
sions of individualization.
It is harder to find a suitable indicator for emancipation.
Although it may seem clear what increasing freedom of choice
means, it is far from evident how it should be measured. Simply
counting the number of options available to people does not seem
to be a feasible option, so we follow a different course. We do not
look at the input of freedom of choice but at the outcome, by mea-
suring to what extent the attitudes of individual people are deter-
mined by their objective characteristics. To be more precise, in-
creasing freedom of choice or emancipation is supposed to mean
that people’s attitudes will be progressively less predictable by ob-
jective personal characteristics like gender, age, and educational
attainment. Hence, as our measure of freedom of choice we use
the proportion of explained variance (R2 for short) of regression
analyses of various attitudes. The smaller the explained variance
in a particular country is, i.e. the less predictable the attitudes of
the population are, the more its people are emancipated. If the
proportion of explained variance shows a downward trend, this
indicates that freedom of choice is growing and people are becom-
ing more emancipated over time.
In constructing an indicator for heterogeneity of attitudes, we
start from the logical assumption that maximum homogeneity –
or minimum heterogeneity – would mean that all members of a
population share the same opinion. An obvious indicator for het-
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erogeneity then is the dispersal of opinions, as measured by a con-
ventional statistic. We will use the coefficient of variation – i.e. the
standard deviation divided by the mean – as an indicator for the
heterogeneity of opinions among the population.
We use the second and fourth wave of the European Values
Study (EVS) and the World Values Study (WVS) to assess the ex-
tent of individualization in a number of countries at two points in
time. The fourth wave is the most recent one and covers the years
1999-2004. The second wave covers the years 1989-1993. Thus,
on average, we can trace the evolution of individualization over a
period of ten years. Unfortunately, this is rather short to find clear
signs of a long-term trend of individualization, which may take
decades to evolve fully. However, the first wave of the EVS and
WVS, which dates from 1981-1984, includes too few variables that
are identical to those in the consecutive waves to make a useful
comparison.
To measure detraditionalization we use the questions in EVS/
WVS regarding the marital status of the respondent and whether
they have children, and whether they belong to a religious organi-
zation, a labor union or a professional organization, and a political
party. Being married and having children or being a child that is
living with its parent(s) is interpreted as belonging to a traditional
nuclear family. If one is married but has no children, this is only
counted as “half” a membership. The total number of member-
ships is subtracted from four to get an overall indicator for detra-
ditionalization, which thus ranges from zero (minimum detradi-
tionalization) to four (maximum detraditionalization). The
detraditionalization score for a particular country is calculated as
the average of this indicator for all respondents in that country.
To construct an indicator for heterogenization, the standard de-
viation of fourteen attitudes is calculated. These attitudes refer to:
– Self positioning on a political scale from left to right.2
– Preferences with respect to income equality, private versus state
ownership of business, government versus individual responsi-
bility, the obligation to accept a job for the unemployed,
whether competition is good or harmful, and whether firms
should have more or less freedom.3
– The rating one gives to the political system for governing the
country and the rating for the political system as it was before.4
– The justifiability of cheating the government (by evading taxes
or claiming benefits unjustly), of individual liberty rights (for
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homosexuals, free abortion, divorce, and suicide) and of im-
proper road behavior (joyriding, using alcohol while driving,
throwing litter on the street, exceeding the maximum speed).5
Emancipation is measured as one minus the average explained
variance (R2) of a number of linear regression analyses with the
above-mentioned questions as dependent variables and sex, age,
marital status, family situation, educational level, income category,
social class, labor market position and town size as independent
variables. This indicator thus measures the average proportion of
the variance of opinions of individuals that cannot be explained by
their objective personal characteristics.
4.3 Is there a process of individualization going on?
Before analyzing the trends in individualization, we first describe
the state of individualization in 25 industrialized countries around
the year 2000. Table 4.1 shows the scores of these countries on
the three indicators of individualization (see the Appendix for
more detailed information). The higher the scores, the more indi-
vidualized the people of a country are. The correlation coefficients
at the bottom of the table show that the three dimensions of indi-
vidualization are positively correlated, though the correlations are
rather small. This confirms that the three interpretations of indi-
vidualization are indeed separate dimensions, which are not sim-
ply interchangeable.
Although it is rather arbitrary to fix a threshold above which a
country may be called individualized, the figures in Table 4.1 seem
to point to quite a high degree of individualization. An average
score of almost three on the indicator for detraditionalization
means that on average a citizen of these countries is a member of
only one of the four traditional institutions (family, religious orga-
nization, labor or professional union, and political party) that con-
stitute this measure. Only Icelanders and Swedes belong, on aver-
age, to two institutions. The Britons, French and Portuguese have,
on average, the smallest number of memberships.
An average score of two on heterogenization means that the
average coefficient of variation of the set of opinions used is rather
large, pointing to a lot of disagreement among the population.
The Polish, Turkish and Slovakian people disagree most with
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Table 4.1 Scores on three interpretations of individualization, c. 2000
Scores Ranking
detraditionalization hetero-
geneity
emanci-
pation
detraditionalization hetero-
geneity
emanci-
pation
average
Austria 2.64 1.88 0.928 22 24 20 22.0
Belgium 2.94 2.02 0.935 12 12 16 13.3
Canada 2.82 1.96 0.948 16 15 8 13.0
Czech Republic 3.01 2.26 0.927 9 4 21 11.3
Denmark 2.67 1.94 0.941 19 19 13 17.0
Finland 2.65 1.95 0.922 21 17 25 21.0
France 3.25 2.09 0.953 2 5 3 3.3
Germany 3.15 2.04 0.935 4 11 17 10.7
Greece 2.91 2.09 0.952 13 6 4 7.7
Hungary 3.02 2.08 0.949 8 7 7 7.3
Iceland 1.83 1.90 0.934 25 21 18 21.3
Ireland 2.90 1.95 0.933 14 18 19 17.0
Italy 2.75 2.07 0.939 18 8 14 13.3
Japan 2.94 1.88 0.948 11 22 9 14.0
Republic of Korea 2.90 2.06 0.952 15 9 5 9.7
Luxembourg 3.00 1.96 0.954 10 16 2 9.3
Netherlands 2.66 1.65 0.927 20 25 23 22.7
Poland 3.08 2.37 0.927 7 1 22 10.0
Portugal 3.17 2.06 0.968 3 10 1 4.7
Slovakia 2.76 2.31 0.944 17 3 11 10.3
Spain 3.10 1.99 0.943 6 14 12 10.7
Sweden 2.02 1.91 0.944 24 20 10 18.0
Turkey 3.10 2.35 0.938 5 2 15 7.3
United Kingdom 3.30 1.88 0.926 1 23 24 16.0
United States of America 2.31 2.02 0.950 23 13 6 14.0
average 2.83 2.03 0.941
Correlation coefficients:
detraditionalization 1 0.35 0.13
heterogeneity 1 0.11
Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors
each other. The Dutch, Austrians and Britons share the same
views relatively often. However, the differences between the coun-
tries with respect to heterogeneity are rather small.
Finally, an average score of 0.94 on emancipation means that,
on average, 94 percent of the variance of the opinions of individ-
uals cannot be explained by their objective characteristics. This
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points to a large freedom of choice with respect to one’s opinion,
independent of the social group one belongs to. The opinions of
the people of Portugal, Luxembourg and France are the least pre-
dictable; the Finnish, British and Dutch people are somewhat
more predictable.
If one looks at the ranking of the various countries on the three
indicators of individualization in the right-hand panel of Table 4.1,
there are only a few countries that score consistently high or low
on all indicators. Somewhat unexpectedly, the French and the Por-
tuguese turn out to be, on average, the most individualized, close-
ly followed by the Greeks and the Turks. The Dutch, Austrians,
Icelanders and Finns appear to be the least individualized.
Actually, the term individualization does not refer to a situation,
but to a process. To determine whether there really is a process of
individualization going on, one has to analyze the evolution of the
scores on detraditionalization, heterogeneity and emancipation. If
there is indeed a trend of individualization, the average scores
should rise over time.
Table 4.2 shows the changes in the average scores between the
second and the fourth wave of the EVS/WVS. Roughly, these
changes represent the individualization trend during the 1990s.
At the bottom of the table, the average of the changes of detraditio-
nalization, heterogeneity and emancipation is shown. Contrary to
expectations, both detraditionalization and heterogeneity have, on
average, decreased during the 1990s. In only a quarter of the coun-
tries did the average number of memberships drop (i.e. the detra-
ditionalization score rose), the most pronounced drop being in the
United Kingdom. The strongest increase in membership rates oc-
curred in Sweden, the United States and Finland. This was mainly
due to an increase in the membership of religious organizations.
Remarkably, in all 25 countries considered, the heterogeneity of
opinions decreased, meaning that around the year 2000, people
more often agreed on a number of opinions than around the year
1990. The strongest decrease in heterogeneity (or increase in
homogeneity) occurred in Korea and Turkey.
The trend with respect to emancipation is less clear. Although
the average unpredictability (i.e. unexplained variance) of people’s
opinions grew slightly, in only one in three countries was there an
increasing trend of emancipation, most notably in Korea and Fin-
land. In fact, in more than half of the countries, people’s opinions
became more predictable during the 1990s.
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Table 4.2 Change of scores on individualization between c. 1990
and c. 2000
detraditionalization heterogeneity emancipation
Austria -0.07 -0.13 -0.008
Belgium 0.00 -0.21 -0.004
Canada 0.07 -0.08 0.008
Czech Republic -0.02 -0.06 0.021
Denmark -0.07 -0.21 0.002
Finland -0.31 -0.14 0.030
France 0.07 -0.09 0.011
Germany 0.12 -0.15 -0.001
Greece 0.00 -0.15 0.000
Hungary -0.11 -0.15 0.002
Iceland -0.23 -0.18 -0.001
Ireland 0.04 -0.24 -0.009
Italy -0.19 -0.23 -0.006
Japan -0.07 -0.08 -0.002
Republic of Korea -0.23 -0.43 0.035
Luxembourg 0.00 -0.06 -0.008
Netherlands -0.01 -0.17 -0.009
Poland -0.08 -0.11 -0.007
Portugal 0.10 -0.19 -0.005
Slovakia -0.16 -0.05 -0.003
Spain 0.04 -0.26 0.000
Sweden -0.64 -0.19 0.015
Turkey 0.00 -0.37 -0.005
United Kingdom 0.20 -0.21 -0.013
United States of America -0.33 -0.06 0.004
Average -0.08 -0.17 0.002
% of increases 28 0 36
correlation coefficients:
detraditionalization 1 0.03 -0.47
heterogeneity 1 -0.13
Source: EVS/WVS (1989-1993) and EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors
In short, there is hardly any evidence for a trend of individualiza-
tion during the 1990s. Contrary to expectations, in most countries
membership rates of traditional organizations went up, and the
people became more united with respect to a number of opinions.
There was, thus, no general trend of detraditionalization and het-
erogenization. Moreover, in over half of the countries, individual
opinions became more predictable, contradicting the expectation
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of an emancipation process, although on average, all countries
considered, unpredictability increased slightly.
4.4 Conclusion
The empirical analysis of this chapter leaves us somewhat
puzzled. Although, both in the popular media and in the scientific
literature, individualization is often mentioned as one of the main
social trends of the past decades, we did not succeed in establish-
ing this claim empirically. First, we observed that the existing
scholarly literature on individualization is rather vague and pro-
vides little basis for examining this phenomenon empirically. Sec-
ond, after we constructed three indicators for individualization
which, in our opinion, come as close as possible to the tenor of
the theoretical literature, we did not find any proof of an individu-
alization trend in 25 developed countries.
There are four possible explanations for this unexpected result.
The first is that the indicators we constructed are not adequate to
measure individualization. The obvious question is then, of
course, what would be better indicators. Since the best-known
authors on individualization did not provide us with a clue of how
to measure it, we do not know what would be better measures of
individualization.
Second, the time period we examined, viz. the 1990s, might be
too short to be able to detect the individualization process.
Although we agree that a period of ten years is rather short to
measure a gradual process such as individualization, we neverthe-
less found considerable evidence for the opposite trend of indi-
vidualization, which we might perhaps call collectivization. Else-
where, we carried out a more detailed analysis for one particular
country, the Netherlands, covering a much longer period of time
(ranging from 20 to 50 years) and also found little evidence for an
individualization trend, with the exception of detraditionalization
(De Beer 2007).
Third, the data we analyzed might be unreliable.6 The fact that
we, rather unexpectedly, found the highest levels of individualiza-
tion for countries such as Turkey and Portugal might be caused by
the unreliability of the data for these countries. If the data contain
a lot of random noise, e.g. due to measurement error, this may
inflate the heterogeneity of responses and reduce the explained
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variance. The overall fall of heterogeneity during the 1990s might
then be due to the fact that the fourth wave of the EVS and the
WVS was conducted more accurately and meticulously than the
second wave. Since we do not have independent information on
the accuracy of the various country surveys, we are not able to
judge the plausibility of this explanation.
Finally, our results might, of course, also be caused by the fact
that there simply is no unambiguous trend of individualization.
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, this conclusion
would not rule out the possibility that most people consider them-
selves to be individualized or believe that they have more freedom
of choice and are less influenced by social conditions than before.
But as is well-known, people’s perceptions of their own motives
and behavior might substantially deviate from what scientists find
if they examine their behavior more closely.
To conclude, the fact that we did not find evidence for a trend of
individualization during the 1990s in our sample of 25 countries
does not necessarily imply that the whole idea of an individualiza-
tion trend is a concoction. Perhaps there would be clearer signs of
individualization if we could survey a much longer time period,
for example the whole twentieth century. Perhaps we are just at
the beginning of a process of individualization which will mani-
fest itself fully in the decades to come. And perhaps individualiza-
tion reveals itself in other phenomena than those we were able to
test empirically. So, our conclusion is not that individualization is
a chimera, but we do want to stress that it is a much less under-
stood and much more ambiguous phenomenon than is generally
thought.
Notes
1. Sections 1 and 2 of this chapter are based on De Beer (2007).
2. The question runs as follows:
In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. How would you
place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (1) Left … (10) Right.
3. The following questions were used:
How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree comple-
tely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the
statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you
can choose any number in between.
– (1) Incomes should be made more equal … (10) We need larger income
differences as incentives for individual effort
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– (1) Private ownership of business and industry should be increased …
(10) Government ownership of business and industry should be in-
creased
– (1) The state should give more freedom to firms … (10) The state should
control firms more effectively
– (1) The government should take more responsibility to ensure that every-
one is provided for … (10) People should take more responsibility to pro-
vide for themselves
– (1) People who are unemployed should have to take any job available or
lose their unemployment benefits … (10) People who are unemployed
should have the right to refuse a job they do not want
– (1) Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop
new ideas ... (10) Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in peo-
ple
4. The next two questions were used:
People have different views about the system for governing this country.
Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: 1 means very bad; 10
means very good.
Where on this scale would you put the political system as it was [some spe-
cific moment in the past].
5. The following questions were used:
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can
always be justified (10), never be justified (1), or something in between:
– Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled
– Cheating on taxes if you have a chance
– Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties
– Homosexuality
– Abortion
– Divorce
– Euthanasia - ending the life of the incurably sick
– Suicide
– Throwing away litter in a public place
– Driving under the influence of alcohol
– Taking away and driving a car belonging to someone else (joyriding)
– Speeding over the limit in built-up areas
6. We would like to thank Mark Elchardus for drawing our attention to this
explanation.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
Table A1 Data for detraditionalization and emancipation
Detraditionalization
membership of
traditional
family
religious
organization
labor
union
professional
organization
political
party
score
Austria 0.75 0.25 0.19 0.08 0.12 2.64
Belgium 0.65 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.07 2.94
Canada 0.56 0.30 0.13 0.16 0.06 2.82
Czech Republic 0.72 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.04 3.01
Denmark 0.57 0.12 0.54 0.11 0.07 2.67
Finland 0.47 0.46 0.34 0.06 0.06 2.65
France 0.62 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 3.25
Germany 0.59 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.03 3.15
Greece 0.75 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.08 2.91
Hungary 0.73 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.02 3.02
Iceland 0.60 0.71 0.60 0.19 0.19 1.83
Ireland 0.72 0.19 0.10 0.08 0.04 2.90
Italy 0.79 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.04 2.94
Japan 0.86 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.03 2.90
Rep. of Korea 0.67 0.42 0.06 0.09 0.03 2.75
Luxembourg 0.71 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.05 3.00
Netherlands 0.55 0.34 0.24 0.17 0.09 2.66
Poland 0.74 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.01 3.08
Portugal 0.71 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 3.17
Slovakia 0.81 0.17 0.16 0.05 0.07 2.76
Spain 0.76 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 3.10
Sweden 0.51 0.71 0.62 0.15 0.10 2.02
Turkey 0.88 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 3.10
United Kingdom 0.55 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.03 3.30
United States 0.58 0.58 0.13 0.27 0.19 2.31
Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors
66
Table A1 Data for detraditionalization and emancipation (continued)
Emancipation
average R2 of regression analyses with as dependent variable:
Self
positioning
in political
scale
Income
equality
Private
vs state
ownership
of business
Government
responsibility
Job taking
of the
unemployed
Competition
good or
harmful
Firms
and
freedom
Rate
political
system for
governing
country
Austria 0.024 0.113 0.025 0.026 0.094 0.012 0.056 0.036
Belgium 0.047 0.031 0.060 0.064 0.036 0.049 0.065
Canada 0.038 0.028 0.041 0.036 0.036
Czech Republic 0.063 0.109 0.093 0.077 0.043 0.028 0.074 0.020
Denmark 0.079 0.029 0.047 0.060 0.079 0.008
Finland 0.056 0.080 0.046 0.048 0.062 0.010 0.041 0.047
France 0.021 0.021 0.026 0.023 0.072 0.018 0.032 0.054
Germany 0.056 0.072 0.053 0.084 0.040 0.038 0.026
Greece 0.026 0.035 0.008 0.042 0.015 0.040
Hungary 0.015 0.040 0.072 0.013 0.048 0.040
Iceland 0.053 0.043 0.048 0.023 0.016 0.039 0.036 0.048
Ireland 0.027 0.053 0.051 0.080 0.112 0.032 0.007 0.035
Italy 0.027 0.050 0.038 0.045 0.053 0.020 0.046 0.020
Japan 0.035 0.061 0.043 0.050 0.022
Rep. of Korea 0.064 0.022 0.040 0.010 0.002
Luxembourg 0.020 0.020 0.000 0.021 0.034 0.040 0.022 0.021
Netherlands 0.080 0.059 0.062 0.023 0.061 0.028 0.033 0.045
Poland 0.008 0.127 0.097 0.039 0.042 0.013 0.057 0.067
Portugal 0.042 0.036 0.009 0.053 0.039 0.003 0.023
Slovakia 0.029 0.000 0.047 0.076 0.029 0.083 0.017
Spain 0.071 0.010 0.031 0.034 0.074 0.011 0.033 0.032
Sweden 0.089 0.023 0.047 0.035 0.057 0.039
Turkey 0.068 0.031 0.046 0.052 0.056 0.011 0.027
United Kingdom 0.054 0.041 0.040 0.057 0.074 0.031 0.014 0.065
United States 0.013 0.027 0.046 0.043 0.060
Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors
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Table A1 Data for detraditionalization and emancipation
(continued)
Emancipation
average R2 of regression analyses with as dependent variable:
justifiability of
cheating
government
(taxes, benefits)
justifiability of
individual
liberties
(homo,
abortion,
divorce,
suicide)
justifiability
of road behavior
(joyriding,
alcohol,
litter,
speed)
average
Austria 0.087 0.229 0.094 0.072
Belgium 0.083 0.136 0.090 0.065
Canada 0.055 0.147 0.052
Czech Republic 0.062 0.129 0.100 0.073
Denmark 0.030 0.149 0.063 0.059
Finland 0.097 0.189 0.184 0.078
France 0.087 0.093 0.070 0.047
Germany 0.078 0.166 0.051 0.065
Greece 0.043 0.156 0.059 0.048
Hungary 0.086 0.080 0.065 0.051
Iceland 0.073 0.150 0.196 0.066
Ireland 0.062 0.239 0.041 0.067
Italy 0.089 0.185 0.104 0.061
Japan 0.012 0.125 0.052
Rep. of Korea 0.121 0.048
Luxembourg 0.060 0.113 0.107 0.046
Netherlands 0.102 0.206 0.107 0.073
Poland 0.075 0.206 0.068 0.073
Portugal 0.032 0.035 0.033 0.032
Slovakia 0.054 0.119 0.063 0.056
Spain 0.055 0.218 0.057 0.057
Sweden 0.035 0.117 0.076 0.056
Turkey 0.021 0.285 0.023 0.062
United Kingdom 0.158 0.176 0.102 0.074
United States 0.072 0.066 0.050
Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors
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Table A2 Data for heterogenization
standard deviation of opinions with respect to
Left-right Socio-economic issues
Self
positioning
in political
scale
Income
equality
Private
vs state
ownership
of business
Government
responsibility
Job
taking
of the
unem-
ployed
Competition
good or
harmful
Firms
and
freedom
sub-
average
Austria 1.65 2.57 2.10 2.57 2.62 2.01 2.56 2.41
Belgium 1.87 2.92 2.73 2.83 2.60 2.82 2.70
Canada 1.78 2.66 2.21 2.56 2.36 2.50
Czech Republic 2.34 2.78 2.54 2.57 2.68 2.20 2.69 2.58
Denmark 2.01 2.15 2.74 2.24 2.41 2.43
Finland 2.09 2.58 2.09 2.46 2.65 2.23 2.29 2.38
France 2.17 2.98 2.22 2.51 2.93 2.70 2.88 2.70
Germany 1.83 2.28 2.70 2.74 2.18 2.76 2.56
Greece 2.12 2.58 2.69 2.53 2.62 2.57
Hungary 1.74 2.84 2.90 2.55 2.81 2.69
Iceland 2.18 2.85 2.12 2.64 2.81 1.85 2.12 2.40
Ireland 1.67 2.75 2.28 2.54 2.67 2.29 2.48 2.50
Italy 2.20 2.73 2.21 2.67 2.43 2.49 2.78 2.55
Japan 1.89 2.20 1.85 2.59 2.07 2.32
Rep. of Korea 2.22 2.75 2.39 2.27 2.24 2.48
Luxembourg 1.76 2.61 2.47 2.63 2.48 2.49 2.54
Netherlands 1.74 2.03 1.86 2.11 2.25 2.04 2.04 2.06
Poland 2.29 3.18 2.83 2.62 2.94 2.76 3.01 2.89
Portugal 2.19 2.36 2.73 2.61 2.66 2.67 2.62
Slovakia 2.03 2.61 2.75 2.23 2.58 2.53
Spain 1.94 2.86 2.49 2.50 2.43 2.35 2.38 2.50
Sweden 2.09 2.22 2.38 1.92 2.11 2.28
Turkey 2.55 3.25 3.30 3.27 3.09 3.19 3.22
United Kingdom 1.65 2.55 2.19 2.39 2.62 2.15 2.21 2.35
United States 1.96 2.57 2.24 2.70 2.40 2.52
Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors
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Table A2 Data for heterogenization (continued)
standard deviation of opinions with respect to
Political system Justification of transgressions total score
Rate
political
system for
governing
country
Rate
political
system
as it was
before
sub-
average
cheating
government
(taxes,
benefits)
individual
liberties
(homo,
abortion,
divorce,
suicide)
road
behavior
(joyriding,
alcohol,
litter,
speed)
sub-
average
average
of
sub
averages
Austria 1.89 1.92 1.90 1.34 2.40 0.92 1.55 1.88
Belgium 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.64 2.16 0.92 1.57 2.02
Canada 2.05 1.96 1.49 2.20 1.60 1.96
Czech Republic 1.80 2.41 2.11 1.67 2.93 1.49 2.03 2.26
Denmark 2.02 2.10 2.06 0.86 2.24 0.72 1.27 1.94
Finland 1.79 1.89 1.84 1.36 2.09 1.03 1.49 1.95
France 1.82 1.75 1.79 1.79 2.10 1.17 1.69 2.09
Germany 2.05 2.38 2.22 1.44 2.21 0.98 1.54 2.04
Greece 2.00 2.01 2.00 1.61 2.05 1.27 1.64 2.09
Hungary 1.88 2.32 2.10 1.93 2.39 1.10 1.80 2.08
Iceland 1.72 1.63 1.68 1.08 1.81 1.11 1.33 1.90
Ireland 2.10 2.29 2.19 1.27 2.07 0.91 1.42 1.95
Italy 1.89 2.26 2.07 1.29 2.09 1.00 1.46 2.07
Japan 1.89 1.88 1.27 1.93 1.44 1.88
Rep. of Korea 1.94 1.91 1.26 2.56 1.65 2.06
Luxembourg 1.79 1.77 1.78 1.65 2.32 1.33 1.77 1.96
Netherlands 1.41 1.40 1.41 1.17 2.20 0.82 1.40 1.65
Poland 1.91 2.68 2.30 1.80 2.84 1.30 1.98 2.37
Portugal 1.75 1.87 1.81 1.54 1.90 1.43 1.62 2.06
Slovakia 1.85 2.53 2.19 2.18 3.00 2.25 2.48 2.31
Spain 1.90 1.85 1.88 1.41 2.46 1.05 1.64 1.99
Sweden 1.95 1.84 1.90 1.27 1.90 1.02 1.40 1.91
Turkey 2.03 2.82 2.43 0.82 2.17 0.60 1.20 2.35
United Kingdom 1.77 2.07 1.92 1.45 2.17 1.16 1.59 1.88
United States 2.12 2.00 1.50 2.13 1.59 2.02
Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors
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5 Independent yet solidary
The impact of individualization on
solidarity
Complaints about the erosion of social solidarity often go hand in
hand with a simple explanation. Declining solidarity is allegedly
caused by the process of individualization and, thus, progresses
with each new generation. At face value, it is obvious that indi-
vidualization is related to the erosion of solidarity. As social soli-
darity refers to mutual bonds and commitment, individualization
points to the loosening of the ties between the individual and so-
ciety. Thus considered, individualization and erosion of solidarity
are two sides of the same coin: individualization undermines soli-
darity, and restoring solidarity is only possible by turning the indi-
vidualization process back. If one thinks of individualization as an
autonomous trend, one cannot but be pessimistic about the future
of solidarity. Since the younger generations are more strongly in-
dividualized than older generations, the replacement of the older
by the younger generations will inevitably erode solidarity even
more. If it is true that social solidarity is the foundation of the
welfare state, it will be increasingly difficult to sustain the welfare
state in the long run.
As much as this way of reasoning might seem intuitively ap-
pealing, it is based on a number of tacit but rather dubious as-
sumptions. We should examine this reasoning thoroughly – both
theoretically and empirically – before drawing any definite conclu-
sions on the impact of individualization on social solidarity and
the sustainability of the welfare state. Moreover, in the former
chapter we concluded that there is no unambiguous trend of indi-
vidualization. Indeed, the trends of detraditionalization, emanci-
pation and heterogenization during the 1990s in a sample of 25
wealthy countries point to a process of collectivization rather than
individualization. Thus, even if individualization hurts solidarity,
this does not mean that solidarity will inevitably crumble in the
future.
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One might even wonder whether there is much sense in scruti-
nizing the effects of individualization on solidarity if there is no
clear trend of individualization to start with. Nevertheless, we be-
lieve that it is important to analyze the relationship between indi-
vidualization and solidarity more closely. First of all, we have some
reservations about our conclusions in Chapter 4. Since our analy-
sis covered a period of only one decade and since the comparabil-
ity of the data from the second and fourth wave of the EVS and
WVS is not beyond doubt, our findings might not be very robust.
Secondly, it is possible that our results for the 1990s cannot be
extrapolated to the future. Even if there was no process of indi-
vidualization going on during the 1990s, this does not exclude
the possibility that there will be such a process in the future.
Thirdly, we are not only interested in trends of individualization,
but also in differences in the extent of individualization between
countries. In Chapter 4 we found considerable variation in the ex-
tent of detraditionalization, emancipation and heterogenization
among the 25 countries we studied. Thus, an important question
is whether differences in solidarity between countries, as analyzed
in Chapter 2, are related to – and perhaps caused by – differences
in the extent of individualization. If this turns out to be true, it
would offer us valuable insight into the factors that explain the
variety in solidarity and the support for the welfare state among
wealthy countries, irrespective of any trend of individualization.
Finally, it is also of interest to look at the relationship between
individualization and solidarity at the individual level, as we will
do in this chapter. If those persons that are most strongly indivi-
dualized turn out to be the least willing to show solidarity, this
would inform us about the kind of persons one would have to ad-
dress in trying to strengthen support for solidarity and the welfare
state. So, overall we think it is important to study the relationship
between individualization and solidarity as such, irrespective of
the actual trends of individualization and solidarity.
This chapter first surveys the theoretical sociological literature
on the relationship between individualization and social solidarity
(Section 5.1). Next, we explain how we intend to examine this rela-
tionship empirically (Section 5.2). Section 5.3 presents the results
of an empirical analysis of the relationship between individualiza-
tion and solidarity at the country level in 25 industrialized coun-
tries. In Section 5.4 we analyze individual-level data on individual-
ization simultaneously with country-level data in a multilevel
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analysis. In Section 5.5 we conclude that there is no straightfor-
ward relationship between individualization and solidarity. The
most robust result is that detraditionalization and volunteering
are negatively correlated.
5.1 Sociological theory and the relationship between
individualization and solidarity
In Chapters 2 and 4 we explained that the terms solidarity and
individualization have various meanings. With respect to solidar-
ity, for example, one-sided solidarity should be distinguished from
two-sided solidarity and voluntary solidarity from compulsory soli-
darity. Individualization can be interpreted as either detraditiona-
lization, emancipation or heterogenization. From the start, it is
not very likely that there is one simple causal relationship between
each pair of possible combinations of individualization and soli-
darity. This section examines which kinds of relationships can be
expected from a theoretical perspective. We start with a short over-
view of the sociological literature on the foundations of solidarity.
5.1.1 Mechanisms of solidarity
The distinguishing feature of solidarity is that someone is willing
to help someone else without getting something immediately in
return. This does not rule out the possibility that one expects a
return in the long term, but one cannot be sure of that. Solidarity
thus presupposes a bond with the other person or with society at
large. This does not need to be a personal bond between the per-
sons involved. A person can show solidarity with completely un-
known persons, provided that they consider them to be in some
sense equal, i.e. as a member of the same community with whom
one shares, to some extent, the same fate. An important question
is, then, which conditions foster the rise of solidarity. In the socio-
logical literature roughly two opposing explanations can be found
for the existence of solidarity, viz. a normative and an individualis-
tic explanation.
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A normative explanation of solidarity: community spirit
The normative explanation of solidarity starts from the assump-
tion that people act in accordance with the prevailing norms in
their community. This presupposes a strong community spirit
which does not primarily emanate from a common interest, but
from emotional ties. These ties can have two sources – using the
terms of Sen (1977/1982) – sympathy and commitment. Sympa-
thy means that one feels better or happier if someone else is doing
well. The solidarity which sympathy gives rise to, can be consid-
ered as self-interest to a certain extent. Commitment, however,
means that one feels the moral duty to support someone else, irre-
spective of whether this makes oneself happier.
According to Durkheim (1893/1997) commitment – or me-
chanical solidarity, as he names it – is a characteristic feature of
traditional communities, in which people have a fixed position,
determined by birth, tradition and coercive group norms. Solidar-
ity is then a natural moral duty, which has been taken in, so to say,
with the mother’s milk. Durkheim argued that this kind of solidar-
ity dwindled because of the modernization of society and the ad-
vancement of the division of labor. However, a hundred years later
there are still many instances of communities in which the mem-
bers share a strong mutual bond. Some, widely diverging, exam-
ples are the nuclear family, the residents of a neighborhood, the
supporters of a football club, the fellow workers of a company, the
members of an ethnic or a religious group, and the citizens of a
nation. A common characteristic of these communities is the
sharing of a common goal. There is no reason to believe that these
communities are disappearing in modern society, although they
may be less dominant than in the past.
Generally speaking, three factors underlie this community spir-
it, namely affection, tradition and identification. Affection is
usually the main source of informal solidarity between those who
have an intimate relationship: spouses, parents and children, and
other relatives. Tradition is an important source of solidarity if the
sense of belonging to a particular community and the obligation
of solidarity are passed on from one generation to the next. How-
ever, traditional communities, whether a village, a religious com-
munion or a social class, are gradually losing their naturalness
and strength. What might be called “heavy communities” increas-
ingly give way to “light communities”, the membership of which
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is not given by tradition but is a matter of personal choice (Duy-
vendak & Hurenkamp 2004).
The third factor, identification, is probably the most important
source of contemporary forms of formal, one-sided solidarity. It is
not obvious, however, under which conditions people identify suf-
ficiently strongly with someone else to be willing to act one-
sidedly. Experience shows that people sometimes identify with
the victims of a natural disaster in a faraway country, after watch-
ing a television coverage, but at the same time do not identify with
a beggar in the street or with a long-term unemployed person
from a minority group in their own country. These examples sug-
gest that the possibility for identification is not innate, but is
strongly influenced by the media and by opinion makers. Thus,
the conditions for sustaining one-sided solidarity can, to some ex-
tent, be deliberately created, but can also be undermined.
An individualistic explanation of solidarity: enlightened self-interest
The individualistic explanation of solidarity assumes that people
are rational actors that further their self-interest. This perspective
explains solidarity from the fact that showing solidarity not only
involves costs, but may also yield a positive return. This is the
case with two-sided solidarity, which is based on the expectation
that one’s own contribution is balanced by an equivalent future
contribution of someone else. Two examples are mutual help
among friends and insurance schemes.
Two-sided solidarity based on enlightened self-interest requires
that three conditions are met: mutual dependence, limited infor-
mation and trust. First, two-sided solidarity presupposes the
awareness of a certain extent of mutual dependence. According to
Durkheim, this mutual dependence is the result of the division of
labor in modern society. This causes a strong sense of dependence
between the members of society, comparable to the interdepen-
dence between the organs of a body – thence the term ‘organic
solidarity’. Moreover, the division of labor makes it more likely
that people are hurt by different risks at different moments in
time, which increases the opportunities for sharing those risks.
For instance, small farmers in a traditional agrarian society cannot
spread the risk of a bad harvest, since everyone is hit by bad
weather at the same time. Due to the strong differentiation of eco-
nomic activities in modern society, the odds are much smaller that
a large share of the population will be hit by the same calamity
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simultaneously. This makes it possible to pool risks: the fortunate
support the unfortunate.
A second precondition for two-sided solidarity is that one has
sufficient, but not complete information about the risks one runs
and the extent to which others run the same risks. Since two-sided
solidarity is based on a rational calculation of the costs and bene-
fits of pooling risks, one first has to be aware of the existence of
these risks. If one has no knowledge at all about a particular risk –
imagine, for example, a yet-unknown disease or an unpredictable
natural disaster, such as the impact of a comet – there is no point
in pooling this risk with others. On the other hand, if one has al-
most perfect knowledge about who will be struck by a particular
calamity, those who know that they won’t be hurt will have no in-
terest in sharing that risk with others. For example, if genetic
screening makes it possible to predict serious diseases with (al-
most) complete certainty, a voluntary insurance of the costs of
medical treatment of such diseases will be untenable, since only
those bearing the particular genetic endowment will insure them-
selves. Two-sided solidarity is only sustainable if there is a “veil of
ignorance” about the risks of individual people.
A third condition for two-sided solidarity is that there is suffi-
cient confidence between people that the others will fulfill their
commitment and help them when they are hit by a calamity.
Thus, two-sided solidarity requires a minimum level of interper-
sonal trust. Moreover, one also needs to be confident that others
will not abuse the solidarity and only make an appeal on the soli-
darity of others if they are really in need and have first tried to
cope with their adversity themselves.
The embeddedness perspective
The normative and the individualistic explanations of solidarity
are two opposite approaches to the relationship between individ-
uals and society. Whereas the normative approach reflects what
may be named the oversocialized conception of the individual,
the individualistic perspective can be considered an undersocia-
lized conception (Wrong 1961). The undersocialized conception
views people as social atoms that are not part of a social context
and can therefore not be influenced by it. In contrast, the overso-
cialized conception holds that individuals do not have the freedom
to make their own choices since they behave according to their
social role and the social norms associated with it. Both concep-
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tions have been subject to criticism. Social scientists in favor of
the individualistic conception of solidarity have accused those in
the normative camp of being blind to individual freedom of
choice, whereas their opponents have criticized the individualistic
theorists for ignoring the normative and cultural aspects of social
life. Recently, the embeddedness perspective has been put forward
as an alternative to both the undersocialized and the oversocia-
lized conception by regarding individual behavior as being both
supported and constrained by the social context in which it takes
place (Granovetter 1985). The embeddedness perspective is not
simply a combination of the individualistic and the normative ap-
proach. It differs from both in that it uses features of the social
context to explain individual behavior. In accordance with the in-
dividualistic approach, the embeddedness perspective argues that
people balance costs and benefits in decision-making. However, it
does not follow that these costs and benefits are given or fixed, the
assumption is that they differ depending on the social context in
which the decision is being made. As such, people’s behavior may
vary across different social structures. At the same time, the em-
beddedness perspective differs from the normative approach in
that norms for social behavior are assumed not to be given but
influenced by the social context in which individuals interact with
each other. This also implies a shift from social norms as the start-
ing point for the analysis of solidarity to studying social norms as
the result of social interactions.
Several levels of embeddedness can be distinguished. At the
lowest level are the personal relationships between individual peo-
ple. At higher levels these relationships are embedded in networks
and institutional settings. These different kinds of embeddedness
provide opportunities for learning and control, which can help to
develop and sustain solidarity (Raub 1997). Learning means that
individuals receive information about the intentions and beha-
viors of others. Control refers to the possibility of using both posi-
tive and negative sanctions to influence the acts of others. Learn-
ing and control affect solidarity, since positive information
increases people’s trust that others will contribute to the solidarity
as well and control mechanisms decrease the likelihood that
others are able to get away without doing their share. The extent
to which embeddedness influences solidarity is conditional on the
duration and the quality of the relationship between individuals,
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the networks that these relationships are part of, and the institu-
tions in which these networks are embedded.
Temporal embeddedness
Temporal embeddedness refers to the duration of the relationship
between two persons. The length of the relationship is relevant for
understanding solidarity, since people’s behavior in one-off meet-
ings tends to differ from cases in which there have been earlier
encounters and where future interactions between the individuals
are likely to occur. If people have interacted in the past, they have
information about the reliability of one another. The expectation
that the relationship will continue in the future enables sanction-
ing, both positive and negative, of current behavior. Thus, a longer
duration of the relationship does not influence the level of solidar-
ity directly, but offers the conditions for learning and control that
can enhance solidarity.
Homans (1961) focuses on learning through past interactions
in social relations. Within such relationships, behavior is condi-
tioned by rewarding desired behavior and punishing undesirable
behavior. As time passes, people learn to distinguish between suc-
cessful and unsuccessful acts as well as between those they can
and cannot trust. Experiments by Axelrod (1984) showed that fu-
ture encounters enable conditional cooperation, i.e. someone is
willing to show solidarity on the condition that the other person
cooperates. However, if the other person does not comply, the first
one reciprocates by withdrawing their solidarity in the next move.
As experiments show, such a “tit-for-tat” strategy generates posi-
tive results in the longer run.
Network embeddedness
Network embeddedness refers to the fact that people’s relation-
ships are part of a larger system of social relations. Again, these
networks offer opportunities for learning and control. If a relation-
ship is embedded in a network, the intentions and behavior of
another person can be known not only through direct observation,
but also through the experiences of other members of the network
with the same person. People may thus receive information about
each other even before they meet in person. Control through net-
work relations takes the form of gossip, the effects of reputation,
and the development of and compliance with social norms.
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Institutional embeddedness
Institutions comprise formal rules and laws as well as informal
rules, social norms, traditions and regularities that constrain indi-
vidual behavior (North 1990). Formal and informal rules can re-
duce the risks associated with acting out of solidarity, such as op-
portunistic behavior. Although formal and informal rules may
have the same effects, their combined effect might either
strengthen solidarity or adversely affect solidarity by crowding
each other out. The welfare state, including social insurances and
other welfare provisions, is an important example of the institu-
tional settings in which persons interact. Because the provisions
are funded through taxes and mandatory contributions, every citi-
zen of a country is in principle entitled to them. To maintain the
legitimacy of such a system requires mechanisms for monitoring
individual contributions and claims, to make sure that everyone
contributes their fair share and to keep track of persons who
wrongfully claim benefits or provisions.
5.1.2 How does individualization affect solidarity?
In this sub-section we will use the theoretical perspectives on the
foundation of solidarity, set out in the previous sub-section, to for-
mulate a number of hypotheses on the consequences of individu-
alization for solidarity. We take the embeddedness perspective as a
starting point, but assume that, depending on the kind of solidar-
ity at stake, elements of the normative and of the individualistic
perspective are also relevant in explaining the relationship be-
tween individualization and solidarity. Generally speaking, with
one-sided solidarity the emphasis lies more on the normative per-
spective, which presupposes community spirit, whereas with two-
sided solidarity the individualistic perspective, which assumes
that people are self-interested, is the most relevant. In the em-
beddedness perspective the level of embedding of the individual
largely determines the kind of mechanism that brings about soli-
darity. At the lower levels, at which one-to-one relationships and
networks prevail, the emphasis lies on informal, voluntary solidar-
ity, while obligatory solidarity predominates at the highest, formal
level. It is therefore important to keep the distinction between var-
ious levels of embeddedness in mind when analyzing the conse-
quences of individualization.
79
In the previous chapter we distinguished between three inter-
pretations of individualization, detraditionalization, emancipation
and heterogenization. For each of these forms of individualization
we examine which effects on solidarity can be expected. If indi-
vidualization is interpreted as the loosening of ties between indi-
viduals and traditional institutions, such as the family, the neigh-
borhood and the church (detraditionalization), the solidarity with
people in someone’s vicinity can be expected to dwindle. Probably,
people will be less willing to devote time and pay attention to their
families, their neighbors, their parish, etc., especially if it does not
bring them any benefit but is prescribed by social norms (volun-
tary, one-sided solidarity). Instead of this, people might be increas-
ingly concerned about friends or colleagues or join an association
voluntarily. However, as the interactions between the members of
these voluntary networks are probably more occasional and less
enduring than in traditional institutions, this might hinder the
creation of mutual trust. Because the future return of solidaristic
behavior will be less predictable, the willingness to act out of (two-
sided) solidarity might diminish. From a theoretical perspective,
the impact of detraditionalization on two-sided solidarity is thus
ambiguous.
Less enduring ties with traditional, local communities, in tan-
dem with increasing participation in larger networks could also
enhance commitment at a higher level, for instance the national
or even the global community. Examples are the concern with de-
velopment assistance, human rights, the problem of climate
change, and so on. Thus, public support for collective solidarity,
both one-sided and two-sided, at the national or supranational
level might increase.
Individualization in the sense of emancipation means that peo-
ple’s opinions and attitudes are decreasingly determined by the
collectivity to which they belong and become more a choice of
their own. As a consequence, people’s attitudes and behavior will
be less predictable. If one gets in touch with a stranger, it will be
harder to predict their behavior from their social characteristics,
such as age, sex, religion and education. This hinders the develop-
ment of mutual trust. This will primarily harm two-sided solidar-
ity, since one can be less confident that the other will reciprocate
one’s solidarity. However, the willingness to act out of one-sided
solidarity might also decline, because it becomes less clear
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whether the other really needs one’s support and does not simply
shun their own responsibility.
Probably, this decline of solidarity will not be limited to volun-
tary solidarity, but will also manifest itself with respect to compul-
sory solidarity. If anonymous persons claim support from the wel-
fare state, these claims might increasingly be attributed to lack of
willpower and to individual choices rather than to bad luck. One
might also be less confident that others will contribute equally to
the provisions of the welfare state. This negative relationship be-
tween emancipation and solidarity stems from changing expecta-
tions with respect to the behavior of others and thus refers to
emancipation as a macro-phenomenon. Might the emancipation
of the individual also negatively affect their willingness to act out
of solidarity? This is not clear. If people increasingly choose their
own opinions instead of adopting the dominant opinions of their
social group, this might result in either more or less solidaristic
behaviour. If one belongs to a group with traditionally strong soli-
daristic norms, then the odds are that emancipation will make
that person less solidaristic. But if that group did not have particu-
larly strong solidaristic norms in the first place, then emancipa-
tion might even make a person act in a more solidaristic manner.
Thus, we have no particular expectation with respect to the effect
of the individual’s emancipation on their willingness to show soli-
darity.
Finally, individualization can mean that society becomes more
heterogeneous. If the differences between people grow, this can
make it harder for them to identify with each other, and thus the
willingness to consider others as belonging to the same commu-
nity decreases. This might be especially harmful for one-sided so-
lidarity, which rests on a community spirit. In local communities
in which people know each other personally, in particular, solidar-
ity might be damaged. It is easy to imagine how, in a small village
with a homogeneous population, the influx of residents from a big
city increases the heterogeneity of the population and undermines
the local solidarity. However, this might also occur on a larger
scale as the heterogeneity of the population increases and people
no longer recognize their fellow citizens as members of their own
community. Thus, the support for public goods might erode.
However, there is no reason to expect that two-sided solidarity will
be hurt by heterogenization. On the contrary, increasing heteroge-
neity makes it easier to spread risks, because it is less probable
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that many people will be affected by the same calamity at the same
time. It thus becomes more attractive to pool risks through insur-
ances.
The four elements of individualization, combined with four
kinds of solidarity (one-sided voluntary, two-sided voluntary, one-
sided compulsory, and two-sided compulsory solidarity) leave us
with sixteen hypotheses concerning the causal relationship be-
tween individualization and solidarity. Table 5.1 summarizes these
hypotheses. A “+” means that individualization is expected to fos-
ter solidarity, a “–“ sign that individualization harms solidarity and
a “0” that there is no effect or an indeterminate effect.
Table 5.1 Hypotheses concerning the effect of four kinds of indi-
vidualization on four forms of solidarity
solidarity:
individualization:
one-sided,
voluntary
two-sided,
voluntary
one-sided,
compulsory
two-sided,
compulsory
detraditionalization – 0 / + + +
emancipation – macro level – – – –
emancipation – individual level 0 0 0 0
heterogenization – + – +
This summary clearly illustrates that the theoretical expectations
of the impact of individualization on solidarity are ambiguous. In
seven out of the sixteen possible cases, the expected impact is
negative (individualization erodes solidarity), in four cases it is po-
sitive (individualization boosts solidarity), and in five cases it is
absent or indeterminate. Only emancipation as a macro-phenom-
enon – i.e. decreasing predictability of other people’s attitudes and
behavior – is unambiguously expected to affect all kinds of solidar-
ity negatively. One-sided voluntary solidarity, such as volunteering
and giving, is most vulnerable to individualization, since all kinds
of individualization – except emancipation at the individual level –
are expected to reduce this kind of solidarity. In the remaining
sections of this chapter, we test whether these hypotheses are con-
firmed by the differences and trends in individualization and soli-
darity in practice.
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5.2 Method and data
Basically, there are three ways to analyze the relationship between
individualization and solidarity empirically. First, one can analyze
a time series of aggregate data (e.g. for one particular country) to
find out whether the evolution of individualization and the evolu-
tion of solidarity coincide. To perform such a time series analysis,
one needs high-quality data for quite a long period of time, prefer-
ably some decades. Even then it is pretty difficult to establish a
(causal) relationship. If both phenomena, individualization and
solidarity, display a trend, then they will tend to be strongly corre-
lated, but this might be caused by a third, unknown factor which
also displays a time trend. The correlation between individualiza-
tion and solidarity might then be spurious.
Second, one can make a cross-country comparison of individual-
ization and solidarity. For this, one needs aggregate (country-level)
data on both phenomena for a sufficient number of countries.
Since we already presented such data in Chapters 2 and 4, we ana-
lyze these data further in this chapter. We will compute both the
correlation between individualization and solidarity at one particu-
lar moment in time and the correlation between the changes of
both phenomena between c. 1990 and c. 2000. As with a time-ser-
ies analysis, the correlations found from such a cross-country com-
parisonmight be spurious because they are caused by a third factor.
To control for this, we will calculate partial correlations, controlling
for the level of gross domestic product per capita.
Third, one can analyze the relationship between individualiza-
tion and solidarity using micro-data at the individual level. Two
important advantages of such an approach are that one can use
much larger data-sets and that it is possible to control for a num-
ber of other (individual) characteristics that might influence
someone’s solidarity. Such an analysis assumes that the impact of
individualization manifests itself at the individual level, i.e. it is
assumed that people who are more strongly individualized behave
differently or have other preferences with respect to solidarity
than people who are less individualized. However, one particular
interpretation of individualization, heterogenization, can only be
measured at the aggregate level, since it refers to the spread of
attitudes among the population. Moreover, as we noted above,
emancipation might have a different impact at the aggregate level
than at the individual level. In order to include these aggregate-
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level effects we have to analyze the impact of individualization
both at the micro-level and at the macro-level, simultaneously.
The best way to do this is by performing a multilevel regression
analysis, which includes individual-level variables and country-
level variables for individualization.
The basic multilevel model consists of observations at one level
that are nested in a higher level (in this case citizens within differ-
ent countries), with a dependent variable at the lowest level and
explanatory variables at all levels. The behavior or attitudes of sub-
jects that are nested within the same group (e.g. fellow-country-
men) may be correlated and thus violate the condition of indepen-
dent measures. This is for instance the case when the attitudes of
fellow citizens are closer to each other than to those living in dif-
ferent countries, due to cultural influences and prevailing norms.
The problem presents itself even more clearly when explanatory
variables at the higher level (i.e. the country level) are added to the
analyses. These variables have the same value for each of the citi-
zens in a country (also referred to as the fixed part of the model).
Multilevel analysis is developed to deal with such nested data
structures. The basis of multilevel modeling is that a regression
model is broken down in separate regression intercepts and re-
gression coefficients, which are allowed to vary between units (the
random part of the model) and that variations between lower and
the higher levels of analysis are distinguished (Snijders & Bosker
1999; Hox 2000).
For this multilevel analysis we use data from the fourth wave
(1999-2004) of the European Values Survey and the World Values
Survey. We already used this data set for estimating individualiza-
tion in 25 industrialized countries in the previous chapter. Unfor-
tunately, these surveys do not include many variables that allow us
to construct indicators for the various dimensions of solidarity dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. We thus have to confine our analysis to three
indicators, only one of which refers to solidaristic behavior. The
three indicators are:
1. willingness to help others;
2. voluntary work;
3. preference for state-organized solidarity.
Ad 1. This indicator is based on the following question:
“Would you be prepared to actually do something to improve the
conditions of:
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a. people in your neighborhood/community;
b. elderly people in your country;
c. immigrants in your country;
d. sick and disabled people in your country?”
The possible answers are (1) absolutely no; (2) no; (3) maybe yes,
maybe no; (4) yes; (5) absolutely yes. The scores on each of the
four items are added and then recoded so that the resulting vari-
able ranges from 0 to 10.
Ad 2. The respondents were asked: “Which, if any, of the follow-
ing voluntary organizations are you currently doing unpaid volun-
tary work for?” The number of organizations for which they an-
swered in the affirmative is used as a scale for voluntary work.
This variable ranges from 0 to 15.
Ad 3. The indicator for being prepared to help others (re 1) was
combined with the question: “How would you place your views
on this scale?: (1) Individuals should take more responsibility for
providing for themselves... (10) The state should take more re-
sponsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.” The result is
a variable “preference for state-organized solidarity” which has the
value 1 (no solidarity) if the score on being prepared to help is low-
er than or equal to 6 and the score on responsibility lower than or
equal to 5, the value 2 (voluntary solidarity) if the score on help is
higher than 6 and the score on responsibility lower than or equal
to 5, and the value 3 (compulsory solidarity) if the score on help is
higher than 6 and the score on responsibility higher than 5.
It should be stressed that neither the cross-country comparison
nor the multilevel regressions inform us about the causal relation-
ship between individualization and solidarity. Although, on theo-
retical grounds, we expect that individualization affects solidarity,
it cannot be excluded a priori that a (positive or negative) correla-
tion points to a causal effect from solidarity to individualization.
The only way to disentangle these causal effects would be to ana-
lyze time series data and establish the timing of changes in order
to find out whether a change in solidarity follows or precedes a
change in individualization. Unfortunately, such data are not
available, yet.
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5.3 The relationship between individualization and
solidarity at the country level
The simplest way to analyze the relationship between individual-
ization and solidarity is to compute the correlation coefficients be-
tween the three interpretations of individualization, discussed in
Chapter 4, and the various kinds of solidarity, described in Chap-
ter 2. The left panel of Table 5.2 gives these correlation coefficients
for a sample of 25 industrialized countries.1 Most of the correla-
tions are negative, suggesting that individualization adversely af-
fects solidarity. However, only a minority of these correlations is
significant, even at the ten percent level, so it is unclear whether
these negative correlations are real effects or mainly coincidental
results. The only significant negative correlation between detradi-
tionalization and solidarity relates to the share of volunteers in the
adult population, confirming our theoretical expectation. There
are five significant negative correlations between heterogeneity
and solidarity, concerning development aid (ODA), the recogni-
tion of asylum-seekers, gross private social expenditure, private
insurances and the contribution of volunteering to GDP. This
suggests that a greater heterogeneity of attitudes among the popu-
lation has an adverse effect on external (supranational), one-sided
solidarity (development aid and asylum-seekers), on voluntary,
two-sided, formal solidarity (private social expenditure and insur-
ance) and on one kind of voluntary, one-sided, informal solidarity
(volunteering). To phrase it differently, the size and generosity of
the welfare state are not (significantly) affected by heterogeneity,
but most other kinds of solidarity are. Finally, there is no signifi-
cant correlation between emancipation and any kind of solidarity.
As mentioned above, the correlations between individualization
and solidarity could be caused by a third factor that influences
both individualization and solidarity. Although there are numer-
ous factors that might cause such a spurious correlation, the most
likely candidate is the wealth of a country. It is plausible that in
richer countries both individualization and solidarity differ from
those in poorer countries. For example, wealthy countries might
have more resources to enable people to choose their own way of
living and to organize formal solidarity through the welfare state
instead of relying primarily on informal solidarity. To allow for
this possible mediating influence of wealth, the right-hand panel
of Table 5.2 shows partial correlation coefficients between indi-
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vidualization and solidarity which are controlled by the average
gross domestic product per capita (in purchasing power parities).
Although most correlation coefficients show no major changes,
the significance changes in a number of cases. Detraditionaliza-
tion now turns out to be positively correlated with private insur-
ance. This suggests that the less people are attached to traditional
institutions, the more they rely on private insurance schemes to
protect themselves against risks. The significance of the negative
correlations of heterogeneity with various kinds of solidarity de-
creases. The correlation with private social expenditure and pri-
vate insurance, in particular, is no longer significant. With respect
to emancipation, nothing really changes.
Table 5.2 Correlations between individualization and solidarity,
c. 2000
Pearson bivariate correlation Partial correlation controlled for
by GDP per capita in PPS
detradition-
alization
hetero-
geneity
emanci-
pation
detradition-
alization
hetero-
geneity
emanci-
pation
gross public social expenditure -0.05 -0.17 -0.11 0.01 -0.03 -0.13
net public social expenditure 0.10 0.00 -0.06 0.17 0.18 -0.07
generosity public social security -0.08 -0.14 0.01 -0.06 -0.11 0.00
development aid (ODA) -0.18 -0.62** -0.03 -0.04 -0.37* -0.08
inflow of asylum-seekers -0.20 -0.35 -0.24 -0.09 -0.03 -0.31
recognition of asylum-seekers -0.07 -0.55** -0.30 -0.03 -0.57** -0.32
gross private social expenditure -0.39 -0.56** -0.11 -0.33 -0.41 -0.15
net private social expenditure -0.25 -0.40 -0.01 -0.14 -0.07 -0.06
private insurance 0.12 -0.42** 0.15 0.57** 0.25 0.17
volunteering (% pop.) -0.54** -0.37 -0.04 -0.50** -0.19 -0.06
volunteering (hrs per week) -0.23 -0.30 0.21 -0.12 0.03 0.20
volunteering (% GDP) -0.32 -0.65** -0.21 -0.22 -0.43* -0.30
giving -0.22 -0.17 0.22 -0.13 0.15 0.21
child care -0.25 -0.17 -0.36 -0.28 -0.29 -0.36
* significant, p<.1
** significant, p<.05
Source: see Chapter 2 and Chapter 4; calculations by the authors.
The correlations in Table 5.2 are based on the level of individual-
ization and the level of solidarity in about 25 countries at one par-
ticular moment. Since the level and composition of solidarity are
probably dependent on a range of other factors besides the level of
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individualization, it is not surprising that we do not find many
significant correlations. If we assume that the differences between
the countries with respect to these other factors do not change
substantially over time, we might be better able to trace the rela-
tion between individualization and solidarity by looking at the evo-
lution of both phenomena. Since we only have sufficient informa-
tion on individualization for two moments in time (c. 1990 and c.
2000), we use data on solidarity for these two years. This restricts
our analysis to eight kinds of solidarity. Table 5.3 shows the corre-
lations between the change of individualization and the change of
solidarity during the 1990s.
Table 5.3 Correlations between change of individualization and
change of solidarity, c. 1990-c. 2000
Pearson correlation Partial correlation (controlled for
by annual real GDP growth)
detradition-
nalization
hetero-
geneity
emanci-
pation
detradition-
alization
hetero-
geneity
emanci-
pation
gross public social expenditure 0.10 -0.20 0.28 0.05 -0.11 0.46*
benefit generosity 0.04 -0.18 0.11 0.13 -0.31 0.18
ODA 0.12 -0.14 -0.14 0.12 -0.16 -0.03
inflow of asylum-seekers 0.16 0.08 -0.21 0.35 0.23 -0.42*
recognition of asylum-seekers -0.02 0.02 0.16 -0.02 0.05 0.18
gross private social expenditure -0.36* 0.08 0.34 -0.38 0.10 0.40
private insurance 0.23 0.23 -0.35* 0.39 0.13 -0.67**
volunteering -0.05 0.62** -0.46** -0.07 0.59** -0.50**
* significant p<.1
** significant p<.05
Source: see Chapter 2 and Chapter 4; calculations by the authors
Less than half of the correlations are now negative, and again,
most of them are not significant. Somewhat unexpected is that
the change of detraditionalization is significantly negatively corre-
lated with the change of private social expenditure. Since this cor-
relation is no longer significant if we control for changes in GDP
per capita (right-hand panel), this correlation is probably spurious.
Remarkably, there is a large and significant positive correlation
between the change in heterogeneity and volunteering, even if we
control for changes in GDP per capita. Thus, in those countries
where the heterogeneity of attitudes increased the most, the share
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of the population that is active in volunteer work also increased
the most. We do not know how to explain this unexpected result.
An increase of emancipation is significantly negatively corre-
lated with both private insurance and volunteering. This confirms
our theoretical expectation that emancipation reduces the extent to
which people recognize and trust others. As the partial correla-
tions show, increasing emancipation is also associated with a low-
er inflow of asylum-seekers and with higher expenditure on social
protection. The last result suggests that people resort to the (wel-
fare) state if they no longer trust each other sufficiently.
5.4 The relationship between individualization and
solidarity at the individual and the country levels
The empirical analysis in the preceding section only sheds light
on the relationship between individualization and solidarity at the
country level. It does not give insight into differences in solidarity
between people that are more or less individualized within coun-
tries. As explained in Section 5.2 we try to test the impact of indi-
vidualization at the individual level by means of a multilevel ana-
lysis in which we simultaneously estimate the effect of individual
characteristics, including individualization, and the effect of indi-
vidualization at the country level. At the individual level both de-
traditionalization (decreasing membership of traditional institu-
tions) and emancipation (deviance from the average attitudes of
the social group) can influence the solidarity of the individual. In
our analysis we incorporate the possibility that the effects of these
individual characteristics differ between countries, by including
so-called random effects. At the country level, emancipation (aver-
age predictability of attitudes) and heterogeneity (diversity of atti-
tudes) can influence the solidarity of the population. Table 5.4
shows the estimated effects of these dimensions of individualiza-
tion for a sample of 25 industrialized countries (the full results of
the regression analyses are presented in the Appendix). As indica-
tors for solidarity, we use the willingness to help others, participa-
tion in volunteering and the support for solidarity organized by
the state.
As expected, detraditionalization has a significant negative ef-
fect on all three kinds of solidarity: the smaller the number of tra-
ditional institutions an individual belongs to, the less prepared
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they are to help others, take part in volunteering, and be in favor
of state-organized solidarity. Emancipation, on the contrary, has a
positive effect on solidarity. We did not derive an unambiguous
effect of emancipation at the individual level from theory. Appar-
ently, deviating from the dominant attitudes of your social group
stimulates solidarity.
With one exception, the indicators for individualization at the
country level do not have a significant impact on the solidarity of
individuals. The predictability of individuals’ attitudes (emancipa-
tion) does not influence solidarity, which confirms our earlier re-
sult from the cross-country comparison. The heterogeneity of atti-
tudes has a significant positive effect on the support for state-
organized solidarity, although we did not find any correlation with
public social expenditure in our cross-country analysis. However,
this result is in accordance with our theoretical expectations as far
as two-sided compulsory solidarity is concerned. Heterogeniza-
tion might lead people to increasingly rely on state-organized soli-
darity instead of on informal, voluntary solidarity.
Table 5.4 Multilevel analysis of the impact of individualization on
three kinds of solidaritya
solidarity:
individualization: help
(being prepared
to help others)
volunteering
(number of
unpaid activities)
state solidarity
(prepared to
help * responsibility)
individual-level variables
detraditionalization -0.24** -0.40** -0.88**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.28)
emancipation 0.13* 0.08** 5.71**
(0.07) (0.04) (0.75)
country-level variables
emancipation 6.71 -2.26 55.97
(4.86) (7.67) (74.59)
heterogeneity 0.04 -0.42 17.52*
(0.60) (0.65) (8.85)
a Unstandardized regression coefficients, controlled for by sex, marital status, age group, educational
attainment, town size, social class, labor market status and income category; standard errors between
parentheses; for full details see the Appendix.
* significant p<.1
** significant p<.05
Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors
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5.5 Conclusions
Because of the many different interpretations of both individual-
ization and solidarity, it does not come as a surprise that we do not
find a straightforward relationship between individualization and
solidarity in this chapter. For theoretical reasons we expected the
strongest negative impact of individualization on one-sided volun-
tary solidarity and much less influence – or even a positive influ-
ence – on two-sided solidarity. Only the first part of these expecta-
tions is largely confirmed by our empirical analysis.
Table 5.5 Empirical test of the effect of four kinds of individualiza-
tion on four forms of solidarity
solidarity:
individualization:
one-sided,
voluntary
two-sided,
voluntary
one-sided,
compulsory
two-sided,
compulsory
detraditionalization – + 0 0 / –
emancipation – macro level 0 0 0 0
emancipation – individual level + +
heterogeneity – –a – 0 / +
a The negative sign becomes a zero after controlling for GDP per capita.
Source: Tables 5.2 and 5.4.
Table 5.5 summarizes the results of our empirical analyses. We do
not include the somewhat puzzling results of the dynamic cross-
country analysis in Table 5.3. Comparing Table 5.5 with Table 5.1
shows that only about one-third of the theoretical expectations are
borne out by the empirical analysis. As expected, detraditionaliza-
tion is harmful for one-sided, voluntary solidarity in the form of
volunteering, and it is supportive for two-sided solidarity in the
form of private insurance. However, we did not find the expected
positive effects on compulsory, state-organized solidarity. Emanci-
pation as a macro-phenomenon does not have the negative effect
on individualization that we expected from theory, and emancipa-
tion as an individual characteristic fosters both one-sided, volun-
tary solidarity (willingness to help and volunteering) and two-
sided, compulsory solidarity (state-organized solidarity). Finally,
heterogeneity has the expected negative effect on one-sided soli-
darity, both voluntary and compulsory, and the expected positive
effect on two-sided, compulsory solidarity, albeit only if measured
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as support for state-organized solidarity. However, we did not find
a positive effect on two-sided, voluntary solidarity.
To conclude, our analysis shows that the impact of individual-
ization on solidarity is much less clear-cut than is often suggested.
Although there are some indications of a negative effect of indi-
vidualization on solidarity, this is only the case with some specific
interpretations of individualization and some particular forms of
solidarity. The most robust effect is the negative correlation be-
tween detraditionalization and volunteering: the smaller the num-
ber of traditional institutions people belong to, the less they tend
to participate in volunteering. It should, however, be noted that it
is not clear in what direction the causal relationship runs. Does
membership of a traditional institution, such as a church, a trade
union, or a political party, encourage people to do voluntary work?
Or do people become a member of such an organization because
they want to do voluntary work? Or, alternatively, do both member-
ship of traditional institutions and volunteering spring from an
unobserved third characteristic, such as social commitment or
civic engagement?
The worries about the societal implications of the individualiza-
tion process that are regularly expressed only seem to be well-
founded with respect to the consequences of a deteriorating mem-
bership of traditional institutions. This conclusion is in accor-
dance with the finding of Robert Putnam (2000) that the mem-
bership of clubs and associations is an essential ingredient of
social capital and social cohesion. However, in the preceding chap-
ter we found that there is no general trend of declining member-
ship rates in the industrialized world. On the contrary, member-
ship rates have gone up slightly, on average. Based on the
experiences of the past one or two decades, there is, thus, no
ground for worrying that individualization will erode social soli-
darity. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that a
marked process of individualization will manifest itself in the fu-
ture, albeit perhaps only in particular countries. But, as we
showed in this chapter, even then this will probably not have an
unambiguous negative impact on either voluntary solidarity or
the public support for state-organized, obligatory solidarity.
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Note
1. Some correlations are based on a smaller number of countries because for
some countries the necessary data are not available.
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Appendix to Chapter 5
Results of the multilevel regression analyses of solidarity
Table A5.1 Multilevel regression analysis of being prepared to help
others
Model 1
empty model
Model 2
individual control
variables
Model 3
individual individualization
variables (fixed & random
effects) and national
individualization
variables (fixed effects)
B SE t/Wald Sig. B SE t/Wald Sig. B SE t/Wald Sig.
Estimates of fixed effects
intercept 6.33 0.08 75.02 0.00 6.20 0.11 57.05 0.00 6.71 4.86 1.38 0.19
country-level variables
1-R2 -0.01 5.08 0.00 1.00
heterogeneity 0.04 0.60 0.07 0.94
individual-level variables
detraditionalization -0.24 0.02 -10.92 0.00
emancipation 0.13 0.07 1.93 0.07
age group
age 15-24 -0.29 0.05 -6.13 0.00 -0.24 0.05 -4.95 0.00
age 25-34 -0.18 0.03 -5.76 0.00 -0.16 0.03 -4.92 0.00
age 35-44 (ref.)
age 45-54 0.12 0.03 3.95 0.00 0.12 0.03 3.85 0.00
age 55-64 0.19 0.03 5.96 0.00 0.19 0.03 5.73 0.00
marital status
married man (ref.)
married woman 0.16 0.03 5.43 0.00 0.17 0.03 5.59 0.00
cohabitating man -0.12 0.13 -0.94 0.35 0.02 0.14 0.13 0.90
cohabitating woman 0.11 0.12 0.88 0.38 0.30 0.13 2.30 0.02
divorced man -0.21 0.06 -3.48 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.81 0.42
divorced woman 0.09 0.05 1.76 0.08 0.34 0.05 6.41 0.00
widower -0.21 0.08 -2.59 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.29 0.77
widow 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.95 0.25 0.05 4.89 0.00
single man -0.22 0.05 -4.72 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.39 0.70
single woman 0.03 0.05 0.67 0.50 0.28 0.05 5.43 0.00
son -0.23 0.05 -4.51 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.98
daughter 0.17 0.06 2.93 0.00 0.39 0.06 6.52 0.00
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Table A5.1 Multilevel regression analysis of being prepared to help others
(continued)
Model 1
empty model
Model 2
individual control
variables
Model 3
individual individualization
variables (fixed & random effects)
and national individualization
variables (fixed effects)
educational level
low educated -0.18 0.03 -7.29 0.00 -0.18 0.03 -7.04 0.00
middle educated (ref.)
upper educated 0.17 0.03 5.72 0.00 0.16 0.03 5.19 0.00
social class
upper class 0.11 0.49 0.22 0.82 0.10 0.49 0.21 0.83
upper middle class -0.03 0.04 -0.77 0.44 -0.03 0.04 -0.68 0.50
lower middle class (ref.)
working class -0.08 0.03 -2.68 0.01 -0.08 0.03 -2.73 0.01
lower class -0.30 0.04 -7.57 0.00 -0.28 0.04 -7.19 0.00
town size
<5,000 residents 0.20 0.07 2.80 0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.26 0.79
5,000-20,000 residents 0.25 0.07 3.53 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.16 0.87
20,000-100,000 residents 0.18 0.07 2.51 0.01 -0.06 0.09 -0.66 0.51
100,000-500,000 residents 0.14 0.07 1.96 0.05 -0.08 0.09 -0.87 0.38
>500,000 residents 0.08 0.07 1.05 0.30 -0.13 0.09 -1.42 0.16
size unknown (ref.)
labor market status
full-time employed (ref.)
part-time employed 0.09 0.04 2.25 0.02 0.09 0.04 2.17 0.03
self-employed -0.01 0.04 -0.33 0.74 -0.01 0.05 -0.12 0.91
retired 0.16 0.03 4.91 0.00 0.16 0.03 4.67 0.00
housewife -0.02 0.04 -0.55 0.58 0.01 0.04 0.29 0.78
student 0.22 0.05 4.30 0.00 0.26 0.05 4.99 0.00
unemployed -0.01 0.05 -0.12 0.90 0.01 0.05 0.30 0.76
other non-employed 0.15 0.07 2.03 0.04 0.16 0.07 2.21 0.03
income class
lower income class -0.01 0.03 -0.44 0.66 -0.01 0.03 -0.53 0.60
middle income class (ref.)
upper income class 0.02 0.03 0.85 0.39 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.98
Estimates of random effects
intercept 0.15 0.05 3.11 0.00 0.14 0.04 3.10 0.00 0.12 0.05 2.40 0.02
detraditionalization 0.00 0.00 1.63 0.10
emancipation 0.05 0.03 2.02 0.04
residual 2.72 0.02 114.3 0.00 2.65 0.02 114.2 0.00 2.60 0.02 111.7 0.00
-2 Log likelihood 100,494 99,911 95,235
deviance 583 4,676
intraclass correlation 0.05 0.05 0.04
Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors
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Table A5.2 Multilevel regression analysis of number of unpaid activities
Model 1
empty model
Model 2
individual control variables
Model 3
individual
individualization
variables
(fixed & random effects)
and national
individualization
variables (fixed effects)
B SE t/Wald Sig. B SE t/Wald Sig. B SE t/Wald Sig.
Estimates of fixed effects
intercept 0.61 0.08 7.86 0.00 0.52 0.08 6.82 0.00 4.33 7.42 0.58 0.57
country-level variables
1-R2 -2.26 7.67 -0.29 0.77
heterogeneity -0.42 0.65 -0.65 0.53
individual-level variables
detraditionalization -0.40 0.03 -15.39 0.00
emancipation 0.08 0.04 2.19 0.04
age group
age 15-24 -0.12 0.02 -4.79 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -1.06 0.29
age 25-34 -0.11 0.02 -6.80 0.00 -0.06 0.02 -3.57 0.00
age 35-44 (ref.)
age 45-54 0.03 0.02 1.87 0.06 0.02 0.02 1.24 0.22
age 55-64 0.08 0.02 4.40 0.00 0.05 0.02 2.54 0.01
marital status
married man (ref.)
married woman -0.05 0.02 -2.96 0.00 -0.05 0.02 -3.34 0.00
cohabitating man -0.11 0.06 -1.88 0.06 0.31 0.06 5.03 0.00
cohabitating woman -0.16 0.06 -2.84 0.00 0.31 0.06 5.26 0.00
divorced man -0.15 0.03 -4.43 0.00 0.27 0.04 7.31 0.00
divorced woman -0.09 0.03 -3.33 0.00 0.31 0.03 10.37 0.00
widower -0.10 0.05 -2.24 0.03 0.27 0.05 5.80 0.00
widow -0.09 0.03 -3.54 0.00 0.26 0.03 9.40 0.00
single man -0.08 0.03 -3.04 0.00 0.32 0.03 11.54 0.00
single woman -0.09 0.03 -3.49 0.00 0.31 0.03 10.91 0.00
son -0.03 0.03 -1.21 0.23 0.33 0.03 11.38 0.00
daughter -0.03 0.03 -0.86 0.39 0.34 0.03 10.63 0.00
educational level
low educated -0.13 0.01 -9.43 0.00 -0.12 0.01 -8.57 0.00
middle educated (ref.)
upper educated 0.24 0.02 15.19 0.00 0.21 0.02 13.15 0.00
social class
upper class 0.10 0.09 1.07 0.29 0.10 0.09 1.13 0.26
upper middle class 0.07 0.02 3.44 0.00 0.06 0.02 2.95 0.00
lower middle class (ref.)
working class -0.06 0.02 -3.92 0.00 -0.06 0.02 -3.55 0.00
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Table A5.2 Multilevel regression analysis of number of unpaid activities
(continued)
Model 1
empty model
Model 2
individual control variables
Model 3
individual
individualization
variables
(fixed & random effects)
and national
individualization
variables (fixed effects)
lower class -0.11 0.02 -5.37 0.00 -0.10 0.02 -4.86 0.00
town size
<5,000 residents 0.21 0.03 6.98 0.00 0.15 0.03 4.68 0.00
5,000-20,000 residents 0.22 0.03 7.06 0.00 0.16 0.03 4.91 0.00
20,000-100,000 residents 0.12 0.03 3.89 0.00 0.06 0.03 1.88 0.06
100,000-500,000 residents 0.13 0.03 4.03 0.00 0.07 0.03 2.24 0.02
>500,000 residents 0.06 0.03 1.89 0.06 0.03 0.03 1.07 0.28
town size unknown (ref.)
labor market status
full-time employed (ref.)
part-time employed 0.10 0.02 4.48 0.00 0.12 0.02 5.35 0.00
self-employed 0.09 0.02 3.78 0.00 0.11 0.02 4.79 0.00
retired 0.02 0.02 1.24 0.21 0.05 0.02 2.54 0.01
housewife 0.01 0.02 0.54 0.59 0.06 0.02 2.64 0.01
student 0.14 0.03 4.97 0.00 0.18 0.03 6.46 0.00
unemployed -0.03 0.02 -1.22 0.22 0.03 0.02 1.14 0.25
other non-employed 0.02 0.04 0.42 0.68 0.04 0.04 1.06 0.29
income class
lower income class -0.02 0.01 -1.69 0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.70 0.48
middle income class (ref.)
upper income class 0.07 0.01 4.83 0.00 0.05 0.01 3.82 0.00
Estimates of random effects
intercept 0.15 0.04 3.52 0.00 0.13 0.04 3.51 0.00 0.35 0.11 3.21 0.00
detraditionalization 0.01 0.00 3.20 0.00
emancipation 0.02 0.01 2.23 0.03
residual 1.18 0.01 138.77 0.00 1.14 0.01 138.71 0.00 1.08 0.01 136.03 0.00
-2 Log likelihood 115,727 114,752 108,596
deviance 976 6,155
intraclass correlation 0.12 0.10 0.25
Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors
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Table A5.3 Multilevel regression analysis of preference for state solidarity
(prepared to help X responsibility)
Model 1
empty model
Model 2
individual
control
variables
Model 3
individual
individualization
variables
(fixed & random
effects) and
national
individualization
variables
(fixed effects)
B SE t/Wald Sig. B SE t/Wald Sig. B SE t/Wald Sig.
Estimates of fixed effects
intercept 31.10 0.97 32.02 0.00 30.63 1.28 24.00 0.00 -62.01 71.30 -0.87 0.40
country-level variables
1-R2 55.97 74.59 0.75 0.46
heterogeneity 17.52 8.85 1.98 0.07
individual-level variables
detraditionalization -0.88 0.28 -3.17 0.00
emancipation 5.71 0.75 7.60 0.00
age group
age 15-24 -1.21 0.55 -2.19 0.03 -1.05 0.57 -1.85 0.06
age 25-34 -1.25 0.37 -3.37 0.00 -1.20 0.38 -3.16 0.00
age 35-44 (ref.)
age 45-54 1.37 0.36 3.82 0.00 1.36 0.37 3.73 0.00
age 55-64 0.57 0.37 1.51 0.13 0.53 0.38 1.38 0.17
marital status
married man (ref.)
married woman 1.62 0.34 4.77 0.00 1.84 0.35 5.31 0.00
cohabitating man -0.06 1.50 -0.04 0.97 0.45 1.59 0.28 0.78
cohabitating woman 3.80 1.42 2.68 0.01 4.57 1.52 3.00 0.00
divorced man -1.22 0.70 -1.74 0.08 -0.72 0.75 -0.96 0.34
divorced woman 1.52 0.58 2.61 0.01 2.38 0.63 3.79 0.00
widower -2.62 0.92 -2.84 0.00 -1.92 0.97 -1.99 0.05
widow 0.31 0.56 0.56 0.58 1.20 0.60 2.00 0.05
single man -1.24 0.55 -2.25 0.02 -0.50 0.60 -0.83 0.41
single woman 0.98 0.56 1.76 0.08 2.10 0.60 3.49 0.00
son 0.00 0.59 0.00 1.00 0.78 0.63 1.23 0.22
daughter 2.10 0.66 3.17 0.00 3.33 0.70 4.73 0.00
educational level
low educated 0.36 0.29 1.25 0.21 0.33 0.30 1.10 0.27
middle educated (ref.)
upper educated 1.01 0.35 2.91 0.00 1.09 0.36 3.07 0.00
social class
upper class -5.97 5.69 -1.05 0.29 -6.06 5.67 -1.07 0.29
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Table A5.3 Multilevel regression analysis of preference for state solidarity
(prepared to help X responsibility) (continued)
Model 1
empty model
Model 2
individual
control
variables
Model 3
individual
individualization
variables
(fixed & random
effects) and national
individualization
variables
(fixed effects)
upper middle class -1.95 0.46 -4.23 0.00 -2.00 0.46 -4.32 0.00
lower middle class (ref.)
working class 1.60 0.36 4.49 0.00 1.44 0.36 4.02 0.00
lower class 0.80 0.46 1.75 0.08 0.72 0.46 1.57 0.12
town size
<5,000 residents -1.38 0.82 -1.69 0.09 -2.18 1.04 -2.09 0.04
5,000-20,000 residents -1.06 0.83 -1.28 0.20 -1.93 1.05 -1.84 0.07
20,000-100,000 residents -0.97 0.82 -1.18 0.24 -1.79 1.04 -1.73 0.08
100,000-500,000 residents -0.75 0.84 -0.89 0.38 -1.43 1.05 -1.37 0.17
>500,000 residents -0.62 0.84 -0.73 0.46 -1.31 1.03 -1.27 0.21
town size unknown (ref.)
labor market status
full-time employed (ref.)
part-time employed 0.65 0.48 1.35 0.18 0.98 0.50 1.98 0.05
self-employed -2.21 0.52 -4.26 0.00 -2.19 0.53 -4.13 0.00
retired 1.04 0.38 2.72 0.01 1.28 0.39 3.29 0.00
housewife 0.07 0.49 0.14 0.89 0.39 0.50 0.77 0.44
student 1.33 0.59 2.25 0.02 1.70 0.60 2.82 0.00
unemployed 3.63 0.54 6.72 0.00 3.40 0.56 6.08 0.00
other non-employed 0.77 0.84 0.91 0.36 0.83 0.85 0.99 0.32
income class
lower income class 1.08 0.31 3.51 0.00 0.98 0.32 3.09 0.00
middle income class (ref.)
upper income class -1.61 0.30 -5.28 0.00 -1.65 0.31 -5.32 0.00
Estimates of random effects
intercept 19.49 6.26 3.12 0.00 19.12 6.14 3.11 0.00 27.64 11.14 2.48 0.01
detraditionalization 0.71 0.37 1.92 0.06
emancipation 7.06 3.61 1.96 0.05
residual 355.43 3.14 113.11 0.00 350.37 3.10 113.03 0.00 348.55 3.15 110.53 0.00
-2 Log likelihood 223,170 222,752 213,400
deviance 419 9,351
intraclass correlation 0.05 0.05 0.07
Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors
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6 A borderless world?
Developments in globalization, 1970-2005
To an outside observer we live in an era of globalization. When we
wake up, we eat our breakfast, drink a cup of coffee or tea, perhaps
a glass of orange juice, all made from ingredients from different
parts of the world, while we are reading the world news in our
morning papers. After we finish breakfast, it is time to get in our
foreign-made car to get to the multinational company we work for,
in the meantime listening to rock classics on the radio. As we ar-
rive at work, we start up our computer and get in touch with the
rest of the world by checking our emails from colleagues and cus-
tomers residing in other countries. During our walk to the coffee
machine, we have a conversation about the recent developments
within the European Union, discuss matters like the importance
of peace missions, as well as lighter subjects like our plans for the
next vacation. Drawing a map of all the international flows of
money, goods, information, and people would result in quite a
messy picture with lines moving all over the globe. At the same
time, one would notice that most of the activity is concentrated in
specific regions such as America, Europe and Japan.
These examples illustrate that globalization, though taking
place at the international level, has multiple consequences at the
national and the individual levels. Besides, this process is far from
complete and in fact still rather limited and to a large extent path-
dependent. That globalization is limited is apparent from the fact
that large parts of the world still do not participate in the process
of globalization and that the spread of popular culture in Western
countries is mainly a matter of the adoption of American prac-
tices. How the international relations that we know today have
come about is an evolving historical process in which the influ-
ence of the colonial relations between countries is still visible.
Whereas globalization refers to a worldwide process, countries
differ in the extent to which they are involved in it. Therefore, if
we want to investigate the impact of globalization on the welfare
state and solidarity (as we will do in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8), we
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need to know what the relevant dimensions of globalization are in
which countries can differ.
This chapter provides an overview of the development of globa-
lization over the last thirty years. The discussion is organized as
follows. First, we provide a comprehensive definition of globaliza-
tion, and compare it to earlier work in this field. Our main con-
cern in the present chapter is how to measure globalization. We
mention some available data sources and investigate to what ex-
tent they are suitable for the purposes of this book. Based on one
of the most advanced measurement instruments, the KOF Index
of Globalization, we describe the course that globalization has ta-
ken.
6.1 What is globalization?
Conventional wisdom has it that the term globalization was first
used by Theodore Levitt in his 1983 Harvard Business Review arti-
cle “Globalization of Markets”. Though there may be reasonable
doubt whether this really is the source of the term, what cannot
be denied is that in the beginning of the 1980s the term globaliza-
tion caught on and soon became a catch-word widely used by
countless academics, journalists, activists and politicians. Despite
its enormous popularity, or perhaps due to this, there is no gener-
ally accepted definition of globalization, and most of the time it is
used rather loosely for many different developments. As such, it is
an umbrella term that can refer to many different things. As a
consequence, it may happen that in the same discussion someone
uses the term globalization only for foreign trade relations while
another person may have a whole gamut of economic, political,
social, and ecological developments in mind. Furthermore, a com-
plicating factor in discussions about globalization is the normative
connotation that is often attached to it.
Globalization is not just a factual development, it is something
you can be in favor of or opposed to, and many people respond to
globalization from an ideological point of view. Those in favor of
globalization will argue that a fully integrated world market in-
creases everyone’s welfare but asks for a complete removal of all
disturbing factors, like government interventions. On the other
hand, the people that are opposed to globalization point to its un-
favorable effects and the fact that many people will lose as we
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move towards a global market. In such discussions globalization
is either something to strive for, for the benefit of all, or the root of
all evil that has to be combated. Notwithstanding the value of this
for political decision-making and international actions geared to-
wards fighting poverty and inequality, starting from a normative
point of view is a hindrance to scientific investigations. This is
not to say that we cannot study the positive and negative conse-
quences of globalization, but a serious investigation of these ef-
fects requires both a clear definition and an objective measure-
ment.
Just as is the case with many other concepts in the social
sciences, the lack of consensus on the definition of globalization
results in a proliferation of terms and ideas. As a consequence,
most publications in the field start with a list of definitions pro-
posed by others. An example of this is the overview by Al-Rodhan
and Stoudmann (2006), providing a table of no less than 114 defi-
nitions. This plethora of definitions warns us of the danger that
two people talking about globalization may be referring to comple-
tely different things. In that sense, we regard the overviews of de-
finitions as a signal, if not a warning sign, that we should make
clear what we mean by the term globalization from the start. We
thus begin with a brief discussion of some of the conceptualiza-
tions in the literature and the way we relate to them. In Table 6.1
we present a small selection from the available definitions that
serve as examples of the different approaches to globalization.
They can be put under three headings: economic, normative and
comprehensive approaches. The economic aspect of globalization
is part of almost all the definitions, but authors differ with respect
to whether it is only one of the many different dimensions or in
fact the only dimension of globalization. There may be a good rea-
son for emphasizing the economic aspect, since a large part of the
literature examines the impact of this kind of globalization (Brady,
Beckfield & Zhao 2007). Besides, empirical research quickly de-
veloped in this field thanks to the great number of data sources
including cross-national and longitudinal data.
Defining globalization exclusively in economic terms has some
advantages, but it has the drawback of overlooking some other as-
pects that may also be important. In Table 6.1, we identify two
alternatives to the strictly economic approach, that is, the norma-
tive and the comprehensive approaches to globalization. In the
normative approach the definitions include the author’s opinion
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Table 6.1 Examples of different definitions of globalization
Economic approaches
“The integration of the world economy” (Gilpin 2001: p. 364).
“… development of global financial markets, growth of transnational corporations and their growing
dominance over national economies” (Soros 2002: p. 13).
Normative approaches
“The harsh reality about globalization is that it is nothing but ‘recolonisation’ in a new garb” (Neeraj
2001: pp. 6-7).
“As experienced from below, the dominant form of globalization means a historical transformation: in the
economy, of livelihoods and modes of existence; in politics, a loss in the degree of control exercised
locally, and in culture, a devaluation of a collectivity’s achievements” (Mittelman 2000: p. 6).
Comprehensive approaches
“Globalization can be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant local-
ities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”
(Giddens 1990: p. 64).
“Globalization refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the
world as a whole” (Robertson 1992: p. 8).
on globalization. Most of the time, this is a negative opinion, and
this approach thus includes many examples of anti-globalization.
From an empirical point of view, these definitions are of little use
because they do not make possible a clear distinction between
cause and effect. In fact, a normative definition may imply that
globalization takes place if certain parts of the world are being co-
lonized (Neeraj 2001) or if collective achievements devaluate (Mit-
telman 2000). There are several problems with this. For instance,
globalization is only one of the many reasons why colonization
and devaluation can occur. Therefore, such a definition does not
provide us with an unequivocal indicator of globalization. What is
more, starting from a normative definition obscures the really in-
teresting question, namely whether it really has such negative im-
pacts or not. To answer this question, one needs a clear measure
of globalization. Comprehensive approaches differ from the other
two approaches because they are not restricted to a single dimen-
sion, such as the economic approach, and try to define globaliza-
tion without a normative judgment. A common feature of the two
examples of broad definitions in Table 6.1 is that they refer to glo-
balization as increasing interconnectedness. Central to this is that
the world, so to speak, becomes smaller; worldwide events in-
creasingly affect each other (Giddens 1990), and space is com-
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pressed (Robertson 1992). A weak point of this approach is that
the definitions of globalization are so general that no measures
can be derived from them. It also raises questions about what is
meant exactly by a term like compression, let alone how to meas-
ure it. Of value for the present discussion is that these approaches
challenge the single-dimension approaches like the economic
ones; international economic relations lead to a compression of
the world and an integration of social relations, but other dimen-
sions are not excluded from this comprehensive approach.
We combine the three approaches as follows. The economic ap-
proaches offer the best developed and most measurable defini-
tions of globalization. However, the economic dimensions do not
suffice for a satisfactory measurement of globalization, as the
comprehensive approaches make clear. Therefore, they will be ex-
tended by other dimensions. Finally, with these extended meas-
ures of globalization, it is possible to turn the implicit assump-
tions of the normative approaches into research questions and
hypotheses that can be tested empirically.
6.1.1 A definition of globalization
In this book we define globalization as increasing cross-border inter-
actions. This definition fits into the class of comprehensive ap-
proaches and has to be specified to provide indicators that can be
measured empirically. To make clear what is meant by our defini-
tion, each of its elements will be further developed in this section.
We start with the interactions part of the definition. An interac-
tion takes place when actors are in contact with each other. Both
the actors and the kind of interactions can vary. This can be illu-
strated by distinguishing between the players (the actors) and the
game they play (the interactions), and as with a game, to under-
stand globalization one needs to clarify who is involved in what
kind of interaction. The players in the process of globalization are
either individual actors or collective actors, such as companies and
governments. Their interactions can be economic, social or political.
For example, companies involved in international trade not only
have economic interactions with other companies and customers,
they also affect social interactions by employing people with differ-
ent cultural backgrounds, and they may have political interactions
with national and local governments of the host countries. Never-
theless, even though these interactions are interrelated in practice,
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it is possible to measure their empirical occurrence indepen-
dently. Moreover, on theoretical grounds one can argue that eco-
nomic, social, and political interactions differ from each other,
and by singling out their effects one can investigate the effects of
globalization more closely.
We only include cross-border interactions in our definition of glo-
balization. This means that globalization requires exchanges be-
tween two or more actors separated by national borders. There
are three forms of international exchanges. First, there are cross-
border interactions when goods and services are traded between
companies located in different countries and when migrants
move from one country to another. Secondly, the actors from dif-
ferent countries can be organized in a supranational body of ex-
changes, such as international political bodies like the United Na-
tions and the European Union. And, thirdly, a company can be
located in more than one country. The crucial point is that cross-
border interactions are distinguished from within-the-border in-
teractions, giving a central place to the nation-state in the defini-
tion of globalization. Therefore, this definition deviates from
more general approaches to globalization that include all possible
exchanges. Nevertheless, it is closely related to what has been re-
garded as one of the most important indicators of globalization,
namely the trade between countries in terms of exports and im-
ports. Moreover, it also includes the usual way of looking at the
globalization aspect of migration; people moving from one place
to another within a single country are generally not included in
definitions of globalization. Furthermore, the central place of the
nation-state in the definition of globalization, separating the in-
side from the outside, provides us with a theoretical starting point
to argue whether globalization decreases the power of the state,
and, more specifically, whether it threatens the solidarity within
countries, as we will explore in the next two chapters.
The last element of our definition of globalization refers to in-
creasing cross-border interactions. This part of the definition refers
to an ongoing process instead of a certain state of affairs. It should
be noted that whether or not economic, social, and political inter-
actions are indeed increasing is an empirical question. Regarding
the definition of globalization, this means that we only speak of
globalization if there is an increase over the course of time. A de-
crease of the interactions should rightfully be termed de-globaliza-
tion, referring to a decline in globalization. Moreover, some have
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noticed that globalization does not rule out the possibility of local
interactions becoming increasingly important (Keohane & Nye Jr.
2000).
There are two different levels at which one can analyze the in-
creasing cross-border economic, social, and political interactions.
These two approaches correspond with respect to their definition
of globalization. Nevertheless, they differ in how they investigate
cross-border interactions, with the first approach focusing on the
structure of the international interactions and the second on the
actors taking part in the process of globalization. There have been
a number of studies investigating the global structure of cross-bor-
der interactions, such as an analysis of trade globalization from
1795 onward (Chase-Dunn, Kawano & Brewer 2000), the volume
of international trade in 1959, 1975, and 1996 (Kim & Sin 2002),
a comparison of international telephone traffic between 1978 and
1996 (Barnett 2001), and the structure of Internet traffic between
29 OECD countries (Barnett, Chon & Rosen 2001). These investi-
gations aim to describe the structure of cross-border interactions,
whether these structures have changed over time, and how to ex-
plain this. This structure of international relations is examined
with indicators like the number of ties and the density of the net-
work. Globalization occurs if the number of ties and the density
have increased over a certain period. By looking at the network
structure of international relations as a whole, one gets a big pic-
ture of global exchanges, but one is not informed about separate
countries. At a lower level of aggregation, it is possible to examine
the place of countries within these global structures and how this
affects national policies and social structures within societies. Glo-
balization, however, refers to the structure of worldwide relation-
ships, and therefore we do not speak of a country having a certain
level of globalization but of the openness of countries with respect to
the extent to which they are engaged in cross-border interactions.
Theoretically, the level of openness ranges from countries that are
completely isolated from the outside world to those that are totally
open. In reality, the level of openness varies between countries,
but such extreme cases are not likely to be found. Even countries
like Cuba and North Korea do have some connections with other
countries, and even the most open countries still have borders se-
parating them from other countries.
We distinguish between three dimensions of openness based
on the three types of interactions. Economic openness refers to the
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cross-border economic interactions of a country through ingoing
and outgoing flows of goods, services, and capital. This kind of
openness is indicated with trade openness, i.e. the sum of imports
and exports, inflow and outflow of foreign direct investments, and
financial liberalization. Social openness is the extent to which a
country takes part in globalization through cross-border flows of
information, ideas (culture), and people. Part of this kind of open-
ness develops due to means of communication, available through
inventions like the telephone, television, and the Internet, and the
other part consists of the movement of people to different coun-
tries due to migration and traveling. The political openness of a
country refers to its international political relations with other
countries and includes both bilateral relations between counties
as well as membership of larger organizational bodies like the
United Nations, the European Union, and NATO.
6.1.2 Explanations of globalization
The literature on globalization tends to pay more attention to its
supposed and actual impact than to the question of what causes it.
Partly, this unevenness in the studies is caused by the fact that
globalization does not have a starting point, whereas the effects of
globalization on everyday life are visible for everyone. Even those
who believe that globalization is a relatively new phenomenon
have difficulty showing when the process began. Therefore, it is
hard to argue what the ultimate causes of globalization are. Never-
theless, several causes are frequently mentioned in the literature,
but without it being clear which is the most important force be-
hind globalization. There are several reasons for this. Globaliza-
tion is likely to have multiple causes, provided that the process
itself is made up of different dimensions, each influenced by dif-
ferent international developments. What is more, even these un-
derlying dimensions may not have a single cause and are ex-
plained by more than one factor. Besides, although in principle
such causes can be distinguished from each other, in practice
they are likely to be intertwined, affecting each other, and making
it difficult to come up with the exact cause of the openness of
countries. For example, a researcher interested in studying eco-
nomic relations between countries will probably focus on this di-
mension in isolation, but when it comes to explaining the devel-
opment of economic openness, references to social and political
108
processes enabling trade relations between countries have to be
included.
A further complicating factor is that cause and effect may not be
clearly distinguishable when it comes to globalization. On the one
hand, the wealth of countries has increased due to international
trade; on the other hand, this economic growth has given an im-
pulse to these trade relations in turn. The same line of argument
applies to the standardization of time, measures, and weights.
When such forms of standardization took a hold, they had a posi-
tive impact on the cross border interactions between people, since
traveling from one place to another and trading goods became ea-
sier. Arguing that the process of standardization is the cause of
globalization, however, is one step too far. In fact, the causal rela-
tion could be in the opposite direction: globalization increased the
need for standardization, compared to a time when people were
only trading within their own communities and the local means
of measurement sufficed. In other words, it is not possible to find
the ultimate cause of globalization since the relationships between
factors like a country’s openness and its economic, technological,
and political development are complex and ambiguous rather than
simple cause and effect relations.
Nevertheless, let us discuss a few of the causes that are com-
monly regarded to be important causes of globalization, keeping
in mind the critical remarks we just made. Technology is widely
believed to be a main driving force behind globalization. Thanks
to technology, the application of knowledge to solve practical prob-
lems, establishing connections between individuals and compa-
nies has become far easier than before. The means for such con-
nections through communication and transport facilities have
grown gigantically in recent times. In addition, the costs of com-
munication and transport have decreased. Because of this, most of
the literature considers technology to be the most important expla-
nation of globalization, and economic openness in particular.
Nevertheless, some authors are critical of such technological de-
terminism. Their criticism originates from studies of the hypoth-
esis that technology drives globalization. The basic assumption
underlying this hypothesis is that technology has become more
advanced, in the sense that it has progressed over the centuries,
and that we have not experienced a period of technological regres-
sion. An implication of this is that there should be decreasing con-
straints for international trade relations, and gradually these rela-
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tions should result in a world market, as the possibilities for com-
munication and transport increase and their costs decrease. How-
ever, empirical data of international trade in goods and services
show that this is not what is happening (Taylor 2002). Contrary to
what may be expected, national borders are still a major factor in
explaining why there is no integrated world market. This is illu-
strated by comparing the trade within and between countries. For
example, comparing cities in the US and Canada, it turns out that
there is twelve times more trade between cities in the same coun-
try than between cities in the neighboring countries that are lo-
cated at an equal distance. Also in Europe, with its emphasis on
the internal market, trade within countries is three to ten times
higher than cross-border trade, even if the analysis allows for fac-
tors like size of the local economy and geographical distance.
An additional argument that the world market is not integrated
holds that the prices for the same products should not differ be-
tween countries if there were such a full integration. Again, em-
pirical research refutes this expectation; a number of studies show
fluctuations of internationally traded goods like oil, computers,
cars, and televisions within countries but not between countries.
These examples lead to the conclusion that the technology argu-
ment is not capable of explaining developments in international
trade and the internationalization of production (Garrett 2000).
Against this, it can be argued that focusing on trade in goods does
not suffice to show how technology has affected international
trade. Goods like cars and flowers still need to be transferred
from one place to another, and even if transportation costs have
declined, they have certainly not disappeared (Keohane & Nye Jr
2000). Therefore, a considerable impact of technology has to be
found in the trade sectors using information technology and data
instead of moving physical goods from one country to another.
This should lead to the prediction that national borders should
not matter in the case of financial transactions. Once again, em-
pirical research counters this expectation (Taylor 2002). Investors
have a strong tendency to invest in their home market. At the end
of the 1990s, US investors held 90 percent in US stocks, Cana-
dian investors held 88 percent of Canadian stocks, and Japanese
investors held 94 percent of Japanese stocks. In Europe, investors
in the UK and Germany held 80 percent of the stocks from their
own countries. This shows that there is only a small amount of
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market integration at the global scale when it comes to financial
markets.
The examples indicate that the world is far from borderless and
raise the question of why the world market is not more integrated,
as might be expected. One possible explanation is that transport
costs are a smaller fraction of the total costs of importing goods
than is sometimes assumed – somewhere around 2.8 percent for
different products (Hummels 2007). So, even though transport
and communication costs have been decreasing (Crafts & Ven-
ables 2003; Hummels 2007), this has only a minor effect on the
total costs of international trade. Furthermore, there are various
explanations why national borders have a persistent influence on
trade between countries, like preferences of consumers, different
currencies and exchange rates, transaction costs associated with
contracts, and the importance of trade networks within countries
(Anderson & Marcouiller 2000; Parsley & Wei 2000; Rauch 2001;
Frankel & Rose 2002). All of these factors provide additional costs
and benefits influencing the choices made by companies and cus-
tomers.
That national borders and distance still matter is the major rea-
son to be skeptical about the technological explanation of globali-
zation. Empirical research into the development of globalization
over the course of time points in the same direction. If technology
progresses over time, then it can be expected that globalization
will increase as well. However, the actual development does not
show such a pattern. Through the course of history, there have
been periods of rising globalization but also times in which the
level of openness of countries dropped considerably. In their study
of waves of globalization since 1795, Chase-Dunn, Kawano &
Brewer (2000) construct a measure of trade globalization that re-
lates the worldwide exports of goods to the total GDP of all coun-
tries. Using this indicator the following pattern appears: until
1880 international trade increased, then it decreased until 1905,
followed by an increase until 1929 (with a short break during
World War I), after which it dropped again to reach the lowest
historical point in 1945. Since World War II, international trade
has grown steadily towards the point that we know now. To ac-
count for this pattern, the authors state that the first two waves of
international trade were due to the rise and fall of hegemonic re-
gimes that provided stability for the world markets and that the
recent increase is caused by the growing number of countries
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trading their goods on the international market (Chase-Dunn, Ka-
wano & Brewer 2000).
With a different indicator of economic globalization, the level of
market integration based on price convergence for similar goods,
Findlay and O’Rourke (2001) identify somewhat different periods
of increasing and decreasing globalization. Their research con-
cludes that there was increasing globalization until the start of the
First World War, at which point world trade decreased for a while,
then at the end of the war it increased again. During the big reces-
sion of the 1930s, world trade declined, and after the Second
World War it increased again.
These studies provide evidence for the disturbance created by
the two world wars, putting world trade on hold. Robertson
(2004) argues that there have been three distinct periods of globa-
lization, differing qualitatively from each other. The first period
was related to the spread of European trade to other parts of the
world that started in the sixteenth century, the second one with
industrialization and technological changes during the nineteenth
century, and the third with the establishment of the US as a hege-
monic power from the 1930s onwards. Although these studies
lead to partly contrasting patterns of globalization, they show that
technological developments and decreasing costs of international
trade cannot fully account for changes in globalization. Other fac-
tors, such as world wars and the presence of powerful countries,
have an equal and perhaps even stronger impact on the course of
globalization.
Then there is a list of other possible explanations of globaliza-
tion, like rationalization, capitalism, and regulations (Scholte
2000), that have attracted less research attention than technology
but are nonetheless worth considering. Rationalization is a pro-
cess of secularization in which humanity has a central place and
that is associated with scientific and instrumental thinking. One
of the consequences of rationalization is that people’s thinking is
less attached to their nationality, religion, and ethnicity, which
used to constrain globalization, and this has thus enabled the
opening up of countries. Capitalism is a specific type of economic
organization aimed at profit-making. This may foster openness
because companies have a permanent incentive to look for places
where they can save on production costs and for new markets to
sell their products. Regulation is the political and juridical frame-
work governing international relations. A major difficulty with
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these possible explanations is that it is very hard to tell whether
they are the causes or, actually, the effects of increased openness.
If cross-border interactions between actors from different coun-
tries increase, it may be expected that their relationships are
rationalized to create stability and predictability, that capitalism
arises to organize economic exchanges, and that they develop reg-
ulations to back up the system of exchanges and let them run
smoothly.
To summarize, explaining the openness of countries is not an
easy task. There is a great variety of factors influencing the process
of globalization, and periods of increased openness are followed
by times of decreasing integration at a global scale. In this pro-
cess, factors like technology, rationalization, capitalism, and regu-
lations are necessary but not sufficient conditions to bring about
globalization. That is, they have made cross-border flows easier,
but they did not cause them. Maintaining international exchanges
would have been difficult if not impossible without technological
breakthroughs such as steam engines, telegraphs, telephones, and
the Internet, which provide the means to cross long distances. The
same holds for rationalization, capitalism, and regulations, which
support these international interactions. Along with these factors
and others like trust relations between countries, national cul-
tures, increased welfare, as well as the global inequality of in-
comes, worldwide interactions have developed. These develop-
ments have occurred not as a matter of one cause and one effect
but through mutually affecting processes and feedback mecha-
nisms that have influenced each other. In some cases they have
strengthened each other, and in other instances opposing forces
have been at work.
In the globalization process, the three dimensions of openness
are interrelated. A large part of human history is made up of peo-
ple living at different locations. Then, over time, there was migra-
tion, cultural exchanges, through which people learned from each
other, innovations like technology and language diffused, goods
were exchanged, and societies gradually developed and became
more complex (Diamond 1997). As such, there is nothing new
about globalization. However, if we move far back in time, we can-
not speak of cross-border interactions because there were no
nation-states yet. Modern states, based on sovereignty of the state,
only came about in the sixteenth century, creating a distinction
between national and international relations. Within the national
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boundaries, one of the government’s main tasks was the protec-
tion of security, rights, and the economic welfare of its citizens. At
the same time, with the development of the modern state, the
question of how to deal with the relations between states arose. At
first, this question may have been a matter of political relation-
ships and how to regulate them. With the growing interdepen-
dence among states through economic and social exchanges, the
demand for regulation increased even further, leading to bilateral
relations between countries as well as larger international organi-
zations. As such, the political openness of countries was a re-
sponse to increasing economic and social openness, as a means
to regulate exchanges and prevent and solve conflicts between
countries. If the dimensions of globalization are indeed as
strongly interrelated as is suggested here and if all of them are
affected by a multitude of factors, it should be clear that finding
the ultimate cause of globalization is impossible.
6.2 Measuring the openness of countries
Investigating to what extent countries differ with regard to their
openness and how this developed requires reliable and compara-
tive data. Such data enable us to research whether globalization is
indeed happening, that is, whether the openness of countries is
increasing, or whether other patterns are found. Data for many
countries over a longer period of time allow us to answer basic
descriptive questions. For a long time, answering these relatively
simple questions was difficult due to a lack of data. Quite recently,
datasets have been compiled of the different kinds of openness. A
common feature of these datasets is that they bring together data
from existing sources instead of gathering new data. These data
are organized in such a way that they can be interpreted as indica-
tors of the openness of countries. We will take a look at a number
of these datasets and discuss their strengths and weaknesses.
Researchers from AT Kearney developed the Globalization Index
after a request from Foreign Policy Magazine and labeled it the first
effort to measure globalization (Kearney 2002). This index aims at
providing a broad image of globalization, that is, broader than the
then existing indexes that exclusively focused on the economic di-
mension. An example of such an approach is the G-Index pro-
vided by the World Markets Research Centre (WMRC). Even
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though this index measures fewer dimensions of globalization
than the AT Kearney index, its major strength is that it includes
data for no less than 185 countries for a period of 30 years. The
data from AT Kearney were compiled for the first time in 2001,
generating information for 62 countries, which include 85 per-
cent of the world population. As long as only these two datasets
were available, the choice was between a narrow approach, mea-
suring only the economic dimension of globalization, but for
many countries and over a long period of time, or a more inclu-
sive measure providing data for fewer countries and without the
possibility of making analyses through time.
This situation has improved recently, since there are now two
datasets available combining the strengths of the two approaches
that include information about several dimensions for a large
number of countries. Moreover, developments can be investigated
both across countries and through time, as these data sources
span a long period. The first of these sources is the CSGR Globali-
sation Index developed by the Centre for the Study of Globalisation
and Regionalisation (CSGR) of Warwick University, containing in-
formation for the period 1982 to 2004 (Lockwood & Redoano
2005). The second one is the KOF Index of Globalization from the
Konjunkturforschungsstelle in Zürich. The KOF Index is compar-
able to the CGSR Index in that both provide data about economic,
social, and political openness. The main difference is that the first
goes further back in time, namely to 1970 (Dreher, Gaston & Mar-
tens 2008). As the CGSR and the KOF Index are similar, we chose
to use the KOF Index in the remainder of this chapter to investi-
gate developments in economic, social, and political openness. In
Chapters 7 and 8, we examine the effects of openness with infor-
mation from this index.
The 2007 version of the KOF Index of Globalization is con-
structed as follows. Economic openness is measured with data on
trade, foreign direct investment, both flows and stock, portfolio
investment, income payments to foreign nationals (all in percen-
tage of GDP), hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on
international trade (in percentage of current revenues), and capital
account restrictions. Social openness includes data on outgoing tel-
ephone traffic, government and workers' transfers received and
paid (in percentage of GDP), international tourism, foreign popu-
lation, international letters, Internet users, cable television, trade
in newspapers, radios, number of McDonald’s restaurants, num-
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ber of IKEA stores (all these indicators are per capita), and trade in
books (percentage of GDP). Political openness combines informa-
tion about embassies in a country, membership in international
organizations, participation in UN Security Council missions.
Each variable is transformed to an index with values between one
and a hundred, with a hundred being the maximum value for a
specific variable between 1970 and 2005. A higher value indicates
a higher level of openness. The weights of the different indexes
are calculated using principal components analysis for the whole
sample. The variance of the variables in each sub-group are parti-
tioned. Since the weights are determined in a way that maximizes
the variation of the resulting principal component, the indices
capture the variation as fully as possible (Dreher, Gaston & Mar-
tens 2008).
6.2.1 Developments in globalization
With the information from the KOF Index of Globalization, we
show how the economic, social, and political openness of coun-
tries developed between 1970 and 2005. We start with a descrip-
tion of the average development of the openness of countries. This
answers the question of whether globalization, an increasing
openness of countries, has been taking place during that period
of 35 years, and if the developments in the three dimensions of
openness are similar or not. After this, we investigate which are
the most open countries, for each of the dimensions and for dif-
ferent points in time.
Figure 6.1 represents the mean economic, social, and political
openness between 1970 and 2005. Comparing the 2005 levels of
openness with those in 1970, we see that the three kinds of open-
ness increased on average, but that there are some differences be-
tween them. The level of economic openness increased steadily
between 1970 and 1990 and accelerated in the 1990s. Around
2000, the growth in economic openness suddenly paused and
started to increase again in recent years. Until the 1990s, social
openness developed on a similar track to economic openness. A
marked difference is the jump that the line shows in the begin-
ning of the 1990s, and then at the end of the 1990s social open-
ness stops growing and remains at the same level afterwards. Po-
litical openness developed in a completely different way to
economic and social openness. Most notably, the pattern of politi-
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cal openness fluctuates far more than the other two dimensions.
After a steep increase between 1970 and 1980, political openness
decreased and almost returned to its initial level. From the end of
the 1980s there was again an increase in political openness, with a
steeper growth at the end of the twentieth century.
Figure 6.1 Openness 1970-2005, 122 countries
Source: KOF Index of Globalization
These figures confirm that globalization has increased during the
last 35 years. At the same time, it provides evidence that there is
little support for the view that globalization is on the loose. The
main reason to be skeptical about this is that most of the time the
levels of openness are increasing gradually. And, although the
world is experiencing higher levels of openness now than in the
1970s, it is conceivable that globalization will not increase a lot
further in the near future. This expectation applies in particular to
social openness, which has stayed at the same level since 2000.
Clearly, the future cannot be predicted from the current situation,
and social openness may catch up, but it may well stay at the same
level for a longer period. Figure 6.1 further illustrates that future
changes in political openness are hard to predict, given its whim-
sical evolution over the past 35 years, and although recently this
kind of openness has increased, it may just as well decrease in the
coming years.
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Historical events can explain some of the patterns we just de-
scribed. The gradual growth in economic openness can be related
to the growing number of countries involved in international
trade, as is argued by Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer (2000),
and other factors like technological developments and the in-
creased liberalization of international trade. Possibly, the sudden
deviation from that growth results from the 9/11 attacks and the
economic crisis that followed. The growth in social openness dur-
ing the 1990s is most likely caused by the start of the information
age that is marked by the introduction of the Internet and its rapid
spread in many countries. Why social openness did not increase
in the last five years is unclear, but partly this may be due to the
fact that in the rich countries most people already have Internet
access, and less growth can be expected in that part of the world.
As access to the Internet increases further in the rest of the world,
this kind of openness should start to increase again. Develop-
ments in political openness during the 1970s and 1980s are
clearly related to the Cold War. In the beginning of the 1970s, the
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States be-
came less tense than before, which resulted in the SALT agree-
ment of 1972. From 1981 on, their relationship was growing more
tense again, and remained that way throughout the 1980s until
they started negotiating once more. The fluctuations in political
openness after this period are harder to connect to large-scale de-
velopments like these.
6.2.2 The ten most open countries
In the previous section, we examined the average openness of all
countries in the sample. This indicates whether economic, social,
and political globalization occurred during the period under study.
Up to this point, we have not looked at the openness of individual
countries. This section, therefore, will focus on identifying the
most open countries, and will answer the following questions:
Which are the most open countries? Is the rank order of countries
stable or has it changed in the past 35 years? Are countries that are
open in one dimension also open in the other dimensions? To
answer these questions, we present a summary of information for
the top ten most open countries with respect to the different di-
mensions, for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2005 in
Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4.
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The information in Table 6.2 shows that the top ten of econom-
ically most open countries is quite stable. Luxembourg, Singapore,
and Belgium have a high position throughout the whole period.
There have also been some changes. Compared to other countries,
the economic openness of Canada decreased, and this country dis-
appears from the top ten in 1990. At the same time, the Nether-
lands and Switzerland also lost the positions they used to have. On
the other hand, the economic openness of countries like Sweden,
Finland, and Austria has increased, and they have been among the
most open countries for ten years now. Furthermore, the list
shows that Malta, Estonia, and Hungary have experienced a large
growth in economic openness and are currently among the lead-
ers in that respect.
Table 6.2 Economic openness: 10 most open countries
1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
Luxembourg (92.65) Luxembourg (93.41) Luxembourg (94.59) Luxembourg (96.88) Singapore (95.90)
Singapore (86.75) Singapore (92.46) Singapore (94.41) Ireland (96.53) Luxembourg (95.14)
Ireland (77.25) Ireland (84.04) Belgium (89.88) Netherlands (95.90) Belgium (91.94)
Netherlands (73.82) Netherlands (82.90) Netherlands (87.82) Belgium (95.77) Malta (91.39)
Belgium (73.24) Switzerland (77.27) Ireland (87.00) Singapore (93.51) Estonia (90.76)
Switzerland (67.31) Belgium (76.38) Switzerland (83.23) Switzerland (92.52) Sweden (89.51)
Canada (66.98) Bahrain (75.30) Sweden (80.98) Denmark (92.45) Finland (88.85)
Oman (63.91) Canada (73.01) Norway (80.30) Finland (92.34) Hungary (88.83)
Namibia (62.90) Botswana (71.08) Bahrain (76.87) Sweden (90.85) Austria (88.48)
South Africa (61.93) United Kingdom (71.02) United Kingdom (74.70) Austria (89.86) Netherlands (88.04)
Source: KOF Index of Globalization
In Table 6.3 we present the top ten of most socially open coun-
tries. Some of the countries that are economically open turn out
to have a high level of social openness as well. For instance, this is
the case for Singapore and Belgium. For the whole period, it is
clear that Switzerland is the most socially open country. Further-
more, Canada and the Netherlands have quite a stable position in
this list, and Austria and the United Kingdom have increased in
social openness since entering the list in 1980 and 1990, respec-
tively.
We examine the results for political openness in Table 6.4.
Here we see that over a period of 35 years, France is one of the
most politically open countries. Some other countries, like Italy
and the United Kingdom, also have a firm position in the top ten.
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Table 6.3 Social openness: 10 most open countries
1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
Canada (68.72) Switzerland (87.22) Switzerland (89.64) Switzerland (95.01) Switzerland (95.38)
Switzerland (62.03) Canada (83.91) Canada (86.00) Singapore (91.35) Austria (92.49)
Denmark (61.33) Netherlands (77.81) Netherlands (85.16) Belgium (91.03) Singapore (92.26)
Norway (58.55) Austria (77.56) Belgium (84.54) Austria (91.01) Belgium (90.82)
Ireland (57.29) Singapore (70.73) Austria (83.00) Canada (90.07) Netherlands (89.41)
Singapore (56.43) Belgium (68.35) Sweden (82.38) Denmark (89.34) Denmark (88.64)
Belgium (55.89) Sweden (68.29) Denmark (80.48) Netherlands (89.11) United Kingdom (87.87)
Luxembourg (54.27) Germany (67.43) United Kingdom (77.26) Sweden (87.47) Sweden (87.43)
Sweden (53.95) Denmark (62.73) Germany (77.17) United Kingdom (87.08) Canada (86.85)
Netherlands (50.40) Norway (60.93) Norway (76.74) Finland (85.02) Czech Republic (84.91)
Source: KOF Index of Globalization
Table 6.4 Political openness: 10 most open countries
1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
Belgium (88.14) France (90.95) Sweden (92.93) France (99.00) France (98.64)
Italy (88.12) Canada (89.99) France (92.51) United Kingdom (95.38) USA (96.67)
France (85.81) Belgium (89.50) Belgium (91.77) Sweden (95.09) Russian Federation (96.04)
United Kingdom (85.45) Italy (88.98) Italy (91.59) Italy (94.84) Italy (95.62)
Netherlands (83.66) Denmark (88.81) Germany (90.21) Belgium (94.58) United Kingdom (95.52)
Denmark (82.77) Sweden (88.80) Canada (89.08) Germany (94.46) Germany (95.17)
USA (82.54) Finland (87.91) United Kingdom (88.40) USA (93.77) Sweden (94.69)
Sweden (81.67) United Kingdom (86.12) Austria (88.02) Russian Federation (92.48) Belgium (94.22)
Austria (81.18) Netherlands (85.41) India (86.58) Egypt (92.12) Austria (93.86)
Canada (80.17) Austria (88.02) Spain (86.13) Canada (91.74) China (92.39)
Source: KOF Index of Globalization
The USA and the Russian Federation are two countries showing
an increase in political openness in recent years (although the
USA was among the most politically open countries in 1970, it
does not appear in the top ten during the 1980s and 1990s). USA
was among the most politically open countries in 1970, it does not
appear in the top ten during the 1980s and 1990s).
If we compare the three tables, we notice some differences.
Only a few countries are among the most open countries for all
120
dimensions (with Belgium being the best example), some coun-
tries are open with respect to two dimensions and do not show up
in the third list (Singapore has a high level of economic and social
openness), and some have a high score on one dimension but not
on the other two (Luxembourg is economically open, and France is
politically open). This indicates that the three dimensions of open-
ness are not closely related to each other. We investigated the rela-
tion between the dimensions of openness in more detail by calcu-
lating the correlation coefficients between economic, social, and
political openness for each of the years. According to these ana-
lyses, economic and social openness are strongly related, most of
the coefficients are around 0.75 and 0.85. Social and political
openness are moderately related, and there is quite some variation
in the correlations, the scores are somewhere between 0.30 and
0.55. Economic openness and political openness are only weakly
related with correlations between 0.20 and 0.30. These results
lead to the conclusion that countries that are economically open
are also likely to be socially open. This finding can be interpreted
in several ways: economic openness fosters social openness, social
openness fosters economic openness, or they have a common
cause. Whatever the exact interpretation is, that economic and so-
cial openness go together is a notable finding. What it shows is
that being involved in international trade may also increase the
openness of a country in terms of cultural exchanges, creating
welfare enabling people to travel abroad and get in contact with
others, or that such social relations make economic exchanges
easier to bring about and sustain. Furthermore, that political
openness is far less related to social openness and even less so
with economic openness refutes the idea that political interna-
tional relations have developed in response to regulating conflicts
resulting from social and economic relations between countries.
6.3 Conclusions
Globalization is among the buzzwords of the 1990s. Now that we
have entered the next century, the term has become less fashion-
able, and theoretical and empirical investigations have increased
our knowledge about the actual developments of globalization.
Now it is time to see what these efforts have taught us about glo-
balization. A first conclusion we draw from the literature is that
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there are at least two reasons not to talk about globalization in too
general a way. On theoretical considerations, three dimensions of
globalization can be identified and distinguished from each other,
each of them referring to different kinds of cross-border interac-
tions between individual and collective actors. Differentiating be-
tween economic, social, and political cross-border interactions is
not just of theoretical interest, as is evidenced by the empirical
part of this chapter. In that part we showed that economic and
social openness are closely related to each other but far less so to
political openness. Besides, referring to globalization in general
terms overlooks the place that individual countries hold in the
process. Much is gained by looking more directly at the extent to
which a country is open to worldwide developments. The most
valuable information in that respect are comparisons over time, to
investigate the evolution of a country, as well as comparisons
across countries to examine what place a country has within the
worldwide process of globalization. The empirical overview in
this chapter shows that some countries are among the most open
countries for a long period of time, whereas the openness of other
countries is far less stable, in terms of their relative position. Such
developments raise questions about the factors that explain these
patterns and the impact they have on the countries involved.
Related to this, we touched upon the development of an Index
of Globalization. Here we would like to raise the point that this
should not be a goal in itself. Our main argument for this is that
the three dimensions of openness differ from each other and that
an overall index of globalization cannot cover these differences.
Although it may be tempting to come up with an instrument that
tells us which country is the leader in globalization, we doubt
whether such a measure really provides an accurate image. The
top ten countries for the different dimensions of openness shows
that there are only very few countries that are open in all three
dimensions. Combining these dimensions of openness in one
measure would only make sense if they are empirical manifesta-
tions of the same underlying phenomenon. This would mean that
a trade-off between the dimensions is possible, in the sense that a
low level of economic openness can be compensated for by a high
level of social and political openness. To some extent this is a mat-
ter of statistical analyses to find out whether these assumptions
hold. However, this issue also has a substantive side since the ef-
fects of economic, social, and political openness can differ and
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should therefore be considered separately from each other. There-
fore, from an empirical point of view, much is gained by the avail-
ability of a set of indicators measuring the various dimensions of
the openness of countries. As we discussed in this chapter, the
literature has put much emphasis on the economic dimension of
globalization, partly because other data were not available for a
large sample of countries and for a long time period. As a result,
globalization research was biased towards the economic dimen-
sion. Datasets like the ones that have been compiled by AT Kear-
ney, CSGR, and KOF more recently are of great value to comple-
ment the existing studies with analyses of the other dimensions of
globalization.
From the empirical analysis in this chapter, we conclude that
globalization is indeed taking place and that the average openness
of countries has increased over the past 35 years. At the same time,
we would like to qualify the image that we live in a ‘flat’ (Friedman
2005), borderless (Ohmae 1990) world. Even if applied to the
most open countries that exist, the world is nowhere close to these
metaphors. With respect to cross-border interactions between
countries, distance still matters, and national borders have not dis-
appeared. Our aim was to come up with a more realistic view of
the world based on empirical data. According to our analyses, the
openness of countries has increased, but the world today is far
from completely integrated in terms of economic, social and poli-
tical relations. What is more, the openness of countries does not
always develop linearly. At certain points in time, openness in-
creases overall, thereby nourishing speculation about an upcom-
ing fully integrated world, but in most instances these periods are
followed by a period in which openness decreases, at least in some
respects. Since it is likely that such fluctuations will continue in
the future, it is doubtful whether we will end up in a fully inte-
grated world.
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7. Threats and opportunities
The impact of globalization on the welfare
state1
Public opinion towards the welfare state has changed completely
in the last 30 years. Whereas in earlier times people were very
optimistic about the welfare state and the belief was widespread
that social rights could be combined with full employment, atten-
tion has slowly shifted to the welfare state’s inability to reach these
goals. At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s,
confidence in the welfare state decreased because it was asso-
ciated with less economic growth and even with financial crises.
More and more attention was given to the idea that welfare states
may not only solve societal problems but can also create them.
Recently, the discussion has widened in scope, and concerns are
being raised about the future of the welfare state and the way it is
threatened by several societal developments (Korpi 2003). Globali-
zation is one of the threats that has attracted the attention of poli-
ticians, researchers, and the general public (Castles 2002). Within
public and political debates there seems to be a consensus that
extensive and generous welfare state provisions cannot be sus-
tained as globalization continues. Usually, expectations about the
threat of globalization are based on the argument that the ongoing
integration of the world market inevitably leads to tax cuts, thus
decreasing the available resources needed to fund the welfare
state. The main reason for this is that countries need to be attrac-
tive for companies, investors and highly qualified personnel to
compete at a global scale. Moreover, high tax levels are believed to
be an incentive for companies to save costs by outsourcing some
of their activities or completely moving their production to low-
wage countries. At the same time, welfare states may function as
a magnet, attracting people from poorer parts of the world who are
trying to get access to the provisions a country offers. Given these
threats, there seems to be little reason for optimism about the fu-
ture of the welfare state.
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This chapter evaluates how severe these threats are by examin-
ing the impact of globalization on the welfare state. In line with
the underlying dimensions of globalization distinguished in
Chapter 6, we investigate the impact of economic, social and poli-
tical openness on the welfare state. This chapter discusses these
effects in two separate sections. Since there is a vast amount of
academic literature on the effects of economic openness, it is pos-
sible to provide a review of these insights and compare the re-
search results. A similar review of the literature cannot be offered
with respect to social and political openness because to date there
are only a few empirical studies in that field of welfare state re-
search. Therefore, we present the results of our own empirical
analysis of these effects.
7.1 Economic openness
The number of empirical studies investigating the relationship be-
tween economic openness and the welfare state has grown exten-
sively over the last twenty years. The relationship between eco-
nomic openness and the welfare state is studied from different
theoretical points of view.
7.1.1 Hypotheses
The hypotheses that are derived from these theories and their pre-
diction of the relationship between economic openness and the
welfare state can be grouped into the following four statements
(Bowles & Wagman 1997; Brady, Beckfield & Seeleib-Kaiser
2005): (1) economic openness is negatively related to the welfare
state, (2) welfare states converge because of economic openness,
(3) economic openness is positively related to the welfare state,
and (4) there is no relationship between economic openness and
the welfare state. With respect to the question of whether econom-
ic openness poses a threat to the welfare state, the statements pro-
vide different answers. The first two argue that economic open-
ness does pose such a threat (hypothesis 1), but according to the
latter two, economic openness does not threaten the welfare state
(hypothesis 2).
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Hypothesis 1: economic openness threatens the welfare state
There are several reasons why economic openness may negatively
affect the welfare state (Mishra 1999). First, it is argued that coun-
tries with high tax rates that are necessary to finance the welfare
state are less competitive than those with lower taxes. A second
reason is that capital flight may result from high tax rates; it is
expected that individuals and companies will move from countries
with high taxes to countries where tax rates are lower. This threat-
ens the financial base of the welfare state, especially because it is
likely that the individuals and companies contributing the most to
the welfare state will leave the country since they have the strong-
est incentive to move. It is argued that governments are likely to
respond to problems of competitiveness and capital flight by low-
ering taxes, resulting in a race to the bottom (Bowles & Wagman
1997). The logic behind the race to the bottom is that countries
will adjust their tax level in accordance with those in other coun-
tries. If one country lowers its tax in order to be more attractive to
individuals and companies, others will follow, and in the end all
countries will end up with low taxes and few financial resources to
support the welfare state. In both instances it is assumed that
there is a direct relationship between economic openness and the
welfare state. A third argument holds that economic openness
may also threaten the welfare state indirectly, namely through the
increased influence of investors on the social policies of countries
and the decreasing power of the nation-state due to globalization
(Scharpf 2000). This argument is based on the assumption that
governments have a weaker grip on the economic situation of
their country than in the past and that they have to deal with the
interests of investors. This may result in a negative influence,
since the power of investors has increased, and they can threaten
to move their production to other countries if they are not pleased
with the outcome.
What these arguments have in common is that they suggest a
negative relationship between economic openness and the welfare
state regardless of the present situation. Others have argued that
generous welfare states are negatively affected by economic open-
ness, whereas the less developed welfare states may actually ex-
pand as the openness of their economies increases. This argu-
ment is based on the observation that countries that have
experienced a growth of economic openness in the past also have
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extensive welfare state arrangements. Nevertheless, it is argued
that these countries have reached an upper limit that makes
further growth difficult or even impossible and renders cuts in
welfare states inevitable to keep the system working. On the other
hand, the countries that are less economically open also have less
developed welfare states. If their economic openness increases,
their welfare state will also develop further, just like the ones that
went through that stage before. As such, two different develop-
ments are hypothesized: for relatively open countries, more eco-
nomic openness will mean a reduction of the welfare state, and
the less open countries will experience a growth of their welfare
state (Rodrik 1997; Huber & Stephens 2001). Ultimately, the ex-
pectation based on this theoretical position is that welfare states
will converge as the economic openness of countries increases.
Thus, the less developed welfare states may benefit from increas-
ing economic openness, while the extensive welfare states are
threatened if they become more integrated into the world market.
Hypothesis 2: economic openness does not threaten the welfare state
There are several arguments countering the hypothesis that wel-
fare states are in crisis because of economic openness. First, the
hypothesis does not match the available empirical data concerning
the development of welfare states. Figures show that spending on
social security has increased since the early 1980s (Castles 2002).
Since this is also the period in which economic openness in-
creased, a reduction of welfare states would be in line with the
first hypothesis. However, an expansion has taken place instead.
Second, empirical studies have shown a positive correlation be-
tween economic openness and public spending, and the countries
with an extensive welfare state are the same ones that are econom-
ically open (Cameron 1978; Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik 1998).
These findings have led researchers to focus on the positive ef-
fects that economic openness may have on welfare state spending.
There are two theoretical arguments why welfare state expansion
may occur because of economic openness. According to the first
view, economic openness causes insecurity. The reason for this is
that economically open countries are more affected by fluctua-
tions on the world market. Due to the interdependence of coun-
tries, the economic situation in one country will affect the situa-
tion in other countries. The fluctuations in the world market may
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increase the risk of unemployment, and it is therefore expected
that the citizens of the more economically open countries will de-
mand more protection through the welfare state (Brady, Beckfield
& Seeleib-Kaiser 2005). According to the second view, economic
openness requires investments in the welfare state to strengthen
the competitiveness of a country. Social arrangements create so-
cial stability, increase human capital, and enable collective agree-
ments between employers and employees that may counter the
negative effects of economic openness (Barro 1991).
Whether the investments in the welfare state are made to deal
with insecurity or to stay competitive, in both instances economic
openness leads to an expansion of the welfare state. In the first
case governments respond to effects that economic openness may
have, and in the latter, governments actively develop policies to
remain competitive in the world market.
The aforementioned arguments are based on the premise that
welfare states are somehow related to economic openness. An al-
ternative view holds that economic openness does not threaten the
welfare state, simply because they are not related at all (Brady,
Beckfield & Seeleib-Kaiser 2005). Supporters of this view argue
that other factors are of more importance for the development of
the welfare state, such as the institutional structure of a country
(Gray 1998; Hall & Soskice 2001; Swank 2002), the equilibrium
between constitutional structure, institutions, and support for
social policies (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Pierson 1996; 2001),
political developments (Korpi 2003; Allan & Scruggs 2004), or de-
industrialization (Iversen & Crusack 2000). Even though these
authors differ with respect to their explanation of the development
of the welfare state, they do agree that such developments cannot
be accounted for by economic openness.
This overview shows that there is disagreement about the con-
sequences of economic openness for the welfare state. Each of the
arguments is plausible, and it is therefore not possible to disre-
gard one of them a priori. Summarizing the empirical material
may help to decide which of the two hypotheses finds the most
support. Therefore, we review the existing studies systematically.
Four criteria are used to select the studies: (1) only empirical stu-
dies were selected, (2) the studies include an indicator of econom-
ic openness, (3) the studies include an indicator of the welfare
state, and (4) the studies are based on cross-country comparisons.
A search of electronic databases yielded 22 studies that match
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these requirements (Appendix to Chapter 7). Some of the studies
use more than one measure for economic openness and the wel-
fare state. In a few cases these studies generate different out-
comes. In total there are 27 outcomes that are taken into account
in the overview.
There are various ways of conducting a research synthesis,
ranging from a purely descriptive overview mapping a field of in-
quiry to a quantitative meta-analysis combining and reanalyzing
the results from different studies (Glass 1976). Quantitative meta-
analysis is the most rigorous but also the most restrictive method
with respect to the kind of data it requires; the measurement of
the variables and the statistical approach need to be similar in the
different studies (Hedges & Olkin 1980). Since the measurement
of welfare states and the statistical tests vary between the studies
in this review, it is not possible to conduct such a meta-analysis.
Therefore, the vote-counting method is applied instead.
The vote-counting method involves counting the number of
studies that support one of the two hypotheses; economic open-
ness threatens or does not threaten the welfare state. Each study
that supports one of the hypotheses will be regarded as a confir-
mation. Hypothesis 1 is confirmed if a study reports a negative
effect of economic openness or finds convergence of welfare
states. Studies in which a positive effect of economic openness is
found and those showing no relationship between economic
openness and the welfare state support Hypothesis 2. Studies that
report a negative relationship for one of the measures of economic
openness but no effect for other measures are considered to sup-
port Hypothesis 1. Studies generating contrasting results support-
ing both hypotheses are reported twice.
In the vote-counting method, each study gets the same weight
when evaluating the hypotheses. This is a weak point in this meth-
od since some studies may be considered more important than
others, for instance because the data or the method of analysis is
of higher quality. Therefore, the outcomes of a vote count may be
affected by the lower quality studies (Cook, Cooper, Cordray, Hart-
mann, Light, Louis & Mosteller 1992). To take this into account,
the quality of the studies is assessed using the impact factor of the
journal in which the study was published, provided by Thomson
Scientific, which has the advantage that it offers a measure to
compare the different studies. The impact factor for the year 2005
is used. Five of the studies are not rated; four studies appeared in
130
journals without a rating, and one study is a book chapter. Other
characteristics of the studies, besides their quality, may also influ-
ence the outcomes. To make sure that the outcomes are not un-
duly influenced by these particularities, a number of variables are
investigated that may vary between the different studies. The first
two variables focus on the breadth of the studies, namely the num-
ber of countries that are included in the studies and the time peri-
od that the studies cover. The other two variables concern the mea-
surement of the variables and deal with how economic openness
and the welfare state are operationalized. After presenting the re-
sults from the vote-counting, the influence of these variables on
the outcomes are investigated in more detail.
7.1.2 Results
The 27 outcomes of the 22 studies are summarized in Table 7.1
and Table 7.2. Table 7.1 provides an overview of the studies sup-
porting Hypothesis 1, stating that economic openness threatens
the welfare state, and Table 7.2 summarizes the studies that sup-
port Hypothesis 2, arguing that economic openness does not
threaten the welfare state. Furthermore, the tables include infor-
mation on the different features of the studies.
The two tables show that eight of the outcomes support Hy-
pothesis 1 and nineteen are in accordance with Hypothesis 2. A
quick look at these figures leads to the conclusion that economic
openness does not threaten the welfare state. Nevertheless, this
conclusion is preliminary since it may well be that other factors
affect the distribution of the outcomes. For instance, if the out-
comes are related to the other variables summarized in the tables,
there may be reason to adjust this conclusion. Therefore, we shall
examine whether or not the characteristics of the studies matter
for these outcomes.
Selection of countries
The tables show that there is some similarity among the studies
concerning the countries that are analyzed. Most of the studies
use data on developed welfare states. This is not very surprising
since a large part of the literature deals with the question of
whether these extensive welfare states are in crisis. Much less em-
phasis is placed on the effect of globalization on developing wel-
fare states (Guan 2001). The focus on developed welfare states
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implies that the number of countries included in the studies is
relatively small, usually between fourteen and nineteen. Stacking
longitudinal data enables researchers to investigate the link be-
tween economic openness and the welfare state. A few studies in-
clude a larger sample of countries in their analyses, such as Alesi-
na and Wacziarg (1998) and Rodrik (1998). Others, such as
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) and Rudra and Haggard
(2005), have focused on less developed welfare states. Including
more countries in the sample does seem to influence the results
somewhat; the two studies examining the largest samples find a
positive relation between economic openness and the welfare
state. Since these studies include a large number of countries, it
can be deduced from them that the overall effect of economic
openness is positive. Nevertheless, the studies do not allow us to
conclude that there is a difference between well developed and
less developed welfare states, as can be read from the tables. Stu-
dies that focus on developed welfare states are found in both
tables, and the same holds for those examining less developed
welfare states. Therefore, the number of countries taken into ac-
count does matter to some degree, but the kind of welfare states –
well developed versus less developed – on which the studies are
based does not make a difference.
Time period
The studies are also similar with respect to the time period they
investigate. The majority of the studies examine the effects of
openness from the beginning of the 1970s until the end of the
1990s. There are four studies that span a substantially longer per-
iod and include developments that took place before 1960, and
some studies include more recent information. Therefore, most
of the findings cover a period of 20 to 30 years. Assuming that
the increase in economic openness is of a relatively recent date, it
is possible that the time period on which the studies focus will
influence the outcomes. The effects of economic openness should
then be more visible in the studies that include more recent data.
There is only limited support for this view. Overall, both the time
period and the time span of the study do not affect the outcomes
to a large extent.
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Quality of the studies
Investigating the impact factor of the journal in which the studies
are published leads to the conclusion that the subject has been
dealt with in high-quality journals. Only three studies are pub-
lished in journals with an impact factor below 1, and six articles
appeared in journals with an impact factor higher than 2, which
are regarded as high-quality journals. These studies, just like the
ones that are not published in journals that are indexed, are evenly
distributed over Table 7.1 and Table 7.2. Therefore, it can be con-
cluded that the quality of the studies does not influence the find-
ings.
Indicators of economic openness
Economic openness is defined as the extent to which a country is
integrated into the world market. As can be read from the tables,
there are various ways to measure this. In about half of the stu-
dies, economic openness is measured by trade openness, i.e. the
sum of imports and exports as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP) of a country. Another measure is liberalization,
such as the indicator developed in Quinn (1997). Foreign direct
investment (FDI) is a third measure used to indicate economic
openness.
Each of these indicators focuses on a different aspect of a coun-
try’s involvement in the world market. Trade openness concerns
the actual level of trade, liberalization indicates the absence of
trade barriers, and the financial interactions between countries
are measured with ingoing and outgoing FDI. These different in-
dicators might have different effects on the welfare state. The lit-
erature pays surprisingly little attention to this possibility. Instead,
the three aspects are considered as manifestations of the overarch-
ing variable “economic openness”. The tables show that many stu-
dies include two or three dimensions of economic openness. It
turns out that trade openness is more often related to the welfare
state than liberalization and FDI. However, the direction of this
influence remains unclear since both negative and positive effects
are reported. In many cases no effects of liberalization and FDI
are found. For reasons of clarity, not all of these null-findings are
reported in Table 7.2. If these finding were reported, there would
be even more support for the hypothesis that economic openness
does not influence the welfare state. From the effects of the differ-
ent dimensions of economic openness, it can be concluded that
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trade openness is related to the welfare state but that the direction
of this effect remains unclear and that considerably less influence
of liberalization and FDI on the welfare state is found.
Indicators of the welfare state
There are also different ways to measure welfare states. In the lit-
erature on economic openness and the welfare state, two indica-
tors are often used. The first indicator is based on the financial
resources that governments spend on social welfare. Usually an
overall measure of welfare spending as a share of GDP is ana-
lyzed, and sometimes distinctions are made between several func-
tional fields such as education, health care and social security. The
second indicator focuses on the income side of the welfare state.
The basic idea behind this measure is that the welfare state cannot
be sustained if there are no financial resources. Government re-
ceipts are measured by taxes; in some studies a distinction is
made between taxes on capital, taxes on labor and taxes on profits.
These monetary measures of the welfare state have some advan-
tages. Their general nature makes it possible to compare govern-
ment expenditures and income across countries and across time.
A problem associated with these measures is that the data are ag-
gregated, and therefore it is not possible to investigate shifts at
lower levels. If only particular groups are affected by economic
openness, the data will not show this. Furthermore, these indica-
tors do not give insight into the character of the social policies and
the qualitative changes that may occur. For instance, monetary
data do not allow us to investigate changes in the generosity of
social policies. Recently, measures have been developed to answer
these questions, of which the level of decommodification (Esping-
Andersen 1990) is probably the best known. The relevant ques-
tion, however, is whether the measurement of the welfare state
affects the outcomes. This turns out not to be the case; the various
measures of the welfare state can be found in both tables.
The overview presented here supports the view that welfare
states are not necessarily in danger because of increasing econom-
ic openness. However, it should be noted that this does not auto-
matically imply that economic openness is positively related to the
welfare state, considering the large number of studies showing no
relationship at all. Perhaps future research can answer this ques-
tion in more depth, but for now we can conclude from the avail-
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able research that economic openness does not threaten the wel-
fare state.
7.2 Social and political openness
As the previous section shows, interest regarding the effects of
economic openness has developed into a field of inquiry consist-
ing of a great number of empirical studies. The same does not
hold for the impact of social and political openness. Partly, this
may be due to the fact that the welfare state is most of all a finan-
cial means for redistributing public resources, and therefore re-
searchers have an almost natural tendency to direct most of their
attention towards economic threats and opportunities. Further-
more, this kind of research may have been constrained more by
data availability than economic openness. In particular, social
openness is a dimension of globalization that is hard to measure,
compared to economic openness, where there are some widely
used indicators available. Moreover, whereas there is a large num-
ber of comparative datasets that include measures of economic
openness, this is not the case for social openness since there is
lack of agreement about how to measure it. Nevertheless, even
though such information about political openness is available,
especially in the field of international relations, to date there has
been little research investigating its effects on the welfare state.
Therefore, it is not possible to come up with a theoretical and em-
pirical review of earlier studies as is the case with economic open-
ness, and our own research is presented instead.
7.2.1 Theories
Social openness
Social openness refers to the cross-border interactions between
people through personal contact, information flows, and cultural
exchanges. The welfare state may be affected by this kind of open-
ness in various ways. International flows of information and cul-
ture include exchanges through the media, like newspapers and
the Internet, or through direct contact between people. This can
result in cultural integration and a better understanding between
people, because they learn to speak a common language and get a
better understanding of each other’s norms and habits. If this is
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the main effect of social openness, the attractiveness of a country
increases for foreign investors, probably strengthening the finan-
cial base of the welfare state (Dreher 2006). Nevertheless, the ex-
pectation is that there are other effects as well, especially at the
level of the policy decisions taken at the national level. Quite re-
cently, researchers have tried to explain the spread of neo-liberal-
ism, and the anti-welfare state policies attached to it, across the
world.
Two mechanisms for understanding how information exchange
in international relations affects national policies are termed
“learning” and “emulation” (Lee & Strang 2006; Simmons, Dob-
bin & Garrett 2006). Learning takes place if governments change
their policies when they receive information about successful in-
terventions and best practices from other countries. From this it
follows that if learning is indeed the prime factor driving policy
changes, the spread of neo-liberalism results from its success in
certain countries and its adoption by governments in other coun-
tries. Whereas this mechanism assumes that governments have
the ability to decide whether policy option A is better than option
B, the emulation mechanism states that decision-makers are not
capable of making such choices. In contrast to the rational deci-
sion assumption central to the learning mechanism, emulation
points at the social construction of policies and the process of le-
gitimization underlying policy choices. Therefore, it holds that
governments are not weighing policy options but are guided by
what others think of as legitimate policy goals and interventions.
As a recent study shows, both learning and emulation explain cer-
tain changes in the size of the public sector (Lee & Strang 2006).
A noteworthy finding in this research is that the learning mecha-
nism provides insight into cuts in spending but not into its
growth, indicating that governments use particular information
and ignore other signals. In fact, this may be due to the emulation
mechanism and the fact that cuts in public spending are more
legitimate than increases.
International migration, the cross-border flow of people, is an-
other feature of social openness that has received some attention
in the literature. As with the other dimensions of social openness,
increasing migration can have contrasting effects on the welfare
state. One expectation is that a “race for the top” will result from
it, based on the argument that extensive welfare state provisions
will work as a magnet for people from poor countries (Buckley &
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Brinig 1997). In that case, large flows of people move into a coun-
try, which is likely to place a burden on the welfare state. On the
other hand, increasing levels of migration may also mean that the
influx of people has a positive impact on the existing stock of
knowledge and abilities in a country, thus leading to a brain-gain.
If that happens, it will be a valuable addition to a country’s econo-
my, and the welfare state is less likely to be threatened or may
even improve because of economic growth resulting from in-
creased productivity. Therefore, the effects of the different dimen-
sions of social openness, information and cultural exchange, and
migration can be either positive or negative and cannot be pre-
dicted beforehand.
Political openness
This state of affairs concerning the impact of social openness is
the same for political openness; it can have either a positive or a
negative impact. Negative effects may be predicted as a conse-
quence of powerful countries influencing the policies of less
powerful ones (Simmons, Dobin & Garrett 2006). This so-called
power mechanism refers to the situation in which the more
powerful countries use strategies such as threatening with vio-
lence, manipulation of economic costs and benefits, and monopo-
lization of information in their interactions with other countries,
both bilaterally and in wider collective settings, to make sure
others apply their preferred policies. For instance, this power
mechanism could play a role in bodies like the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, that are sometimes
accused of working alongside the American government to put
pressure on other countries by being selective in their provisions
of loans (Williamson 1993). On the other hand, it is argued that
these international political relationships have positive effects if
they are used as a means to overcome the negative effects of eco-
nomic openness, for instance when competition is channeled
through mutual agreements (Dreher 2006). The rationale behind
this is that economic openness creates a prisoner’s dilemma: if a
country does not cut its level of spending but its neighbors do,
there is a chance that companies and people move to the neigh-
boring countries where taxes are lower. Since all countries face the
same dilemma, they will decrease taxes and public spending be-
fore the others do, starting a downward spiral. With political
means and mutual agreements this downward spiral may be
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stopped. Therefore, in a similar way to social openness, the im-
pact of political openness on the welfare state cannot be predicted
unambiguously with existing theoretical notions, and it depends
on which of the mechanisms has the strongest effect: the power
mechanism or the cooperation mechanism.
7.2.2 Findings
Earlier research
Besides the aforementioned studies into the spread of neo-liberal-
ism, there are some other studies related to the impact of social
and political openness. Concerning social openness, there have
been some investigations into the question of whether welfare
state provisions function as a magnet for people trying to improve
their economic position by changing their place of residence. The
empirical investigations conducted so far are based on data from
the United States, where states differ with respect to their social
provisions. These studies focus on two kinds of research ques-
tions. The first question is whether people living within the US
move from less generous to more generous states, and the second
question focuses on the decisions of people from outside the US.
Research aimed at answering the first question shows that the
generosity of states does not significantly impact the mobility pat-
terns within the country. Rather, most people move to less gener-
ous states, and other factors, like individual characteristics and the
household situation, are better predictors of the movement of peo-
ple from one place to another (Allard & Danziger 2000). Studies
aiming at answering the second question yield different results,
probably because they focus on a different kind of migration. The
idea that states within a single country are attractive to certain
groups implies that people are completely mobile and will choose
the best possible place, without taking into account the consider-
able economic and social costs of such decisions. It is doubtful
whether such costs outweigh the relatively small benefits that one
gains by going to a more generous state within the same country.
This decision is different for people leaving their country. They
have already experienced the costs of moving, so the choice they
make may depend more on the generosity of the states they can
choose between. The prediction that immigrants in need of sup-
port are concentrated within the more generous states is con-
firmed by US data (Borjas 1999). These two findings show that
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there is some evidence in favor of the argument that welfare states
are magnets for people depending on them, but at the same time
the results indicate that other factors should not be ruled out as
insignificant. Also, it should be realized that two empirical studies
are a weak basis for strong conclusions and that additional re-
search, investigating these effects in other areas, is needed to
further explore the two questions about the location choices of in-
dividuals and households.
Studies of the consequences of European integration for the so-
cial provisions of the member states are examples of empirical
research concerning the effects of political openness. Neverthe-
less, it can be argued that if the European Union has an effect,
this most likely results from economic rather than political pro-
cesses (Andersen 2003). Other research aims at investigating the
impact of particular international organizations. For example, one
study investigated the extent to which the International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO) influenced welfare states, concluding that ILO
treaties have widened the gap between developed and less devel-
oped welfare states. ILO standards have lead to a higher level of
homogeneity among the welfare states in developed countries and
increases in welfare spending. Developing countries are less likely
to ratify ILO standards, and even if they do so, it does not increase
their level of spending (Strang & Chang 1993). Finally, to date
there is one study that includes the economic, social and political
dimensions of openness, as well as their combined effect (Dreher
2006). Based on data from 30 OECD countries between 1970 and
2000, including information on social expenditures and taxes, it
is concluded that the general level of openness is positively asso-
ciated with taxes on capital and that there is no relation with gov-
ernment spending and taxations of labor and consumption. More-
over, a further inspection shows that this effect results from
economic openness and not from social and political openness.
Additional research
Welfare states differ between countries, and researchers have tried
to develop measures to compare these differences across coun-
tries. The extensiveness of the welfare state is most commonly
used as a means to compare welfare states and focuses on how
much money governments spend on welfare provisions, relative
to the GDP of a country. A different approach tries to capture the
specific content of the welfare state policies in a country. This line
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of research is prompted by Esping-Andersen’s categorization of
the welfare state into liberal, conservative and social democratic
types that differ with respect to their level of decommodification;
the extent to which people depend on the labor market for their
individual welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990). Based on this feature
of welfare states, a benefits generosity index for three core welfare
state programs – unemployment insurance, sickness cash bene-
fits and retirement pensions – has been developed (Scruggs & Al-
len 2006a; 2006b). The extensiveness and the content of the wel-
fare state can both be affected by the openness of countries. Since
the level of welfare spending and the kind of welfare policies need
not be related to each other – the actual level of spending can stay
the same, while the system becomes more strict – both aspects of
welfare states are taken into account. As was noted earlier, the ef-
fects of economic openness on the welfare state are mainly based
on the theoretical arguments that it either leads to a race to the
bottom or that it increases insecurity among citizens. The effects
of social and political openness may run through different mecha-
nisms.
Data from different sources are combined to test the hypoth-
eses. The KOF Index of Globalization, discussed in Chapter 6, in-
cludes information on the economic, social and political dimen-
sions of globalization (Dreher 2006). The OECD Historical
Statistics (OECD 2001) provide data on social security transfers,
country size, and GDP per capita. The Comparative Welfare Enti-
tlements Dataset (Scruggs 2004) contains information about the
generosity of the welfare state. The final dataset includes informa-
tion about eighteen countries – Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cana-
da, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK,
and USA – between 1970 and 2000.
Two indicators of welfare states are investigated: social security
transfers and generosity. Social security transfers as a percentage
of GDP include benefits for sickness, old age, family allowances,
social assistance grants, and welfare (OECD 2001). These data are
not complete as the following data points are missing: Canada
(1999, 2000), New Zealand (1983-2000), Switzerland (2000),
and USA (1998-2000). Data on welfare state generosity are pro-
vided by Scruggs (2004). The overall level of welfare state gener-
osity includes information concerning unemployment insurance,
sickness cash benefits, and retirement pensions. Unemployment
144
insurance and the generosity of sickness cash benefits consist of
replacement rates (after-tax benefits for a single, fully insured, 40-
year-old, average production worker (APW) divided by the after-tax
wage of a fully employed APW), qualifying periods (weeks of in-
surance or employment required to qualify for a benefit), waiting
days (number of days before benefits start), duration of benefit
(the number of weeks a benefit is payable for a fully insured, 40-
year-old, unemployed person), and coverage ratio (percentage of
the labor force covered by unemployment insurance). The gener-
osity of retirement pensions consists of information on the mini-
mum replacement rate (after-tax income replacement rate for a
retiree with no other income or work history), standard replace-
ment rate (after-tax replacement rate for a person with a history of
APW earnings in each year of a 45-year working life, taken at nor-
mal retirement age), qualifying period (years of insurance or con-
tributions needed to qualify for standard pensions defined above),
contribution ratio (employee contribution to pensions divided by
[employee + employer contribution], taken at the time the pension
is granted), and coverage and take-up rate (proportion of the popu-
lation above retirement age receiving a public pension, including
public employees). The generosity scores are computed in corre-
spondence to Esping-Andersen’s decommodification index (for
detailed information, see Scruggs & Allan 2006a; 2006b). The
scores for generosity are available for all countries between 1971
and 2000, with one exception: the German data for 1971 and
1972 are missing.
Because social security transfers and welfare state generosity
may be influenced by factors other than social and political open-
ness, two control variables are added to the analyses that have
been used in studies examining the relationship between econom-
ic openness and the welfare state. The first one is GDP per capita,
earlier research showed that this variable is related to social secu-
rity transfers and generosity (Brady, Beckfield & Seeleib-Kaiser
2005). The second control variable included in the analyses is
country size (in squared kilometres), which may mediate the ef-
fect of openness on the welfare state. The reason for this is that
both the welfare state and the level of openness are negatively cor-
related with country size. Therefore, the relationship between
openness and the welfare state may be spurious (Alesina & Wac-
ziarg 1997; Rodrik 1998).
145
The dataset consists of panel data and is analyzed using multi-
level modeling. The basic multilevel model can be applied to long-
itudinal data by modeling events (the repeated measures) nested
within subjects. Advantages of multilevel modeling for repeated
measures are that it deals with the nested structure of the data
and also that it is not constrained by missing observations for sev-
eral points in time that would otherwise be completely excluded
from the analyses (Singer 1998; Hox 2000; Peugh & Enders
2005). In this particular case, developments in welfare state provi-
sions – social security transfers and generosity – and openness are
nested within countries; the multilevel model consists of annual
changes (Level 1) that can differ within and between countries
(Level 2). Multilevel modeling allows the specifying of the covar-
iance structure of the random part of the model. Since the meas-
ures are taken from the same unit, they will be highly correlated
with subsequent years. A common way to deal with this is to spe-
cify a first-order autoregressive covariance structure (AR1); this
structure has homogeneous variances and correlations that de-
cline exponentially with distance (Peugh & Enders 2005).
The analyses are performed in successive steps. First an empty
model is estimated that serves as a base model. In the second step
three variables are added, one examining the annual change in
welfare states (the variable year) and two control variables, the
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Figure 7.1 Mean social security transfers and generosity, 1970-2000
time-invariant variable size of the country and the annually chang-
ing variable GDP per capita (Model 1). In the final model, the vari-
ables social and political openness are added separately in Model
2a and Model 3a. In these models, the direct effect of openness
shows whether the level of openness of a country affects the wel-
fare state, and the interaction between time and openness enables
us to examine the effects of a change in openness. Since it is pos-
sible that the growth of globalization has accelerated during recent
years, two additional models are analyzed. In these models the
squared root of social and political openness is included to take
into account the possibility that globalization does not increase
linearly but faster in more recent years (Model 2b and Model 3b).
Figure 7.1 presents the developments in social security transfers
and generosity for the eighteen countries. Between 1970 and
1994, the mean level of social security transfers increased and
after that it declined. The level of generosity increased between
1971 and 1985, and from then on the mean level of generosity
remained stable. Overall, the welfare states have become slightly
more generous.
The welfare state indicators – social security transfers and gen-
erosity – per country are presented in Table 7.3. Table 7.3 includes
the following information. First, mean levels of social security
transfers and generosity for the whole period are provided. Next,
the difference is given between the first year and the final year.
And thirdly, the mean annual development per year is reported.
There are quite a few differences between the countries. The
means for social security transfers are two to three times higher
in the Netherlands and Sweden than in Australia and Japan, and
the mean level of generosity is twice as high in Sweden and New
Zealand compared to Japan and the United States. With respect to
changes in the welfare state, Table 7.3 shows that social security
transfers increased the most in Sweden, New Zealand and Fin-
land. These transfers decreased in only two countries: Ireland and
the Netherlands. The generosity of the welfare states increased in
all countries, with Germany being the only exception; there, the
level of generosity declined between 1971 and 2000. The highest
increases in generosity are found in Canada, Ireland and New
Zealand.
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Table 7.3 Social security transfers and generosity
Mean
transfers
Overall change in
transfers,
1970-2000
Annual
change in
transfers,
1970-2000
Mean
generosity
Overall
change in
generosity,
1971-2000
Annual change
in generosity,
1971-2000
Australia 7.34 5.40 0.18 19.40 3.00 0.10
Austria 18.17 3.40 0.11 27.17 3.90 0.13
Belgium 16.77 3.60 0.12 30.94 7.80 0.27
Canada 10.74 5.80 0.21 23.85 11.90 0.41
Denmark 16.65 5.50 0.18 35.62 6.80 0.23
Finland 14.78 9.60 0.32 30.78 7.90 0.27
France 17.57 3.20 0.11 29.46 4.80 0.17
Germany 17.14 6.10 0.20 28.71 -1.20 -0.04
Ireland 12.95 -1.10 -0.04 21.91 11.30 0.39
Italy 15.86 4.30 0.14 21.36 8.80 0.30
Japan 9.10 5.40 0.18 17.23 9.40 0.32
Netherlands 22.12 -4.90 -0.16 34.90 4.30 0.15
New Zealand 13.10 4.20 0.35 37.91 10.10 0.35
Norway 14.35 1.70 0.06 25.53 2.90 0.10
Sweden 18.48 7.30 0.24 41.09 2.10 0.07
Switzerland 12.21 3.70 0.13 26.63 1.90 0.07
United Kingdom 13.02 4.40 0.15 18.76 7.60 0.26
United States 11.28 5.00 0.19 18.35 7.00 0.24
Mean 14.54 4.03 0.15 27.20 6.13 0.21
Sources: OECD Historical Statistics and Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset
Figure 7.2 Mean social and political openness, 1970-2000
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The graphs in Figure 7.2 show the evolution of the mean level of
social and political openness between 1970 and 2000. The overall
social openness of the eighteen countries increased from 1970 to
1995. At that point the curve for social openness shows increasing
growth, which is most likely due to the rapid spread of the Inter-
net. The development of political openness differs from that of
social openness. Although the mean level of political openness is
higher in 2000 compared to 1970, there are some fluctuations
within that period. In the 1970s, countries became more politi-
cally open, but in the beginning of the 1980s the political open-
ness dropped to the level of 1970. From the end of the 1980s, the
level of political openness goes upwards, but not in a straight line.
Table 7.4 Social and political openness, 1970-2000
Mean
social
openness
Overall change
in social
openness
Annual change
in social
openness
Mean
political
openness
Overall change
in political
openness
Annual change
in political
openness
Australia 69.94 49.43 1.65 85.97 9.58 0.32
Austria 64.27 45.12 1.50 73.05 18.56 0.62
Belgium 68.95 35.03 1.17 90.66 6.44 0.21
Canada 77.21 27.99 0.93 88.86 11.17 0.37
Denmark 70.49 33.62 1.12 85.40 5.68 0.19
Finland 51.86 49.24 1.64 80.70 11.89 0.40
France 60.05 45.02 1.50 91.31 13.16 0.44
Germany 67.36 44.43 1.48 77.00 27.13 0.90
Ireland 61.07 26.66 0.89 57.87 33.76 1.13
Italy 45.32 41.97 1.40 90.16 6.71 0.22
Japan 39.48 31.28 1.04 68.79 31.16 1.04
Netherlands 72.67 45.00 1.50 84.54 6.72 0.22
New Zealand 53.12 36.68 1.22 48.50 6.87 0.23
Norway 65.95 31.27 1.04 77.15 6.28 0.21
Sweden 70.65 38.10 1.27 89.97 13.38 0.45
Switzerland 78.87 33.44 1.11 78.54 6.81 0.23
United Kingdom 62.33 48.86 1.63 87.77 9.91 0.33
United States 60.97 35.44 1.18 86.22 11.2 0.37
Mean 63.36 38.81 1.29 80.14 13.13 0.44
Source: KOF Index of Globalization
Table 7.4 shows the differences between countries with regard to
social and political openness. The mean levels of openness, the
levels of openness in 2000 compared to 1970, and the mean an-
nual change in openness are reported. From Table 7.4 it can be
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Table 7.5 Social security transfers, 1970-2000
Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b
Year (Y) 0.31**
(0.04)
0.34**
(0.06)
0.34**
(0.06)
0.29**
(0.04)
0.29**
(0.04)
Country size (log) -0.94*
(0.44)
-0.90*
(0.41)
-0.97*
(0.41)
-0.91*
(0.43)
-0.92*
(0.43)
GDP per capita -2.37**
(0.37)
-2.00**
(0.37)
-1.97**
(0.37)
-2.28**
(0.37)
-2.27**
(0.37)
Social openness (S) -0.09
(1.24)
(Y)*(SO) -0.12
(0.07)
Social openness squared (SO-sq) -0.08
(4.01)
(Y)*(SO-sq) -0.41†
(0.22)
Political openness (PO) 0.31
(0.25)
(Y)*(PO) -0.04
(0.02)
Political openness squared (PO-sq) 1.07
(0.84)
(Y)*(PO-sq) -0.12
(0.08)
Intercept 13.06**
(0.77)
14.30**
(0.82)
14.44**
(0.82)
13.07**
(0.82)
13.34**
(0.78)
-2loglikelihood 1451.40 1428.49 1427.16 1448.93 1448.67
Deviance 59.36** 22.91** 24.24** 2.47 2.73
AR1 (rho) 0.97**
(0.01)
0.97**
(0.01)
0.97**
(0.01)
0.97**
(0.01)
0.97**
(0.01)
Sources: KOF Index of Globalization, OECD Historical Statistics and Comparative Welfare Entitlements
Dataset
Empty model: -2loglikelihood = 1510.76; Df = 20.68; Intercept = 12.81 (0.87)
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01
read that countries differ with respect to their level of social and
political openness. Besides that, Table 7.4 shows that all countries
have faced an increase in social and political openness but that the
growth rates differ. Furthermore, the countries that have a high
level of social openness are not necessarily the ones with a high
level of political openness. Switzerland and Canada have the high-
est level of social openness, and the least socially open countries
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are Finland and Japan. At the same time, Finland is also the coun-
try with one of the highest increases in social openness between
1970 and 2000. The level of political openness is high in France
and Belgium. New Zealand and Ireland are among the least politi-
cally open countries. Nevertheless, the political openness of Ire-
land shows a greater increase than in other countries.
Analysis
The results for the effects of social and political openness on so-
cial security transfers between 1970 and 2000 are reported in Ta-
ble 7.5. Model 1 shows that social security transfers have gone up
each year in that period. Country size and GDP per capita have a
negative effect on social security transfers. These effects remain
basically the same in the other models when social and political
openness are added. In Model 2a and Model 2b the effects of so-
cial openness are investigated. In Model 2a the difference in social
openness between the countries and the changes in social open-
ness do not have a significant effect on social security transfers. In
Model 2b, investigating the squared root of social openness, it
turns out that the level of social openness is not related to social
security transfers and that an increase in social openness nega-
tively affects these transfers, suggesting a non-linear trend of so-
cial openness. Model 3a and Model 3b of Table 7.5 show that there
are no effects from political openness on social security transfers.
It can therefore be concluded that both the difference between
countries with respect to political openness and the changes that
took place in this dimension are not related to the social security
transfers in these eighteen countries.
The effects of social and political openness on the generosity of
welfare states are examined in Table 7.6. Model 1 in Table 7.6
shows that there has been an increase in generosity and that lar-
ger countries are less generous compared to smaller ones. GDP
per capita does not affect the level of generosity. Model 2a and
Model 2b show that differences between countries with respect to
social openness do not affect the level of generosity but that an
increase in social openness is related to less growth in generosity.
Model 3a and Model 3b, examining the effects of political open-
ness, show that the level of generosity and changes in generosity
cannot be explained by political openness. These analyses lead to
the conclusion that the level of generosity has increased less in
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Table 7.6 Generosity, 1971-2000
Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b
Year (Y) 0.23**
(0.06)
0.22**
(0.07)
0.22**
(0.07)
0.23**
(0.06)
0.23**
(0.06)
Country size (log) -1.80*
(0.76)
-1.79*
(0.76)
-1.79*
(0.76)
-1.80*
(0.75)
-1.80*
(0.76)
GDP per capita -0.21
(0.52)
-0.04
(0.51)
-0.02
(0.51)
-0.21
(0.52)
-0.21
(0.52)
Social openness (SO) -0.01
(0.02)
(Y)*(SO) -0.01**
(0.00)
Social openness squared (SO-sq) -0.14
(0.31)
(Y)*(SO-sq) -0.11**
(0.03)
Political openness (PO) -0.00
(0.02)
(Y)*(PO) -0.00
(0.00)
Political openness squared (PO-sq) -0.08
(0.27)
(Y)*(PO-sq) -0.01
(0.03)
Intercept 25.19**
(1.34)
26.80**
(1.39)
26.77**
(1.39)
25.26**
(1.34)
25.25**
(1.34)
-2loglikelihood 1812.91 1795.76 1796.34 1812.51 1812.59
Deviance 23.32** 17.15** 16.57** 0.40 0.32
AR1 (rho) 0.98**
(0.01)
0.98**
(0.01)
0.98**
(0.01)
0.98**
(0.01)
0.98**
(0.01)
Sources: KOF Index of Globalization, OECD Historical Statistics and Comparative Welfare Entitlements
DatasetEmpty model: -2loglikelihood = 1836.23; Df = 18.69; Intercept = 25.06 (1.63)
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01
countries experiencing the largest increase in social openness and
that political openness is not related to generosity.
This investigation leads to the following conclusions: welfare
states are not affected by differences in social and political open-
ness between countries, but increasing levels of social openness
are negatively associated with the welfare state, and the welfare
state is not affected by changes in political openness. It is impor-
tant to note that even though increasing levels of social openness
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are negatively related to welfare state generosity, these results have
to be considered in combination with the growth in social security
transfers and generosity during the period under study. A more
complete conclusion is that social security transfers and generos-
ity have increased, but that the countries experiencing the largest
increase in social openness have shown less welfare state expan-
sion than the less socially open countries.
7.3 Conclusions
This chapter investigated the impact of globalization on the wel-
fare state, using the distinctions between economic, social and po-
litical openness that we introduced in Chapter 6. Basically, we
started from the central claim that globalization necessitates a re-
duction of the welfare state. This claim is not supported if we take
the theoretical arguments and empirical findings into considera-
tion. First, we investigated the consequences of economic open-
ness and showed that this kind of openness does not threaten the
welfare state. Most of the empirical studies report a positive rela-
tionship between economic openness and the welfare state, and
quite a few other studies indicate no relationship. The second part
of the chapter leads to a similar conclusion with respect to the
effects of social and political openness: they do not have the dras-
tic negative effects that are sometimes suggested. All in all, there
is reason to believe that welfare states are strong enough to sur-
vive as globalization continues.
Although this conclusion may seem to signal good news for
those supporting the welfare state, it also creates a puzzling situa-
tion. Empirically, the different forms of openness do not cause a
crisis of the welfare state, whereas politicians and others taking
part in the public debate often claim that the opposite is true and
emphasize that economic openness has far-reaching conse-
quences for the generosity of the welfare state. It is not easy to
explain why this is the case, but other studies may shed more light
on the issue. An important insight that may explain the gap be-
tween empirical findings and the public debate is that globaliza-
tion is not just an economic development but also refers to a cer-
tain ideology, namely neo-liberalism, which has been used to
defend cuts in the welfare state (Palier & Sykes 2001; Piven
2001). Such cuts can be viewed as indicative of a broader ideologi-
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cal campaign, which is not opposed by a general public that re-
peatedly hears the message that the welfare state is bad and that
nations are powerless in a world moving further towards integra-
tion (Piven 2001).
In addition, the welfare state may be in crisis, not because of
increased globalization but because neo-liberalism has spread to
many countries through different mechanisms (Simmons, Dob-
bin & Garrett 2006). Whereas this ideology is deeply rooted in
America – culturally, economically, and politically – it also seems
to be gaining ground in Europe and has become central to the
political debate. One can argue that the social-democrats are no
longer the intellectual leaders and that neo-liberalism is the only
alternative for problems like the ageing population and unemploy-
ment (Fligstein 1997; Genschel 2004). A combination of the emu-
lation mechanism, based on the argument that social construction
in international relations affects social policies, and the power
mechanism may explain this. Whether these processes really are
the foundation of the dominant current in political thinking can-
not be concluded from the present research and requires addi-
tional investigations. Apart from that, it should be noted that these
mechanisms can lead to cuts in welfare states, not because such
cuts are necessary but simply because they are a means of acquir-
ing legitimization in international relations. One perverse effect of
such an ideology is that it results in a self-fulfilling prophecy; if
people repeatedly hear the message that the welfare state is a bad
thing, this may eventually lower support for the welfare state,
which is an important factor in sustaining it, and that in turn can
lead to further cuts. As the available research shows, there is little
or no empirical evidence that such cuts are inevitable as a conse-
quence of globalization.
Note
1. This chapter is based on Koster (2008) and Koster (2009a).
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8 Globalization versus localization
The relationship between openness and
solidarity1
The level of openness may have an impact on the social structures
of countries and the behavior and attitudes of its citizens. The eco-
nomic openness of a country implies that a large number of peo-
ple works for a company involved in international trade, affecting
their employment security since there is a chance that the com-
pany could decide to move its production to another part of the
world. In countries with a higher level of social openness, people
are more in contact with other parts of the world, for instance
through the Internet, and these countries are also characterized
by greater cultural diversity. This increased heterogeneity affects
people’s attitudes and behavior towards other groups in society in
particular, rendering solidarity more problematic than in relatively
homogeneous groups. Political openness is likely to have a less
direct effect on daily life compared to the other two, since it re-
sides at the level of international relations, the connections be-
tween political actors. Nevertheless, people do get informed about
political debates at that level through the media, and now and
again, international political developments provoke reactions
from the public.
Although these examples indicate the possible impact of the
three dimensions of globalization on social relations within socie-
ties, the question remains to what extent there is such an influ-
ence in reality, and also whether these consequences are negative
or positive in terms of social cohesion and solidarity. Many as-
sumptions and expectations about these effects of globalization
are to be found in the literature and in the popular press. Notably,
most attention is paid to the negative consequences, but to date,
empirical evidence regarding these questions is lacking. For in-
stance, it is often claimed that local cultures and traditions disap-
pear because of increased openness and that people identify less
with each other as national borders lose importance. At the same
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time, it is argued that globalization increases the importance of
local communities. Recent developments within the European
Union provide some examples to illustrate this. In several mem-
ber states, referenda have been held in which people have voiced
their concerns about the EU, indicating that in their opinion Euro-
pean integration has gone far enough, at least for the moment.
Partly, people’s desire to organize their social lives at the commu-
nity level and to keep them from being overblown by international
developments may explain this, rather than the assumption that
their solidarity with other people is decreasing.
The aim of this chapter is to analyze whether a higher level of
openness at the national level affects solidarity between individ-
uals. Our discussion takes place in two subsequent steps. First,
we analyze to what extent the three dimensions of openness influ-
ence the willingness to help certain groups in society, namely the el-
derly, the sick and disabled, and immigrants. Focusing on differ-
ent groups allows us to take into account that the level of solidarity
towards these groups can vary. We will investigate the different
impact that globalization has with respect to these groups. In ad-
dition, these groups are distinguished because it can be argued
that the motivations to help them differ. One reason to help el-
derly people is that they have already made a contribution to so-
ciety and deserve something in return from the younger genera-
tions. That the sick and disabled are regarded as a group needing
assistance is probable because their need is due to circumstances
beyond their control. People can be willing to support immigrants
to help them to adjust to their new situation. To some extent, dif-
ferences may occur because of in-group and out-group formation
and their effect on solidarity. Whereas elderly people and the sick
and disabled are likely to be regarded as members of the in-group,
indigenous people may have a different opinion about the posi-
tion of immigrants in society. Finally, we distinguish these groups
because people’s perceptions can differ with regard to how much
help they need. In most instances, there will be no doubt that el-
derly people and the sick and disabled need some form of assis-
tance, but in the case of immigrants this is less clear.
Investigating the first question provides insight into the rela-
tionship between the openness of countries and the solidarity of
their population towards the elderly, the sick and disabled, and
immigrants. In addition to people’s willingness to assist others,
we examine how they would like to organize their solidarity towards
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these groups. Therefore, the next question is whether people want
to help these groups informally, for instance through direct help
provided by themselves, or formally through the welfare state. For
that purpose, we make a distinction between two forms of solidar-
ity: compulsory and voluntary. Compulsory solidarity refers to the
formal kinds of solidarity such as the welfare state, to which peo-
ple contribute by paying taxes and contributions, and voluntary
solidarity involves helping others directly without the presence of
formal arrangements, usually the kind of solidarity that is found
in local communities. We analyze the relationship between the
preferences that people have towards these two forms of solidarity
and economic, social and political openness.
8.1 Openness and solidarity
One of the concerns stressed in the literature is that globalization
erodes local cultures and traditions (Inda & Rosaldo 2002; Kellner
2002). Such cultural changes are attributed to more porous na-
tional boundaries that become less clear and may no longer func-
tion as a fence between the inside and the outside world and can
result in the disappearance of identification with one’s own coun-
try (Marcussen, Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf & Roscher
1999; Jones & Smith 2001). If globalization means that national
boundaries become less important, it is possible that it also de-
creases people’s willingness to help each other because of lowered
social cohesion and interdependence among them. Nevertheless,
countering this expectation it can be argued that globalization
makes local social structures more important, for instance be-
cause citizens are more aware of their mutual dependence. If glo-
balization strengthens local structures, it can increase people’s in-
tention to help each other. From the existing literature it is not
clear if the level of helping behavior is negatively or positively re-
lated to globalization. The first part of this chapter is geared to-
wards researching this question.
8.1.1 Theory
Some groups of people are better off than others, because re-
sources and chances are unequally distributed amongst them, for
instance. Within modern societies the position that people have in
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the labor market influences their financial and other resources to
a large extent. People who are far removed from the labor market
can be dependent on others within society because they have diffi-
culty finding a job and making a living on their own. This section
focuses on the willingness to help three groups of people, namely
elderly, the sick and disabled, and immigrants. These groups are
chosen for two reasons. First, the cause for their dependence dif-
fers, and people’s motivation to help them can differ as well. El-
derly people are no longer active in the labor market, sick and
disabled people have difficulty finding a job that fits their abilities,
and for immigrants it may be difficult to find a job because their
credentials do not fit the labor market (Thorslund 2000; Aguilera
& Massey 2003).
People may have different views of these groups based on con-
siderations of insiders and outsiders. Elderly people and the sick
and disabled are more likely to be seen as belonging to society, as
part of the in-group, whereas immigrants are more likely to be
considered outsiders, even though they live in the same country.
Therefore, it is possible that people are more willing to help the
sick and disabled than to assist immigrants. A second reason to
distinguish between these groups is that it enables us to investi-
gate whether globalization is related to the willingness to help
others in general or whether it is related to the intention to help
specific groups in society.
There are different ways through which people can help those
who need assistance. Volunteering is part of a general cluster of
forms of helping behavior through formalized relationships (Wil-
son 2000), and support for the welfare state concerns the willing-
ness to provide financial resources to certain groups in society and
therefore only refers to formal arrangements provided by the state
(Svallfors 1997). Instead of focusing on such specific forms, we
analyze a general form of helping behavior – the willingness to
help certain groups – without specifying the means through
which this help is provided. Nevertheless, the presence of formal
means such as welfare state provisions offered through the gov-
ernment may influence the willingness to assist others. It is possi-
ble that a lot of people are willing to help others, but if most of the
assistance is already paid for through the tax system and dealt
with by the state, these formal kinds of help can crowd out infor-
mal kinds of helping behavior (Van Oorschot & Arts 2005). This is
accounted for in the empirical analyses by adjusting for the influ-
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ence of formal assistance that is organized through the welfare
state.
Helping behavior involves at least two parties: a person or a
group of people providing help and a person or a group of people
receiving help. When two persons are involved, there is one provi-
der and one receiver, and this kind of help can be either one-sided,
if resources are only flowing from the giver to the receiver and not
vice versa, or two-sided, when the receiver provides help in return
(cf. Chapter 2). When more people are involved, the situation is
slightly different. Analytically, it is possible to study helping beha-
vior between two groups in the same manner as in a situation
concerning two individual people, but it is also necessary to take
into account that these groups of givers and receivers consist of
individual actors who form a group that can produce a collective
good that benefits the receivers. As with all collective goods it
holds that its production may be problematic because for each in-
dividual it is costly to provide help, while there is no direct com-
pensation or benefit for that person (Hechter 1987). Given this
characteristic of a collective good, it is not likely that individuals
will engage in such behavior. However, such an approach to peo-
ple’s behavior assumes that people operate in isolation and that
they do not have social relations with others (Granovetter 1985).
In real life, people interact with each other and have social rela-
tions that are embedded in time and are part of a larger system of
social networks (Granovetter 1985; Buskens & Raub 2002). These
forms of embeddedness affect the level of trust amongst people
because they make learning and control possible.
Learning and control apply to the relationship between the pro-
viders and the receivers as well as to relationships amongst the
group of providers. Helping out the sick and disabled people and
immigrants will not be motivated by the expectation of a future
return alone (if at all); instead, the general norm can be that some
groups are in a needy situation for reasons outside their own in-
fluence, as is the case with the group of sick and disabled people.
With regard to immigrants, people can feel that this group needs
some assistance to get adjusted to the new situation that they live
in. Many people are willing to share resources with these different
groups of people, and probably the most important thing they ex-
pect from them is that they will not misuse their generosity by
acting opportunistically (Bowles & Gintis 2000). Through a pro-
cess of learning, information is acquired about such opportunistic
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behavior. When control is possible, negative sanctions can be used
against these opportunistic individuals, such as the withholding of
help in the future.
Learning and control can also increase the contributions that
people make to the collective good. People are likely to be more
willing to help others if they know that others will do the same.
Put simply, if only one person is willing to help out others in so-
ciety, it will not make much of a difference, but when there are
more people willing to do that, they will be able to create a collec-
tive good. Therefore, positive information about what others will
do enhances a person’s willingness to help others, and knowing
that others will not contribute is likely to decrease it (Murningham
1994). Control is also possible amongst the givers. People who are
very generous can be rewarded for that through social approval.
They can improve their reputation and create goodwill amongst
other people. Those who are not willing to help others run the
risk of facing negative sanctions, getting a bad reputation and are
less likely to receive help from others.
Several features of the social structure of a country facilitate or
hinder learning and control among citizens that may influence
their willingness to help others. Learning refers to the informa-
tion people receive about the behavior and intentions of others
through their social contacts. In this section, positive information
about fellow citizens is investigated, regarding the extent to which
people can rely on other citizens in their country and the overall
level of trust in other citizens. Such positive information about
others is likely to increase people’s willingness to help others be-
cause they have less reason to believe that their fellow citizens will
take advantage of them. Control is also related to the social struc-
ture of countries. If mutual control is effective, it induces norms
regarding helping behavior that are enforced through stable and
dense social structures (Coleman 1990). The stronger these
norms are and the more people follow them, the more costly it
becomes for an individual to deviate from them. If globalization
is related to the extent to which people are able to learn from each
other and control each other, it will be reflected in the willingness
to help others.
Hypotheses
Economic, social and political openness may affect the internal
social structure of countries that offer the possibilities for learning
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and control, which in turn are – negatively or positively – related
to the willingness to help others. In the literature, there are two
contrasting views on how globalization is related to social struc-
ture. The major argument for thinking that globalization under-
mines mutual help in society concerns the more porous bound-
aries of countries that function less as a clear dividing line
between insiders and outsiders. Contrary to that, it has been ar-
gued that the importance of local structures has increased because
of globalization, and people may be more willing to help each
other because of increased mutual interdependence. The argu-
ment that is advanced and tested in this section is that the level of
economic, social and political openness is related to the willing-
ness to help others depending on the consequences it has for the
social structure that people live in – and the possibilities these
structures offer for learning and control, and that this relationship
may be negative or positive. Both possibilities are considered,
leading to contrasting hypotheses.
Openness is negatively related to the willingness to help others
The economic openness of countries may be negatively related to
the willingness to help others. Countries with a high degree of
economic openness are involved in international economic rela-
tions and are affected more by what happens on the world market
than countries that have a relatively closed economy. When the
world market gets into a depression, the economically closed
countries are affected far less than the economically open ones.
In addition to that, there are more exit options for companies and
citizens in economically open countries. As the costs of moving
from one country to another are decreasing, it is believed that an
increasing number of companies choose to move their production
to low-wage countries and that individuals similarly move to
places where tax levels are lower. A consequence of these charac-
teristics of economic openness is that citizens face a higher level
of insecurity and that social norms are undermined in countries
with a higher degree of economic openness (Rodrik 1997; Bloss-
feld, Buchholz & Hofäcker 2006), eroding the social structure
that is a necessary condition for helping behavior.
The expectation that there will be a negative relation between
the social openness of a country and the willingness to help others
is based on the assumption that the level of heterogeneity within a
country is higher in socially open countries, which results from
163
the inflow of people from other countries. Heterogeneity may, in
turn, lower the level of social cohesion within societies (McPher-
son, Smith-Lovin & Cook 2001). When the internal structure is
more heterogeneous, the willingness to help others can decrease
because of less interdependence and identification among citi-
zens. Due to the lower social cohesion it can be more difficult to
produce and sustain a collective good like the assistance of vulner-
able groups.
Openness is positively related to the willingness to help others
In contrast, it may be argued that the economic openness of coun-
tries is positively related to the willingness to help others in so-
ciety. If economic openness means that people are more econom-
ically insecure, it implies that the need for protection and mutual
help is greater. People may respond to this heightened demand for
assistance by helping groups that are in need. To make sure that
everyone contributes, people may be more involved in learning
and mutual control, thus the levels of support within society may
be higher, and local structures may be more important (Inda &
Rosaldo 2002). When such mechanisms apply, the willingness to
help others is expected to be higher in economically open societies
compared to relatively closed countries.
Social openness may also mean that people become more aware
of their country’s boundaries; when they are living in a socially
open country, they can be more aware of the fact that their country
is part of a worldwide development than when they are living in a
relatively closed country and take their country’s boundary for
granted. This means that in these socially open countries people
are more aware that they share a common fate with fellow citizens.
Such a view emphasizes that social openness increases the notion
that there is such thing as a community to which people belong
and that people are more aware of their mutual dependence. In-
stead of blurring the national boundaries, this may in fact en-
hance the notion of who is an insider and who is an outsider.
As was noted earlier, we expect that political openness is not
strongly related to the social structures of countries, since it is
basically a matter of international relations between countries.
Therefore, the impact of political openness is more indirect com-
pared to the effects of economic and social openness. Neverthe-
less, there may be an indirect effect since political openness can
have a stabilizing effect that can prevent the negative effects of in-
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security caused by economic openness (Dreher 2006). Economic
openness is especially assumed to negatively affect the welfare
state through increased tax competition among countries (see
Chapter 7). International political relations may be used as a
means for countries with an extensive welfare state to come to
agreements with other countries that are also willing to sustain
their welfare state. The establishment of these mutual agreements
can put a stop to a potential race to bottom. If political openness
does indeed have such a stabilizing effect, it will not threaten the
willingness to help others.
We want to investigate how developments at the macro-level in-
fluence behaviors at the micro-level. The hypotheses do not state a
relationship between the willingness to help people and the eco-
nomic and social openness of a country per se, but it is argued
that this relationship is conditional on the social structure of a
country. According to the first hypothesis, the level of help offered
in more open countries is expected to be lower because the social
structure is assumed to offer fewer possibilities for learning and
control. The second hypothesis leads to the expectation that in
more open countries the social structure will adapt to provide
help to people that need assistance. For the empirical analysis this
means that the relationship between the willingness to help others
and the openness of a country should be mediated by the social
structure of a country.
8.1.2 Data and analyses
Four different datasets are used to test the hypotheses. The Euro-
pean Values Study is a large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal
survey research program regarding basic human values (Halman
2001). It gives insight into the preferences and orientations of the
populations of societies covering a wide range of economic, social,
political and cultural variations. In 1999-2000 the third wave of
this ongoing project was conducted among 39,797 respondents in
32 countries in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. The KOF
Index of Globalization measures the economic, social and political
dimensions of globalization. Country-level data on social struc-
tures are provided by Fidrmuc and Gërxhani (2005). These meas-
ures are based on the Eurobarometer survey 1998, 1999, and
2001 and the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer survey 2002.
Information on welfare state effort is provided through the IMF
165
Government Finance Statistics 2001 (International Monetary
Fund 2001). The four datasets are merged into one dataset. The
country-level datasets did not provide information for all of the
countries surveyed in the EVS. The final dataset includes 31,554
respondents from 26 countries.
Measures
Dependent variable
The European Values Study provides data on solidarity towards the
elderly, the sick and disabled, and immigrants. The exact wording of
these items is: “Would you be prepared to actually do something
to improve the conditions of:” followed by “the sick and disabled
people in your country?” and “immigrants in your country?”.
These variables range from 1 (absolutely no) to 5 (absolutely yes).
Independent variables
– Openness
The KOF Index of Globalization includes data measuring the
economic, social, and political openness of countries between 1970
and 2005 (see Chapter 6).
– Social structure
Three indicators of social structure are used: reliance on others,
national norms of giving, and mean level of trust. Data for the first
two indicators are calculated by Fidrmuc and Gërxhani (2005)
using data from the Eurobarometer survey, and the data on
trust are constructed performing similar calculations on the
European Values Study. The individual-level data from the
Eurobarometer survey and the European Values Study are ag-
gregated to the country level to give an indication of its social
structure. The variable reliance on others is measured with the
following question: “If you needed to borrow money to pay an
urgent bill, like electricity, gas, rent, or mortgage, is there any-
one you could rely on to help you, from outside your own
household?” This variable is coded 0 for people who do not
have someone to rely on and 1 for people who do. At the na-
tional level this variable indicates the fraction of citizens that
can rely on others for help. The variable national norms of giv-
ing is measured with the question: “Now thinking about poor
or socially excluded people, in the last twelve months, have you
given money or goods to poor or socially excluded people at
least once a month, less often or have you not done it?” The
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item is coded as 0 for those who have not contributed, 1 for
those who contributed less than once a month, and 2 for those
who have done so more often. This variable indicates how
strong the norm for helping others is within a country. The
variable mean level of trust is not measured in the Eurobarom-
eter survey and is computed in a similar fashion using the
European Values Study. The indicator for trust in other people
used in the European Values Study is: “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't
be too careful in dealing with people?” This variable is coded 0
for people who say that you cannot be too careful and 1 for
those who state that most people can be trusted. This variable
indicates the fraction of citizens that trust other people.
Statistical control variables
At the national level, we control for welfare spending, measured
with social spending as a share of GDP based on the data from
the IMF. At the individual level, the following independent vari-
ables – indicating the objective characteristics of respondent – are
analyzed. Religious denomination is measured with the item: “Do
you belong to a religious denomination” (0 = no; 1 = yes). Gender
is coded 0 = male and 1 = female. Employed is measured with the
item: “Are you yourself employed or not?” (0 = no; 1 = yes). Stable
relationship is measured with the item: “Whether you are married
or not, do you live in a stable relationship with a partner?” (0 = no;
1 = yes). The age of respondents is recoded into three groups: age-
low (people younger than 35 years old); age-middle (people be-
tween 35 and 65 years old); age-high (people older than 65 years
old). Educational level is recoded into three groups: low educational
level (inadequately completed elementary education, completed
elementary education, and elementary education and basic voca-
tional qualification); moderate educational level (secondary inter-
mediate vocational qualification, secondary intermediate general
qualification, and full secondary maturity-level certificate); and
high educational level (higher education, lower-level tertiary certi-
ficate and higher education, and upper-level tertiary certificate).
Town size is recoded into three groups: small town (under 5,000);
medium town (between 5,000 and 100,000); and big town
(100,000 and more).
The variables are measured at two different levels, the individ-
ual level and the country level. Table 8.1 provides an overview of
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Table 8.1 Data sources
Variable Level Data source
Dependent variables
Willingness to help others Individual European Values Study
Independent variables
Openness
Economic openness Country KOF Index of Globalization
Social openness Country KOF Index of Globalization
Political openness Country KOF Index of Globalization
Social structure
Social capital Country Eurobarometer (calculated by Fidrmuc & Gërxhani 2005)
National norms of giving Country Eurobarometer (calculated by Fidrmuc & Gërxhani 2005)
Trust Country European Values Study (own calculations)
Statistical control variables
Welfare spending Country International Monetary Fund
Individual control variables Individual European Values Study
the variables, the level at which they are measured, and the source
from which the data are taken.
Table 8.2 provides the mean level of the willingness to help the
sick and disabled and immigrants, as well as the country-level data
on reliance on others, national norms of helping, and trust for
each of the countries. Table 8.2 shows that, on average, the will-
ingness to help the sick and disabled is higher than the willing-
ness to help immigrants (m = 3.77 and m = 2.91). The willingness
to help both groups is the highest in Sweden and Ireland and the
lowest in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. The most economically
open countries are Luxembourg and Ireland, and the socially
most open countries are Sweden and Denmark. Romania and Po-
land are the least economically open countries, and Romania and
Lithuania are socially the least open countries in the sample. In
Ireland and Portugal many people can rely on others, whereas
people in Malta and Latvia report the lowest level of reliance on
others. In Ireland and Malta there is a strong national norm of
giving, and in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria the weakest norm
of giving is found. The mean level of trust in others is high in
Denmark and Sweden and low in Romania and Portugal.
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Table 8.2 Country-level means
Country N Willing-
ness
to help
elderly
Willingness
to help
the sick
and disabled
Willingness
to help
immigrants
Economic
openness
Social
openness
Reliance
on others
National
norms
of giving
Mean
level
of trust
France 1,605 3.63 3.73 2.75 4.72 2.45 0.79 0.75 0.21
Great Britain 972 3.58 3.66 2.66 4.47 2.98 0.79 0.92 0.29
Germany 2,005 3.56 3.49 2.94 4.26 2.65 0.65 0.59 0.38
Austria 1,502 3.65 3.66 2.84 4.99 3.14 0.76 0.78 0.33
Italy 1,981 3.94 3.99 3.39 3.88 1.54 0.82 0.92 0.33
Spain 1,172 3.63 3.60 3.29 4.62 1.47 0.79 0.87 0.39
Portugal 995 3.79 3.86 3.01 4.71 1.66 0.91 0.66 0.12
Netherlands 1,001 3.65 3.70 3.18 5.53 3.08 0.88 1.09 0.60
Belgium 1,902 3.79 3.83 2.95 5.40 2.00 0.66 0.65 0.29
Denmark 993 3.72 3.81 2.92 4.38 3.39 0.87 0.72 0.67
Sweden 1,009 4.05 4.14 3.71 5.02 4.24 0.90 0.74 0.66
Finland 1,020 3.82 3.84 2.86 5.25 3.44 0.84 0.84 0.57
Ireland 1,000 4.10 4.13 3.27 5.83 2.63 0.91 1.17 0.36
Estonia 960 3.20 3.31 2.48 5.05 1.91 0.77 0.41 0.23
Latvia 953 3.48 3.54 2.38 4.17 1.41 0.60 0.59 0.17
Lithuania 938 2.99 3.06 2.14 4.16 1.06 0.68 0.89 0.26
Poland 1,063 3.78 3.87 2.71 3.37 1.33 0.76 0.89 0.18
Czech Republic 1,877 3.69 3.93 2.80 4.42 1.82 0.80 0.45 0.25
Slovakia 1,299 3.86 3.89 2.74 4.11 1.13 0.79 0.52 0.16
Hungary 987 3.57 3.59 2.25 4.21 1.73 0.73 0.65 0.22
Romania 1,086 3.94 3.83 2.63 3.28 0.81 0.68 1.08 0.10
Bulgaria 914 3.66 3.79 2.70 3.53 1.11 0.67 0.32 0.27
Greece 1,135 3.76 3.88 3.10 4.55 1.42 0.70 0.82 0.24
Malta 1,000 3.95 4.05 3.08 3.94 2.94 0.56 1.22 0.21
Luxembourg 1,188 3.73 3.72 3.24 8.97 3.00 0.78 0.93 0.25
Slovenia 997 3.70 3.84 3.06 4.07 1.67 0.79 0.70 0.22
Total 31,554 3.70 3.77 2.91 4.65 2.14 0.76 0.76 0.30
Sources: European Values Study, KOF Index of Globalization and Fidrmuc and Gërxhani (2005).
Analysis
The empirical analyses concern variables at different levels of ana-
lysis because the dataset includes data at the individual level (level
1) and the country level (level 2). Therefore, multilevel regression
analysis is applied (cf. Chapter 5).
In this chapter, the dependent variables – the willingness to
help the sick and disabled and the willingness to help immigrants
– are measured at the individual level, and the independent vari-
ables are measured at the individual and the country level. By
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using multilevel regression analysis, it is possible to distinguish
the variations at level 1 and level 2. The multilevel analyses are
performed in several steps, and for each of these models the log-
likelihood statistic is computed. The difference in likelihood be-
tween two models (called the deviance) indicates whether the fit
of the model increases when variables are added to it.
Table 8.3 Country-level correlation coefficients
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. Economic openness
2. Social openness 0.51**
3. Political openness -0.07 0.40*
4. Reliance on others 0.35† 0.45* 0.36†
5. National norms of giving 0.17 0.24 0.08 0.07
6. Mean level of trust 0.26 0.76** 0.41* 0.54** 0.12
Sources: European Values Study, KOF Index of Globalization and Fidrmuc and Gërxhani (2005)
26 countries
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
8.1.3 Results
Table 8.3 shows the relationship between the different kinds of
openness and the indicators of the social structure of countries.
Starting with the three dimensions of openness, it turns out that
social openness is positively related to economic openness and po-
litical openness, and that economic and political openness are not
related. If we focus on the interrelations between the characteris-
tics of social structure, we see that national norms of giving and
the mean level of trust in a country are positively related and that
reliance on others is not related to the other two indicators. Inves-
tigating the relations between openness and social structure at the
national level shows that reliance on others is positively related to
all three dimensions of openness, national norms of giving are
not related to the level of openness, and that the mean level of
trust is related to social and political openness.
Multilevel analysis
We performed a multilevel analysis in a number of steps. First, an
empty model is calculated that functions as a baseline for compar-
ing the other models. Then the statistical control variables are
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Table 8.4 Effects of control variables (multilevel analyses)
Solidarity
with elderly
Solidarity
with the sick
and disabled
Solidarity
with
immigrants
Welfare spending 0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
Religious denomination 0.09**
(0.01)
0.09**
(0.01)
0.10**
(0.01)
Gender (1 = female) 0.08**
(0.01)
0.07**
(0.01)
0.07**
(0.01)
Stable relationship 0.08**
(0.01)
0.05**
(0.01)
0.04**
(0.01)
Employed -0.02
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.01)
-0.02†
(0.01)
Age – low -0.18**
(0.01)
-0.12**
(0.01)
-0.06**
(0.01)
Age – high -0.01
(0.01)
-0.06**
(0.02)
-0.12**
(0.02)
Education – low -0.04**
(0.01)
-0.05**
(0.01)
-0.16**
(0.01)
Education – high 0.03*
(0.01)
0.03*
(0.01)
0.20**
(0.02)
Town size – small -0.04**
(0.01)
-0.04**
(0.01)
-0.05**
(0.01)
Town size – big -0.03**
(0.01)
-0.04**
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.01)
Intercept 3.68**
(0.05)
3.71**
(0.05)
2.83**
(0.07)
Deviance 1,082.87** 785.40** 2,218.36**
Intraclass correlation 0.07 0.07 0.11
Sources: European Values Study, KOF Index of Globalization, Fidrmuc and Gërxhani (2005), and Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (2001)
31,554 respondents in 26 countries. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors
are in parentheses.
Empty model: Intercept 3.76** (0.05); -2*loglikelihood: 77,526.30; Intraclass correlation: 0.07.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
added to the model as is shown in Table 8.4. The effects of the
control variables are similar for solidarity towards the elderly, the
sick and disabled, and immigrants. Welfare spending is not re-
lated to people’s willingness to help these groups. Religious de-
nomination is positively related to the willingness to help others;
this effect is slightly lower for the willingness to help immigrants.
The results for gender indicate that women are more willing to
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help others than men. Living with a partner in a stable relation-
ship is positively related to the willingness to help others. Being
employed does not affect the willingness to help others. Age is
curvilinearly related to the willingness to help others; both young-
er and older people are less willing to help others compared to
people in the age group between 35 and 65 years old. Educational
level has a curvilinear relation with the willingness to help others;
lower educated people are less willing to help others. The differ-
ence between lower-educated and higher-educated persons is
large in the model of the willingness to help immigrants. Town
size has a curvilinear effect; people living in a medium-sized
town are more willing to help others than those living in small or
big towns. The effects of the statistical control variables remain
the same after adding the openness and social structure variables.
Table 8.5 Multilevel analysis of solidarity towards the elderly
Openness
Economic openness -0.01
(0.04)
-0.04
(0.04)
Social openness 0.07
(0.05)
0.05
(0.07)
Political openness 0.06†
(0.03)
0.05
(0.03)
Social structure
Reliance on others 0.90†
(0.50)
0.76
(0.48)
0.60
(0.48)
National norms of giving 0.33†
(0.18)
0.29
(0.19)
0.32†
(0.18)
Mean level of trust -0.01
(0.30)
-0.20
(0.40)
-0.13
(0.30)
Intercept 3.63**
(0.05)
3.63**
(0.04)
3.63**
(0.05)
3.63**
(0.04)
3.64**
(0.04)
3.64**
(0.04)
Deviance 0.03 6.60** 1.60* 4.58** 3.61** 4.75**
Intraclass correlation 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05
Sources: European Values Study, KOF Index of Globalization and Fidrmuc and Gërxhani (2005)
31,554 respondents in 26 countries. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors
are in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
172
Solidarity towards the elderly
Table 8.5 summarizes the result from the analyses for solidarity
towards elderly people. This kind of solidarity is not related to the
economic and social openness of countries and is slightly posi-
tively related to political openness. The effect of political openness
disappears after including the variables measuring social struc-
ture. National norms of giving mediate this relationship. Given
these results, it can be stated that there is a weak relationship be-
tween the openness of countries and solidarity towards elderly
people.
Table 8.6 Multilevel analysis of solidarity towards the sick and
disabled
Openness
Economic openness 0.00
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.04)
Social openness 0.08
(0.05)
0.08
(0.07)
Political openness 0.05
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)
Social structure
Reliance on others 1.01†
(0.52)
0.89†
(0.49)
0.79
(0.22)
National norms of giving 0.22
(0.19)
0.17
(0.19)
0.22
(0.19)
Mean level of trust -0.05
(0.32)
-0.36
(0.41)
-0.15
(0.32)
Intercept 3.71**
(0.05)
3.70**
(0.04)
3.71**
(0.05)
3.70**
(0.05)
3.72**
(0.05)
3.71**
(0.04)
Deviance 0.01 5.36** 2.18** 4.05** 2.39** 3.18**
Intraclass correlation 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05
Sources: European Values Study, KOF Index of Globalization and Fidrmuc and Gërxhani (2005)
31,554 respondents in 26 countries. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors
are in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Solidarity towards the sick and disabled
The relationship between openness, social structure, and the will-
ingness to help the sick and disabled are displayed in Table 8.6.
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Table 8.6 shows that the three dimensions of openness are not
related to this kind of solidarity. Adding the variables for social
structure leads to an improvement of the models for economic
and social openness because, in both cases, reliance on others is
positively related to the willingness to help the sick and disabled.
The conclusion drawn from the results shown in Table 8.6 is that
the willingness to help the sick and disabled is not related to the
economic and social openness of countries, and that the higher
the level of reliance on others is in a country, the higher the will-
ingness to help this group of people.
Table 8.7 Multilevel analysis of solidarity towards immigrants
Openness
Economic openness 0.10†
(0.06)
0.05
(0.05)
Social openness 0.17*
(0.07)
0.09
(0.09)
Political openness 0.06
(0.04)
0.02
(0.04)
Social structure
Reliance on others 1.17†
(0.67)
1.30†
(0.65)
1.26†
(0.67)
National norms of giving 0.28
(0.25)
0.26
(0.25)
0.30
(0.25)
Mean level of trust 0.49
(0.41)
0.17
(0.53)
0.45
(0.42)
Intercept 2.83**
(0.06)
2.83**
(0.06)
2.84**
(0.06)
2.84**
(0.06)
2.85**
(0.06)
2.83**
(0.06)
Deviance 2.74** 8.17** 5.37** 5.45** 2.07** 8.09**
Intraclass correlation 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.08
Sources: European Values Study, KOF Index of Globalization and Fidrmuc and Gërxhani (2005)
31,554 respondents in 26 countries. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors
are in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Solidarity towards immigrants
Table 8.7 shows the multilevel regression for the willingness to
help immigrants. From Table 8.5 it can be read that economic
openness and social openness are positively related to the willing-
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ness to help immigrants, the effect of political openness is also
positive but not significant. The effects of economic and social
openness disappear after the indicators for social structure are in-
cluded in the model. In these models, the variable reliance on
others is positively related to the willingness to help immigrants.
From the analyses that are presented in Table 8.7, it is concluded
that the willingness to help immigrants is positively related to the
economic openness and the social openness of countries and that
these effects are mediated by the variable reliance on others.
Conclusions on globalization and solidarity
Solidarity towards the elderly is somewhat higher in politically
open countries, the willingness to help the sick and disabled is
not related to the openness of countries, and solidarity towards
immigrants is higher in countries with a higher level of economic
openness and the socially open countries. Therefore, these out-
comes do not support the claim that openness undermines peo-
ple’s solidarity. Furthermore, we conclude that the effects of globa-
lization differ across groups; solidarity with the elderly, the sick
and disabled is not related to the openness of a country, whereas
the willingness to help immigrants is higher in the more open
countries. Moreover, because reliance on others explains the posi-
tive relationship between openness and solidarity, the more open
countries are also the countries in which the mean level of reli-
ance on others is higher. That people living in open countries
have better access to social resources than people in less open
countries supports the idea that learning from the behavior of
others increases the willingness to assist others.
8.2 Openness and the organization of solidarity
There are three different interpretations of the relationship be-
tween openness and solidarity, depending on how the questions
in the European Values Study about the willingness to help others
are understood. According to the first interpretation, this question
measures the level of informal help that people offer (Van
Oorschot & Arts 2005). In contrast, the second interpretation ar-
gues that the willingness to help others reflects the level of sup-
port for the welfare state. A third interpretation, which we follow
in this chapter, is that the willingness to help others refers to a
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broader attitude that people have towards those in society who
they think should be assisted. Such assistance can be offered in-
formally, for instance by directly helping these groups, or formally
through the welfare state. According to this interpretation, addi-
tional information is necessary to draw conclusions about whether
people would like to provide help themselves, informally, or
through the welfare state. In the second part of this chapter, we
discuss the preferences that people have regarding the organiza-
tion of solidarity and how they are related to the economic, social
and political openness of countries.
8.2.1 Theory
People run several risks in everyday life, such as illness and un-
employment, which may be dealt with in several ways. Usually,
effective coverage of risks implies that individual contributions
are pooled and arrangements are created, providing rules which
regulate who can make use of these collective means, leading to a
system of collecting and redistributing resources. The three fun-
damental means for allocating resources that are identified in the
literature are termed “markets,” “governments” (or bureaucra-
cies), and “communities” (Bowles & Gintis 1996). These alloca-
tion mechanisms offer different solutions for dealing with risks.
For instance, when a person gets ill and needs help from others, it
is possible that help is provided through the market if there is a
private insurance covering the costs for medical care. It can be
provided through the government if there are collective arrange-
ments or if the care is provided by the government, and finally,
this person may also receive informal help offered by relatives
and friends. The result is similar in all three cases: the sick person
gets help. Nevertheless, the means through which the help is of-
fered differ. The market functions through the price mechanism
bringing together demand and supply, the government uses for-
mal rules and control mechanisms, and the community is charac-
terized by informal relations and mutual trust (Bowles & Gintis
2002). These three mechanisms for allocating resources can be
distinguished by the level and the kind of solidarity they require.
Market relations are characterized by the lowest level of solidarity
compared to the other two mechanisms. Both the provision of
help through the government and help through the community
require solidarity, but they differ with respect to the kind of soli-
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darity on which they are based. In the first case a system of formal
and compulsory solidarity is at work, and the latter is based on
informal and voluntary solidarity.
In the literature, especially the area of economic theories of or-
ganization such as the transaction cost approach (Williamson
1981), there is a focus on a dichotomy between the market and
bureaucratic arrangements; in the case of risk coverage, there is a
choice between the price mechanism and formal regulation by the
government. For analyzing such choices it is argued that as long
as the price mechanism functions well, this will be the most effi-
cient solution, but if the market fails, it is more efficient to use
bureaucratic arrangements. As such, the notion of market failure
is at the heart of economic theories of organization (Simon 1991).
In principle, everything can be taken care of through the market,
and the only reason for government intervention is a market fail-
ure. As a result, this approach aims at identifying the causes of
such failures, which are related to human behavior and cognition
as certain characteristics of market relationships. It is assumed
that people are not perfect, but are rational actors that may act
opportunistically; they are not able to take all possible actions and
their consequences into consideration, and they may take advan-
tage of a situation if the market relation gives them a chance of
doing so. Bounded rationality and opportunism do not create mar-
ket failures as such, but may do if certain conditions are present.
Market relationships can differ with respect to their complexity,
uncertainty, and the number of actors involved. Assuming
bounded rationality and opportunism, markets are more likely to
fail if the market relationship is more complex, more insecure,
and if fewer actors participate (Williamson 1975).
Applied to the example of medical care, in which it is difficult to
get information about other actors, two problems can occur. The
first potential problem is that it leads to a process called adverse
selection (Akerlof 1970). The ones who have a lower risk of get-
ting ill are less likely to be willing to pay for insurance if they will
not benefit from it. If they do not participate, the costs for insur-
ance will go up because fewer people are paying for it while more
people depend on it and need money to pay their hospital bills. In
turn, as the costs increase it drives out the people with an average
chance of getting ill. Even though they may need the insurance,
the costs are too high for them to pay off. In the end, the cost of
getting insured is too high for everyone, leading to a situation in
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which no one is willing to get insurance while at the same time
knowing that everyone would benefit from it if it were available.
The second problem that may occur if there is an insurance
scheme to cover risk is moral hazard (Arrow 1963). If people
know that their risks are covered, they may change their behavior
and take risky actions or even deceive an insurance company in
order to get money. The tendency is clearly illustrated by the case
of “Nub City”. The story about this small town appeared in the
Wall street Journal of December 23, 1974, reporting on the great
number of people losing their arms and legs. Investigations by
experts showed that this situation did not result from accidents
but because people were willing to hurt themselves in order to
claim insurance money (Dornstein 1996). Undoubtedly, this is a
very extreme example, showing that behavior may be affected if
there are insurance schemes in place. As a consequence, the costs
for insurance rise and people have to pay more, including those
who do not embark on more risk-taking behavior than before they
were insured. For this latter group of people, it becomes less at-
tractive to pay for the insurance. Again, this starts a process
through which people withdraw and the costs for insurance rise.
That markets for insurance can fail due to problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard has been used as an argument for gov-
ernment intervention to regulate these markets. The most com-
mon solution proposed to deal with these problems is that govern-
ments introduce a compulsory insurance, limiting people’s
choices, to make sure that both the good and the bad risks are
represented, combined with extensive monitoring and formal
sanctions to make sure that everyone contributes and only those
people who really need it can profit.
The argument outlined above illustrates the dichotomy between
market and government solutions that is central to the literature
on economic organization. Markets can be used to cover risks, but
government intervention may be more efficient if markets fail. In
these approaches, two solutions represent the extremes of a conti-
nuum for the allocation of resources. Nevertheless, it is also possi-
ble that both markets and governments fail. In particular, this may
be the case if there is more insecurity about the transaction and if
the actors have conflicting interests (Ouchi 1980). An additional
mechanism that can be added to the dichotomy is termed “com-
munity” and may be a means to overcome problems of failing
markets and governments. Community relationships are typified
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by a high level of interdependence among members of a commu-
nity and the longevity of these relationships. The advantage of
communities over market and government solutions is that they
contain more accurate information about the behavior, abilities,
and needs of the members, increasing possibilities for sustaining
norms and the search for efficient solutions that are not under-
mined by adverse selection and risk-seeking behaviours (Bowles
& Gintis 2002). Although communities and government solu-
tions both require that people are willing to share resources with
others, they differ with respect to the kind of solidarity associated
with them. In contrast to the compulsory solidarity organized
through the government, community relationships are character-
ized by voluntary solidarity among the members.
Which of the three mechanisms is likely to be the most efficient
depends on the characteristics of the transaction. In the theoreti-
cal literature as well as in policy discussions, considerations about
the most efficient solution are usually top-down. In these in-
stances it is estimated which of the mechanisms will function the
best given the complexity, uncertainty and the number of actors
involved in the transaction. The current section uses a bottom-up
approach to this problem, namely by investigating people’s prefer-
ence for one of the three mechanisms with regard to their willing-
ness to help others. If people are not willing to help others, it is
assumed that they prefer the market mechanism, and if they do
want to help others, this can be organized through the govern-
ment, requiring compulsory solidarity or the community, based
on voluntary solidarity. The preference that people have towards
the organization of solidarity depends on the extent to which they
believe that one of the mechanisms will be a good solution.
Further, beliefs concerning the mechanisms are assumed to be
influenced by the social structure in which they should cover a
certain risk. The three mechanisms are related to the level of un-
certainty, complexity and the number of people. The market
mechanism will be the most efficient solution if the level of uncer-
tainty and complexity is low and many people are involved, which
is necessary to let the price mechanism do its work and bring sup-
ply and demand together. The chances of market failure increase
as the uncertainty and complexity within society increase, and
people will be more willing to let the government take over to
come up with solutions that cannot be left to the market. If the
level of uncertainty and complexity move beyond a certain critical
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point, people will start to doubt that the government is able to
develop efficient solutions, and they will be more in favor of creat-
ing their own solutions within their community. This latter point
involves far fewer people than in the case of the market and the
government mechanism and leads to additional coordination
costs. Since communities are relatively small and the members
that are part of them are able to monitor each other’s behavior
and intentions, norms and sanctions can be developed to sustain
solidarity within them to handle these additional costs.
The effects of globalization
As was theorized in the previous section, people will prefer the
mechanism that they believe is the best way of dealing with a cer-
tain risk and to overcome problems of opportunism. These beliefs
depend on the social structure of society. Therefore, the different
kinds of openness at the national level may influence people’s pre-
ference for the organization of solidarity through the effects that
they have on the social structure.
Economic openness
Economic openness can influence people’s preferences as follows.
It is argued that economic openness leads to more insecurity and
that the social norms and social structure necessary to sustain so-
lidarity may be undermined (Rodrik 1997; Blossfeld, Buchholz &
Hofäcker 2006). A higher level of insecurity either implies that
people’s risks increase or that the number of people facing a cer-
tain risk increases. In both cases the uncertainty and complexity
within countries increase, and it becomes more difficult to cover
these risks through the market. It may be questioned then
whether insurances will be able to cover these risks efficiently.
Therefore, economic openness increases the preference for com-
pulsory solidarity provided through the government. The condi-
tion that needs to be met is that there is a certain level of solidarity
among the citizens of a country, since they have to be willing to
spend financial resources for these collective arrangements from
which they may not benefit themselves. As is shown by research
concerning welfare state support, people will be in favor of collec-
tively organized solidarity if they have the impression that others
are not taking advantage of their contributions (Bowles & Gintis
2000). If the level of insecurity increases further, due to more eco-
nomic openness, it is possible that people will not put their trust
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in the government to deal with these risks and will be increasingly
inclined to come up with solutions within their own community
and thus have a stronger preference for voluntary solidarity. The
expectation is, therefore, that the preference for voluntary solidar-
ity is the strongest in the most economically open countries be-
cause of increased insecurity.
Social openness
The effect of social openness on the preference for solidarity is
based on the assumption that the socially open countries have a
more heterogeneous social structure because of the international
flows of information, culture and people. The level of social cohe-
sion may decrease within these countries because of this in-
creased heterogeneity (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook 2001).
Within heterogeneous countries, there is more uncertainty about
the behavior and intentions of fellow citizens, and as risks may
also be distributed less homogeneously among citizens, societal
complexity is higher. This increases the likelihood of market fail-
ures. As risks vary more, a problem with private insurances can
occur because chances are greater that people with the lowest
risks are less willing to pay for insurance, leaving the people who
have a high risk with an insurance that they may not be able to
afford. At the same time, the preference for compulsory forms of
solidarity can increase because of lower levels of actual and per-
ceived interdependence among people. The expectation is, there-
fore, that people are less willing to contribute to collective arrange-
ments such as the welfare state. Increased heterogeneity can thus
lead to a higher preference for voluntary solidarity organized
through the community. Whereas the heterogeneity of the na-
tional social structure increases, this does not have to be the case
for local structures in which people know each other well enough
to deal with problems of opportunism. We thus expect that the
preference for voluntary solidarity is stronger in socially open
countries because of increased heterogeneity.
Political openness
Political openness is a consequence of the international political
relations between countries and is expected to have less direct ef-
fects on the social structure of countries than economic and social
openness. Nevertheless, there may be an indirect effect since poli-
tical openness can have a stabilizing effect through the interna-
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tional relations that can prevent the negative effects of insecurity
caused by economic openness (Dreher 2006). If political open-
ness does indeed have such a stabilizing effect, there will be no
threat to the level of compulsory solidarity. On the contrary, if
countries counter the negative effects of economic openness suc-
cessfully, this may increase the preference for compulsory solidar-
ity among their citizens. This leads to the prediction that the pre-
ference for compulsory solidarity is stronger in politically open
countries because of the stabilizing effect of international rela-
tions.
8.2.2 Data and analyses
Data
We use data about the same 26 countries as in Section 8.1, avail-
able through the European Values Study, the KOF Index of Globali-
zation and the International Monetary Fund, to perform the ana-
lyses.
Dependent variable: organization of solidarity
The dataset does not include a variable measuring the preferences
that people have towards the organization of solidarity. The vari-
able organization of solidarity is constructed using two variables
from the EVS that represent the distinction between no solidarity,
compulsory solidarity, and voluntary solidarity made earlier in this
section. The first variable measures whether people are willing to
help the elderly, the sick and disabled, and immigrants. In the
EVS this variable is measured on a five-point scale (1 = absolutely
not; 5 = absolutely yes). This variable has been recoded to the two
categories “prepared to help” for the people scoring 1, 2 or 3 and
“not prepared to help” for the people scoring 4 and 5. The second
variable measures whether people think individuals or govern-
ments should take more responsibility, ranging from 1 to 10. This
variable is also recoded into two categories; the persons scoring
between 1 and 5 indicate that they prefer “individual responsibil-
ity” and the ones scoring between 6 and 10 prefer “government
intervention”. The variable organization of solidarity combines
these two variables measuring whether people are prepared to
help others or not and whether they prefer individual or govern-
ment responsibility. This variable is constructed for three groups:
the elderly, the sick and disabled, and immigrants.
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Explanatory variables
We included the same control variables and indicators for open-
ness as in Section 8.1. The variables measuring social structure
are not included.
Method
Table 8.1 provides an overview of the variables used in this study,
the level at which they are measured and the data sources from
which they are taken. Because of the nature of the data, standard
regression analysis cannot be applied. First, the dataset includes
information at two different levels. Individual preferences and
characteristics are measured at the lowest level, and information
about the country’s openness and the welfare state is measured at
the national level. Secondly, the variables used in this study to in-
vestigate people’s preferences are categorical. People prefer one of
the possibilities – no solidarity, compulsory solidarity, or voluntary
solidarity – to the others, and therefore these variables either have
the value 0 or 1. If people have a value of 1 on one of the variables,
it implies that they have a 0 on the other two variables. Logistic
multilevel analysis is applied to deal with the type and structure of
the data in which each of the three possibilities is the dependent
variable for the level and kind of solidarity people prefer towards
the elderly, the sick and disabled, and immigrants. The analyses
are performed in two steps. First, the effects of the statistical con-
trol variables are investigated. The second step examines the influ-
ence of economic, social and political openness in different mod-
els. The effects of the statistical control variables do not change a
great deal after including these national level variables, and there-
fore they are reported separately.
8.2.3 Results
Descriptive results
Table 8.8 summarizes the distribution of people’s preference for
solidarity towards the three groups of people. At the aggregate lev-
el, including all 26 countries, these preferences are almost the
same for the elderly and the sick and disabled and are different
for immigrants. About 37 percent of the people are not prepared
to help the first two groups and almost twice as many people – 75
percent – are not prepared to help immigrants. For all three
groups, more people prefer voluntary solidarity to compulsory so-
183
lidarity. Table 8.8 also shows that there are differences between
the 26 countries with regard to the distribution of the preferences.
The preparedness to help all three groups is particularly low in
Estonia and Ukraine. In Sweden and Italy the solidarity with the
three groups is the highest.
Table 8.8 Distribution of the three mechanisms
Elderly Sick and disabled Immigrants
Not Compulsory Voluntary Not Compulsory Voluntary Not Compulsory Voluntary
France 41 15 44 37 16 47 75 05 20
Great Britain 45 17 38 42 18 41 86 05 10
Germany 46 22 32 50 20 31 77 09 14
Austria 40 14 46 41 14 45 80 05 16
Italy 19 39 41 18 40 42 53 22 24
Spain 43 28 29 45 28 27 65 19 17
Portugal 39 23 37 34 25 41 79 08 13
Netherlands 37 22 41 35 23 43 65 12 23
Belgium 35 26 39 33 27 40 69 13 19
Denmark 33 17 50 30 19 52 70 08 22
Sweden 15 22 63 12 23 65 32 18 50
Finland 29 26 45 27 27 46 77 08 14
Ireland 19 25 47 18 24 58 65 11 24
Estonia 67 18 14 61 22 17 91 06 02
Latvia 44 34 22 41 38 21 88 09 04
Lithuania 66 14 20 65 15 20 96 01 03
Poland 32 30 38 28 32 41 83 07 10
Czech Rep. 37 25 39 24 28 48 85 05 10
Slovakia 31 41 29 29 42 29 79 11 10
Hungary 39 35 26 38 36 26 91 05 03
Romania 33 27 40 36 24 39 78 09 13
Bulgaria 40 27 33 33 29 38 82 08 11
Greece 34 34 33 29 35 36 71 13 16
Malta 23 32 45 18 35 47 73 10 16
Luxembourg 43 15 42 37 17 47 59 12 30
Ukraine 60 21 19 59 21 19 91 05 05
Total 37 25 37 35 26 39 75 10 16
Sources: European Values Study
31,554 respondents in 26 countries. Percentages are reported.
Results from the logistic multilevel analysis
The results of the models including the statistical control variables
are reported in Table 8.9. These analyses show that welfare state
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Table 8.9 Logistic multilevel regression analyses: control variables
Not Compulsory Voluntary
Elderly Sick and
disabled
Immigrants Elderly Sick and
disabled
Immigrants Elderly Sick and
disabled
Immigrants
Welfare spending -0.01
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.03†
(0.02)
-0.02*
(0.01)
-0.02*
(0.01)
0.02*
(0.01)
0.05**
(0.02)
0.04**
(0.02)
0.03†
(0.02)
Religious
denomination
-0.21**
(0.03)
-0.23**
(0.03)
-0.12**
(0.04)
0.02
(0.04)
0.05†
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.05)
0.22**
(0.03)
0.20**
(0.03)
0.19**
(0.04)
Gender
(1 = female)
-0.20**
(0.03)
-0.17**
(0.03)
-0.10**
(0.03)
0.17**
(0.03)
0.14**
(0.03)
0.16**
(0.04)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.05
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
Stable relationship -0.21**
(0.03)
-0.17**
(0.03)
-0.05*
(0.03)
0.05
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)
0.04
(0.05)
0.18**
(0.03)
0.13**
(0.03)
0.04
(0.04)
Employed 0.03
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)
0.10**
(0.03)
-0.17**
(0.03)
-0.14**
(0.03)
-0.21**
(0.05)
0.11**
(0.03)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.01
(0.04)
Young 0.40**
(0.03)
0.24**
(0.03)
0.18**
(0.03)
-0.24**
(0.03)
-0.14**
(0.03)
-0.16**
(0.05)
-0.23**
(0.03)
-0.12**
(0.03)
-0.14**
(0.04)
Old -0.04
(0.04)
0.05
(0.04)
0.25**
(0.05)
0.01
(0.04)
-0.06†
(0.04)
-0.26**
(0.06)
0.05
(0.04)
0.00
(0.04)
0.17**
(0.06)
Low education 0.12**
(0.03)
0.14**
(0.03)
0.32**
(0.04)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.10**
(0.03)
-0.08†
(0.05)
-0.20**
(0.03)
-0.22**
(0.03)
-0.41**
(0.04)
High education -0.08*
(0.04)
-0.06*
(0.03)
-0.38**
(0.04)
-0.08*
(0.04)
-0.11**
(0.04)
0.24**
(0.05)
0.14**
(0.04)
0.14**
(0.03)
0.35**
(0.04)
Small town 0.09**
(0.03)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.11*
(0.04)
-0.07*
(0.04)
-0.08*
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.06)
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.15**
(0.05)
Big town 0.09**
(0.03)
0.11**
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.05
(0.03)
0.13**
(0.05)
-0.08**
(0.03)
-0.06*
(0.03)
-0.06†
(0.04)
Constant -0.33**
(0.08)
-0.45**
(0.10)
1.20**
(0.15)
-1.12**
(0.10)
-1.04**
(0.09)
-2.32**
(0.13)
-0.76**
(0.07)
-0.64**
(0.10)
-1.92**
(0.17)
Variance 0.10
(0.04)
0.13
(0.06)
0.50**
(0.14)
0.16
(0.05)
0.15
(0.04)
0.34**
(0.10)
0.04
(0.02)
0.19
(0.06)
0.61**
(0.17)
Sources: European Values Study and International Monetary Fund (2001)
31,554 respondents in 26 countries. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors are in parenth-
eses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
effort does have some influence on people’s preferences regarding
the organization of solidarity. As the welfare state is more exten-
sive, the preference for voluntary solidarity is higher compared to
compulsory solidarity. Individual characteristics are also related to
people’s preferences. People who belong to a religious denomina-
tion and those who are more highly educated prefer voluntary so-
lidarity. Women are more in favor of compulsory solidarity than
men are. Again, the results for the elderly and the sick and dis-
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abled are similar, and they differ from those for immigrants. With
regard to the first two groups, it is shown that people with a stable
relationship and people who are employed prefer voluntary soli-
darity and that lower-educated people prefer compulsory solidar-
ity. With respect to immigrants, it turns out that older people pre-
fer voluntary solidarity towards this group.
Solidarity with the elderly
The effects of adding economic, social and political openness for
the preferences regarding solidarity with elderly people are re-
ported in Table 8.10. Economic openness is related to a lower pre-
ference for compulsory solidarity. Social openness has three ef-
fects. People in the more socially open country are a little less
willing to support the elderly. At the same time, the people who
are willing to support this group are more in favor of voluntary
solidarity and less in favor of compulsory solidarity compared to
people living in less socially open countries. Political openness is
related to a lower preference for compulsory solidarity.
Table 8.10 Logistic multilevel regression analyses: elderly people
Not Compulsory Voluntary
Economic openness 0.05
(0.04)
-0.15*
(0.07)
0.04
(0.03)
Social openness 0.23*
(0.11)
-0.31**
(0.12)
0.17**
(0.06)
Political openness -0.12†
(0.09)
-0.14*
(0.09)
0.02
(0.04)
Constant -0.36**
(0.09)
-0.31**
(0.06)
-0.43**
(0.09)
-1.12**
(0.09)
-1.07**
(0.09)
-1.08**
(0.07)
-0.77**
(0.07)
-0.75**
(0.07)
-0.76**
(0.08)
Variance 0.08
(0.03)
0.00
(0.00)
0.08
(0.04)
0.14
(0.04)
0.12
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
0.04
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
0.04
(0.02)
Sources: European Values Study and KOF Index of Globalization
31,554 respondents in 26 countries. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors are in
parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Solidarity with the sick and disabled
The results of the logistic multilevel analysis for the sick and dis-
abled including economic, social and political openness are sum-
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marized in Table 8.11. These results are roughly the same com-
pared to those for solidarity towards the elderly, with the exception
that social openness is related to a higher level of solidarity to-
wards this group and that political openness does not have an ef-
fect.
Table 8.11 Logistic multilevel regression analyses: the sick and disabled
Not Compulsory Voluntary
Economic openness -0.00
(0.10)
-0.13*
(0.07)
0.10
(0.08)
Social openness -0.23**
(0.16)
-0.24**
(0.12)
0.40**
(0.12)
Political openness -0.09
(0.10)
-0.07
(0.07)
0.13
(0.08)
Constant -0.47**
(0.11)
-0.45**
(0.06)
-0.50**
(0.11)
-1.04**
(0.09)
-1.04**
(0.09)
-1.05**
(0.09)
-0.65**
(0.10)
-0.68**
(0.07)
-0.63**
(0.08)
Variance 0.28
(0.08)
0.24
(0.10)
0.08
(0.04)
0.13
(0.04)
0.13
(0.03)
0.15
(0.01)
0.18
(0.05)
0.14
(0.04)
0.18
(0.05)
Sources: European Values Study and KOF Index of Globalization
31,554 respondents in 26 countries. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors are in
parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Solidarity with immigrants
The results from the analyses regarding immigrants differ from
the other two groups, as can be read from Table 8.12. Here it is
found that the economic, social and political openness of coun-
tries is related to a stronger preference for voluntary solidarity.
Moreover, whereas the openness of countries is related to a lower
preference for compulsory solidarity regarding the elderly and the
sick and disabled, this is not the case for solidarity towards immi-
grants.
Conclusion on globalization and the organization of solidarity
Based on the results of the statistical analyses, it is concluded that
in general the willingness to help the elderly and the sick and dis-
abled is higher than the willingness to help immigrants and that
voluntary solidarity is more strongly preferred for all three groups
than compulsory solidarity. Secondly, the openness of countries
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does influence these preferences but differs for the three groups.
In the case of solidarity towards the elderly and the sick and dis-
abled, the preference for voluntary solidarity is higher, and the
preference for compulsory solidarity is lower as countries are
more open. This is particularly the case for social openness. With
respect to immigrants, the preference for voluntary solidarity is
also higher in more open countries; however, for this group the
higher openness is not related to less support for compulsory soli-
darity.
Table 8.12 Logistic multilevel regression analyses: immigrants
Not Compulsory Voluntary
Economic openness -0.20†
(0.13)
-0.03
(0.11)
0.26*
(0.14)
Social openness -0.32*
(0.16)
0.01
(0.14)
0.57**
(0.15)
Political openness 0.17†
(0.11)
-0.02
(0.10)
0.26**
(0.11)
Constant 1.20**
(0.14)
-1.23**
(0.13)
-1.11**
(0.12)
-2.33**
(0.14)
-2.35**
(0.14)
-2.26**
(0.12)
-1.93**
(0.16)
-1.95**
(0.14)
-1.80**
(0.12)
Variance 0.46
(0.13)
0.22
(0.12)
0.12
(0.07)
0.34
(0.10)
0.24
(0.10)
0.09
(0.05)
0.53
(0.15)
0.35
(0.13)
0.13
(0.07)
Sources: European Values Study and KOF Index of Globalization
31,554 respondents in 26 countries. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors are in
parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
8.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we examined the relationship between globaliza-
tion and solidarity in two different ways. The first part of the ana-
lysis concentrated on the effect of openness on the willingness to
help several distinct groups in society – the elderly, the sick and
disabled, and immigrants. We complemented these results with a
different indicator that enables us to investigate the consequences
of globalization on people’s preferences for the organization of
solidarity, and hence how much they favor welfare state provi-
sions.
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Considered in unison, the outcomes of the two analyses empha-
size the importance of people’s direct social context for their soli-
darity. Moreover, this may be increasing because of globalization.
The first analysis showed that solidarity can be explained by the
positive information that people receive through their social rela-
tions, and the second analysis adds that the openness of countries
is related to a higher preference for voluntary solidarity. As such,
the two analyses underline that social cohesion is not disappear-
ing due to globalization. On the contrary, based on the results it
can be argued that openness increases the need for community
relations. That this particularly holds for social openness can be
attributed to increased possibilities for communication. Whereas
the Internet enables people to have contacts all over the world, it
should also be noted that people use it as a means to keep in con-
tact with people that are close to them. As a consequence, the In-
ternet may also strengthen local networks, which is also con-
firmed in recent studies on the influence of the Internet on social
relations, showing that people use it for their contacts with neigh-
bors and relatives (Franzen 2000; Hampton & Wellman 2000).
Though it is tempting to think in terms of causal relations, it
should be noted that the empirical study presented in this chapter
does not allow us to draw conclusions about the direction of the
effects. It is also possible that the countries in which the level of
reliance on others is higher and those with more support for com-
munity solidarity are better suited to engage in cross-border inter-
actions with other countries. If, however, our results are indeed a
response to increasing levels of openness, then there may be rea-
son to speculate that the less open countries will follow a similar
path to the open countries. With the available data it is not possi-
ble to test this prediction.
The results differ for the three groups that were identified, in
the sense that they are similar for the elderly and the sick and
disabled and different for immigrants. That people are less sup-
portive towards immigrants compared to the elderly and the sick
and disabled may have two explanations. The first explanation is
that this distinction results from boundaries between the in-group
and the out-group, and the second explanation is that immigrants
are regarded as less in need of help than the other two groups,
which clearly require assistance from others. Which of the two
explanations holds true is a question open to discussion and may
be investigated in future research. Furthermore, the results of
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openness are also different for the three groups, leading to the
conclusion that solidarity studies should distinguish which
groups people are willing to support. The effects of economic
openness were only confirmed with respect to immigrants; people
prefer voluntary solidarity towards this group as their country is
economically more open. The finding that there is less support
for compulsory solidarity in the case of elderly people and the sick
and disabled seems to indicate that in these instances people
question whether the government will be able to support these
groups given economic openness, but that it is not clear which of
the two alternatives people support; it may lead some people to
prefer a market solution, while others have a stronger preference
for voluntary solidarity.
The expectation that political openness will have a stabilizing
effect and that therefore the support for compulsory solidarity will
not be lower was rejected. A possible explanation for this finding
is that people’s preferences may be influenced by the information
they get from political actors. As has been suggested by others,
international political relations and the involvement in interna-
tional organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank influence the views of political actors concerning
the policy that should be followed (Simmons, Dobbin & Garrett
2006). Within these international relations there is a strong pre-
ference for neo-liberalism, the political ideology supporting the
view that welfare states should be curtailed and cannot be sus-
tained as globalization moves on. Additional research should in-
vestigate whether people’s preferences towards compulsory soli-
darity and the welfare state are affected by the international
processes.
As such, the conclusion of this chapter is similar to the conclu-
sion of Chapter 7. Apart from the fact that the welfare state is not
threatened by the different dimensions of globalization, it is also
not the case that it has a dramatic impact on the level of solidarity.
A second implication deals with the relationship between the wel-
fare state and solidarity. The welfare state has been criticized for
undermining informal solidarity and commitment to society. The
findings do show that a more extensive welfare state is related to a
higher preference for voluntary solidarity, which does not support
the concern that welfare states are crowding out community rela-
tionships. In contrast to that, it can be argued that the welfare
state enables communities to create voluntary solidarity. The third
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implication deals with the organization of the welfare state. Most
of these discussions revolve around the dichotomy between mar-
kets and governments, as if they are the only two ways of organiz-
ing solidarity. The argument used in these discussions is that the
market should take over if the government is not functioning effi-
ciently. The analyses presented in this chapter show that organiz-
ing solidarity through the community should be added to this di-
chotomy and offers a third possible solution. This is not only a
matter of theory but should also be considered in practice. If cuts
in the welfare states are regarded as necessary, this does not mean
that the market is the only option at hand, it should be considered
to what extent communities and voluntary solidarity can offer a
valuable solution as well.
Note
1. This chapter is based on Koster (2007) and Koster (2009b).
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9 Myths and facts
Pressures on the welfare state
Little by little it has become received wisdom that modern citizens
are individualized and, thus, are no longer attracted to traditional
institutions and collective arrangements. Whether it is a residents’
association or a trade union, voluntary work or the welfare state,
modern citizens are only prepared to contribute to them if it is in
their personal interest. However, since the well-educated, articu-
late citizen of today is capable of taking care of himself, he hardly
ever considers this to be in his own self-interest. As a conse-
quence, public support for the welfare state is crumbling.
Simultaneously, modern societies are increasingly exposed to
the influences of globalization. This is a second factor that exerts
pressure on the welfare state. The taxes and social contributions
that are levied to finance public social protection raise the cost of
labor and, thus, harm a country’s competitiveness. Moreover, a
generous welfare state attracts immigrants who hope to benefit
from its social provisions. Thus, the welfare state is in danger of
collapsing under its own burden.
A standard reaction of politicians to these developments is to
accept them as facts and reply by curtailing collective provisions.
The state should deregulate, should provide fewer social services
and should rely more on the responsibility of its citizens. To make
sure that citizens – who are increasingly weighing individual costs
against benefits – do indeed take responsibility, the market
mechanism is introduced to bring them to heel. The combination
of collective provisions and mandatory contributions that charac-
terizes the modern welfare state is gradually replaced by a combi-
nation of marketable products and services and financial incen-
tives. Collective insurances are replaced by individual savings
plans, the replacement rate of social benefits is lowered in order
to increase incentives, and a growing share of education and
health care is provided by private companies instead of public
bodies.
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This chapter examines the accuracy of the contention that the
current welfare state is no longer sustainable as a consequence of
individualization and globalization. First, we pass the main find-
ings of the previous chapters in review (Sections 9.1 to 9.4). Next,
we consider a number of developments that might exert increas-
ing pressure on the welfare state in the near future (Sections 9.5
to 9.7). Finally, we try to assess whether a drastic reform of the
welfare state is imperative to make it sustainable in the long term
(Section 9.8).
9.1 The myth of individualization
The focus of this book is on two important social developments
that are often considered to pose a threat to the welfare state, viz.
individualization and globalization. In this section we review the
popular belief that there is a marked trend of individualization.
This is even considered by some to be the most important societal
trend of recent decades (cf. SCP 1998).
Since there are many different interpretations of the term indi-
vidualization, it is not hard to give a concrete example. For in-
stance, the increasing number of single people, rising female
labor participation, the common complaint about the loutish be-
havior of fellow citizens, and the growing number of floating vo-
ters are all put forward as evidence of the individualization pro-
cess. It is, however, rather doubtful whether these examples are
related to the same underlying process. In Chapter 4 we made a
distinction between three interpretations of individualization,
which are loosely connected at best, both theoretically and in prac-
tice. What is usually called a process of individualization can be
better characterized as a transition from one dominant pattern of
values and behaviors to a new dominant pattern. It is not so much
typical of this new pattern that people behave as individuals rather
than as members of a group, as the term individualization sug-
gests, but that the relationship between the individual and the
group changes. Some concrete examples can serve to clarify this.
– Even if the share of the population that belongs to a traditional
institution, such as a church, a trade union, or a political party,
would decrease (detraditionalization) – which is certainly not a
general phenomenon – the bond with other institutions, such
as a circle of friends, a sports club, or an NGO, might strength-
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en simultaneously. Nevertheless, the attachment to these “mod-
ern” institutions might be more volatile than the old bonds.
– Although the liberty of people to form their own opinions and
choose their own behavior has increased compared to the past,
the implication is not that their opinions and behavior increas-
ingly diverge (heterogenization). Indeed, people might volunta-
rily choose to follow the opinions and behavior of their friends,
colleagues, club mates or countrymen, which might even result
in less disagreement on important issues.
– Neither does a growing freedom of thought and behavior inevi-
tably render people’s opinions less predictable (emancipation).
As it happens, the combination of sex, age, position in the
household, educational level, income category, social class,
labor market position and town size nowadays explains a larger
proportion of the variation in people’s attitudes than it did in
the past. Even though people make their own choices, they of-
ten choose, either consciously or not, to follow the flock.
In short, man still is and will remain to a large extent a social
animal, one of the herd. Over time, the nature and composition
of this herd might change – for instance, religion appears to be-
come less important and education more important. Moreover, in-
dividuals have more opportunities than they had in the past to
leave the herd and join another group. In the words of Duyvendak
and Hurenkamp (2004), people no longer belong to one particu-
lar “heavy community” for their whole life, but join the “light
community” they prefer at present and switch between commu-
nities whenever they like. The picture of modern man as a solitary
animal that, free from all ties, chooses his own idiosyncratic way
of life, is, however, far from being the reality.
9.2 Does individualization endanger solidarity?
Chapter 2 showed that, contrary to common beliefs, there is no
general tendency towards declining solidarity in the Western
world. On the contrary, in many countries, both formal (manda-
tory) and informal (voluntary) solidarity have increased over the
past decades. Public social expenditures have risen in most indus-
trialized countries, just as development aid and the admission of
asylum seekers. At the same time, spending on private social pro-
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tection and private insurances and volunteering have increased,
too. So, if anything, social solidarity is larger today than it was
twenty years ago.
However, it is not obvious that these trends will continue in the
near future. There are some indications that solidarity among the
younger generations lags behind the solidarity of older genera-
tions (De Beer & Koster 2007). If this continues to be the case,
then the replacement of the older by the younger generations
might gradually erode solidarity. Chapter 5 examined whether
people who are strongly individualized show less solidarity than
people who are less individualized. The alleged negative relation-
ship between individualization and solidarity appears to be real
only with respect to detraditionalization and one-sided voluntary
solidarity, in particular volunteering. The more emancipated indi-
viduals show more solidarity – in particular informal solidarity
and support for the welfare state – than do less emancipated per-
sons. At the national level, a larger heterogeneity of opinions
among the population is detrimental to solidarity, in particular to
development aid, recognition of asylum seekers, private insurance
and volunteering. Thus, the results of our empirical analysis are
rather mixed and certainly do not warrant a general conclusion of
an unfavorable impact of individualization on social solidarity.
Moreover, since in Chapter 4 we did not find an unambiguous
trend of individualization, there is no ground for the popular fear
that individualization will erode social solidarity in the future.
9.3 The various dimensions of globalization
Globalization is a many-headed monster, too, just like individual-
ization, as we argued in Chapter 6. General statements about glo-
balization are, therefore, just as pointless as sweeping statements
about individualization. First, globalization is not just an econom-
ic phenomenon, but also has social and political dimensions.
There is no doubt that we have witnessed a process of economic
globalization in the past few decades. International trade and capi-
tal flows have increased tremendously, and the obstacles to cross-
border transactions have diminished considerably. Nevertheless,
national borders still matter. Globalization does not mean that
companies become footloose and move across the world without
hindrance, in search of the cheapest labor or natural resources or
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the lowest taxes. On the contrary, economic activities are still
strongly concentrated in specific locations (e.g. Silicon Valley).
The social dimension of globalization shows a rising trend, too,
but this rise started more recently than with economic globaliza-
tion. Since the mid-1990s, in particular, the international ex-
change of people, information and culture – the three elements of
social globalization that were discussed in Chapter 6 – has grown
strongly. This is largely caused by technological progress (the In-
ternet, international telephone services, mass media, etc.). Re-
markably, the international mobility of persons, international mi-
gration in particular, has contributed relatively little to social
globalization.
The evolution of the third dimension of globalization, viz. the
political interrelatedness of countries, is more ambiguous. This
dimension concerns international co-operation, such as the mem-
bership of international organizations and participation in peace
missions of the United Nations. After declining in the 1980s, po-
litical globalization has picked up again since the 1990s.
If we compare the openness to globalization of the industrial-
ized countries, we find that a number of smaller countries, such
as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Singapore, are most
open economically and socially, while a number of larger coun-
tries, especially France, the United States, Russia and the United
Kingdom, are most open in a political sense.
9.4 Does globalization threaten the sustainability of
the welfare state?
These days, there is widespread fear among the European popula-
tion that globalization will hurt the welfare of many citizens and
will affect the long-term sustainability of the welfare state. “Social
dumping” and “a race to the bottom” have become buzzwords to
express these fears. This is quite remarkable, since the globaliza-
tion (economic) that has already taken place in the past is gener-
ally believed to have contributed strongly to welfare growth in the
industrialized countries.
To date, there is abundant scientific literature on the conse-
quences of economic globalization for the sustainability of the
welfare state. The survey of this literature in Chapter 7 showed
that the results of studies of the relationship between globalization
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and the welfare state are rather ambiguous. Thus, no well-
founded statement on the effects of globalization is possible. Our
own study of the impact of social and political globalization did
not yield unequivocal results, either. This might seem disappoint-
ing, since it means that scientific research is not able to resolve
the disputes among politicians about the consequences of globali-
zation.
However, a more positive interpretation of these outcomes is
also possible. The fact that scientific studies do not find an unam-
biguous relationship between globalization and the welfare state
implies that other factors must have a larger impact. Conse-
quently, there is no reason to believe that the future of the welfare
state is primarily dependent on international (economic) develop-
ments. In the context of identical, exogenous global develop-
ments, national welfare states show a lot of variation. Therefore,
there is much more leeway for national policy choices than is
commonly believed – or suggested – by researchers, policy advi-
sors and politicians. It is obvious that, in making these choices,
the international context has to be taken into account. But this is
rather different from suggesting that the only choice available is to
curtail the welfare state drastically.
Apart from the direct impact of globalization on the welfare
state, which we discussed in Chapter 7, there might be a more
indirect influence through the impact on public opinion and the
support for formal solidarity. After all, this book starts from the
assumption that the welfare state is the most important form of
organized solidarity. If the willingness of citizens to support their
compatriots weakens, the public support for the welfare state will
crumble. In Chapter 8, we argued that, from a theoretical point of
view, it is not clear whether globalization will hurt or will foster
(national) solidarity. This depends on the way that globalization
affects the commitment of citizens to their national community.
On the one hand, with people increasingly taking part in interna-
tional, cross-border networks, the commitment to the national
community might diminish. Increasing heterogeneity of the na-
tional community, due to immigration, might also exert pressure
on national solidarity. On the other hand, globalization might
strengthen the awareness of national interdependence and soli-
darity. People might regard the national state as a stronghold
against the threats from abroad. Increasing openness to foreign
cultures might stimulate the recognition of the value of one’s own
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culture and the nurturing of national traditions and national his-
tory. This might strengthen the ties with the local community.
Our empirical analysis in Chapter 8 did not yield convincing
evidence for either a negative or a positive relationship between
openness and national solidarity. Solidarity with elderly people
and with the sick and disabled is not influenced by the economic,
social or political openness of a country. Solidarity with immi-
grants, however, is positively related to economic and social open-
ness. If anything, this does not support the contention that the
commitment to your “own” group strengthens as a consequence
of globalization. However, we did find some indications that the
preferences of the people shift from obligatory, state-organized so-
lidarity to voluntary communal solidarity as a country opens up to
the global community. To be more precise: the citizens of coun-
tries that are more open economically, socially and politically tend
to be less in favor of mandatory solidarity with the elderly and
with sick and disabled people. However, openness does not affect
the support for obligatory solidarity with immigrants. The support
for voluntary solidarity with the elderly, sick and disabled people,
and immigrants is stronger in countries that are socially open.
Thus, it is not solidarity as such but rather the way that it is orga-
nized that is affected by globalization.
9.5 Does the individual interest in collective
arrangements decline?
The preceding remarks with respect to individualization illustrate
that the image of the independent, self-confident citizen who
knows how to manage on his own and does not need others to
support him is not correct. In fact, most people are strongly influ-
enced by the social group they belong to. At any rate, in modern
society and in a globalizing world, it is an illusion that people are
able to manage independently of each other. A characteristic fea-
ture of modern society is that it consists of a dense network of
dependency relations – across borders just as much as within
countries. One could even say that, today, human beings are less
able to live independently from each other than they ever were
before. More than ever, one’s fate is connected to the fate of
others, and the fates of different nations depend on each other.
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The fact that, in contemporary society, one’s chances often de-
pend on others makes it more attractive to organize many matters
collectively rather than individually. Actually, most provisions of
the welfare state are beneficial to a majority of the citizens. Even
though you are healthy, you have an interest in a good health care
system and good health insurance schemes in case you become ill
or get into an accident. Even if your (grand)parents are still in
good health, you have an interest in good professional care for the
invalid elderly. Even though you have no children of your own,
you have an interest in good education so that the next generation
grows up to be productive citizens who will be able and willing to
fund your old age pension when you retire. Research shows that
the benefits of the welfare state are usually distributed rather
evenly across income groups (cf. Kuhry et al. 2006). Of course,
everyone can think of a public provision which he or she never
uses and thus would rather not contribute to. But if all public pro-
visions are taken together, there are probably few people who
would benefit from a complete abolition in exchange for a corre-
sponding tax reduction.
However, this does not guarantee the continuation of the public
support – and especially the support of the middle class – for the
welfare state in the future. There are a number of reasons why the
support for public provisions might deteriorate. This section and
the next discuss a number of internal (i.e. national) developments
that might endanger solidarity. In this section we discuss factors
that might affect the willingness to show two-sided solidarity, and
in the next section we discuss the threats to one-sided solidarity.
Then we go on to discuss which external (i.e. international) factors
might endanger the future of the welfare state (Section 9.7).
Concentration of the benefits of public provisions
The support for public provisions that are based on two-sided soli-
darity might crumble if it turns out that the benefits from these
provisions are increasingly concentrated among particular groups.
This might be caused by diverging risks of social groups. For in-
stance, some claim that the labor market opportunities of the low
skilled are deteriorating compared to the highly skilled (cf. Jacobs
2004). If this is true, low-skilled people will claim an increasing
share of total unemployment benefits and social assistance. This
would mean that the highly skilled would have less self-interest in
a mandatory unemployment insurance scheme.
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Similar developments might take place with respect to health
care. For example, the Dutch Council on Public Health and Care
has established that ten percent of the population causes 70 per-
cent of all health care costs (Jeurissen 2005). Supposedly, this
means that a small group of people benefits disproportionately
from public health care, while the large majority of the population
contributes much more to the system than it profits by it. How-
ever, the fact that the greater part of public health expenditure falls
upon a small part of the population does not necessarily mean that
the majority of the people has no interest in the system. This de-
pends on whether the group that benefits disproportionately can
be identified beforehand. If not, this is simply a case of chance soli-
darity. Whoever pays a fire insurance premium for all their life
without ever claiming damages will most likely not complain but
rejoice that their house did not burn down. Likewise, most people
hope to claim as few health insurance damages as possible, be-
cause they happen to never get seriously ill. However, if one al-
ready expects to benefit much less than others from an insurance
scheme or a public provision beforehand, this might harm the
willingness to contribute to such a scheme. What started as two-
sided solidarity might then become more and more like one-sided
solidarity (see the next section).
Whether this is happening in the cases of unemployment and
health care is not clear yet. For example, in the Netherlands the
relative risk of unemployment of the low-skilled relative to the
highly-skilled person has been stable over the past three decades,
and there is not much reason to expect a change in the future (De
Beer 2006). The rising costs of health care are concentrated large-
ly on the elderly population and are for a large part caused by
chronic illnesses that are still hard to predict, such as Alzheimer’s
dementia.
However, the predictability of individual claims on public provi-
sions may improve in the future due to better screening techni-
ques. With respect to health, in particular, prior knowledge about
who will benefit the most from health care provisions might grow.
The “veil of ignorance” will then be partially lifted. As a conse-
quence, an increasing share of the population might no longer
have any self-interest in those public provisions.
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Table 9.1 Justifiability and perception of abuse of state benefits, 1990 and 1999
Unjustly claiming state benefitsa How many compatriots
unjustly claim state benefitsb
1999 1990 change 1999 1990 change
never
justifiable
1-4 ave-
rage
never
justifiable
1-4 ave-
rage
never
justifiable
1-4 ave-
rage
almost all/many
Austria 57.5 87.9 2.2 64.0 92.0 1.9 -6.5 -4.1 0.3 59.4 59.5 -0.1
Belgium 57.4 82.3 2.4 55.7 80.3 2.5 1.7 2.0 -0.1 32.9 33.3 -0.3
Bulgaria 69.6 90.9 1.9 70.9 92.3 1.8 -1.3 -1.4 0.1 48.1 49.3 -1.2
Belarus 35.1 67.4 3.5 47.2 71.3 3.2 -12.1 -3.8 0.3 30.7 30.7 0.0
Croatia 77.6 93.2 1.6 55.7 81.6 2.5 21.9 11.6 -0.9 47.4 48.2 -0.8
Czech Republic 64.1 91.7 1.9 53.7 76.9 3.0 10.4 14.8 -1.1 44.1 43.8 0.3
Denmark 83.3 96.7 1.4 84.8 96.0 1.4 -1.5 0.8 0.0 30.7 30.7 0.0
Estonia 36.2 73.2 3.2 53.8 81.2 2.5 -17.6 -7.9 0.6 40.0 39.6 0.5
Finland 51.3 86.5 2.3 46.7 78.5 2.7 4.6 8.0 -0.4 37.6 37.8 -0.1
France 40.6 64.5 3.4 39.5 64.2 3.4 1.1 0.3 0.0 37.7 37.9 -0.2
Germany 62.8 92.3 1.9 62.8 89.7 2.0 0.0 2.6 -0.1 49.2 48.1 1.0
Greece 24.0 60.9 4.0 24.0 60.9 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 66.3 66.3 0.0
Hungary 73.9 92.8 1.7 71.1 87.7 2.1 2.8 5.1 -0.4 95.7 95.4 0.3
Iceland 68.0 93.2 1.8 70.9 92.6 1.7 -3.0 0.6 0.0 44.4 44.4 0.0
Ireland 66.6 88.9 1.9 70.2 88.9 1.9 -3.6 0.0 0.0 53.2 51.4 1.8
Italy 64.9 91.1 1.9 69.7 90.8 1.9 -4.8 0.3 0.0 75.6 75.6 0.0
Latvia 62.3 88.0 2.1 57.2 84.9 2.3 5.1 3.1 -0.2 27.4 27.4 0.0
Lithuania 54.2 80.3 2.6 56.3 84.7 2.3 -2.1 -4.4 0.3 30.0 31.7 -1.7
Malta 84.7 97.1 1.4 87.3 97.2 1.3 -2.6 -0.1 0.1 79.3 79.4 0.0
Netherlands 76.9 96.0 1.5 77.9 95.7 1.5 -0.9 0.3 0.0 6.8 6.5 0.3
Poland 53.3 84.7 2.4 58.5 85.7 2.2 -5.2 -1.0 0.1 63.4 64.6 -1.2
Portugal 58.8 90.4 2.0 55.9 83.1 2.5 2.8 7.3 -0.4 57.3 58.7 -1.4
Romania 69.9 91.2 1.8 67.7 90.4 1.9 2.2 0.8 -0.1 85.8 85.8 0.0
Russian Federation 57.9 85.1 2.3 61.6 85.1 2.2 -3.7 0.0 0.1 40.7 40.2 0.5
Slovakia 37.3 77.9 2.9 38.5 70.4 3.4 -1.2 7.5 -0.5 59.2 58.9 0.3
Spain 55.9 84.4 2.4 60.2 83.6 2.4 -4.3 0.7 0.0 20.4 20.4 0.0
Sweden 55.2 91.1 2.1 67.1 92.3 1.8 -11.9 -1.2 0.3 32.9 32.3 0.6
Turkey 89.8 97.9 1.2 86.7 96.3 1.4 3.0 1.6 -0.1 79.6 79.6 0.0
Ukraine 47.7 78.1 2.8 44.7 74.5 3.1 2.9 3.6 -0.2 47.3 46.6 0.7
Great Britain 66.8 88.9 2.0 69.2 90.3 1.9 -2.4 -1.4 0.1 61.7 61.9 -0.1
Northern Ireland 66.3 85.6 2.1 71.4 88.9 1.9 -5.1 -3.3 0.2 60.0 59.7 0.3
Average 59.9 86.1 2.2 61.1 84.7 2.3 -1.2 1.4 -0.1 50.1 50.0 0.0
a The full question reads: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be
justified, or something in between: Claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to.”
b The full question reads: “According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following?: Claiming state benefits to which they
are not entitled.”
Source: EVS (1990 and 1999)
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Individual responsibility
A second cause of an erosion of solidarity might be that the claims
that people lay on public provisions are increasingly considered to
be their own responsibility. The willingness to help someone who
is visited by misfortune is usually larger than if they are thought to
be responsible in some way for their situation. Someone who
loses his job because his company shuts down can expect more
compassion than someone who is fired because he refuses to take
a refresher course as the content of his job changes. Likewise, in
the case of someone who is unemployed, it makes a difference
whether he tries to get back to work as soon as possible or whether
he just sits and waits until a job comes along and is rather choosy
about accepting a job offer. Health could be increasingly related to
lifestyle. An illness or disease that is caused by unhealthy behavior
– drinking, smoking, eating too much – can be considered some-
one’s personal responsibility rather than being a misfortune that
befalls them.
As sociologist Anthony Giddens (1994) has stated more gener-
ally, in modern society risks are increasingly man-made or manu-
factured rather than external. This might be a reason to base social
insurances progressively on individual savings rather than on col-
lective contributions, in order to stress personal responsibility.
Abuse
A third factor that might harm the support for obligatory solidarity
is the belief of widespread abuse of social provisions. If many peo-
ple believe that others claim benefits falsely or take advantage of
public provisions, their willingness to contribute to them will
crumble. In general, Europeans are strongly opposed to the mis-
use and fraudulent claiming of social benefits. If asked whether
claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to can always be
justified (score 1) or never be justified (score 10), 60 percent say it
is never justified, and the average score is 2.2 (EVS 1999) (Table
9.1). At the same time, half of all Europeans think that many or
almost all of their fellow citizens do abuse benefits (EVS 1999).
Compared to the previous wave of EVS, which was conducted in
1990, the proportion of the population that thinks abuse of bene-
fits can never be justified dropped slightly, while the percentage
that thinks that many compatriots abuse benefits remained the
same. So, although the discrepancy between the condemnation of
abuse and the belief of widespread abuse might undermine the
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support for the social security system, there is no indication that
this discrepancy has increased during the 1990s.
Of course, one may have doubts about the comparability of
these questions in different countries. However, since we are not
so much interested in the differences between countries but in
the discrepancy between justifiability and perception within the
countries and in the changes over time, these doubts do not affect
our conclusion.
Free-riding behavior
A fourth factor that might affect the readiness to contribute to
public provisions is the perception that others contribute as well.
A common assumption of economic theory is that people behave
opportunistically. Even though people might be in favor of a wel-
fare state, whenever they get the chance, they will shy away from
contributing to it. Thus, although the respondents of surveys may
say that they support the welfare state, this does not mean that
they will actually pay their taxes and social contributions. This is
called the problem of free-riding behavior. Monitoring and sanc-
tioning might be necessary in order to secure everyone’s contribu-
tion to the welfare state. Of course, everyone knows from their
daily experience that most people do not act opportunistically all
of the time. Even though people are not permanently monitored
and may not be afraid of being punished, many of them are never-
theless willing to pay their taxes and contributions.
In recent years, laboratory experiments have repeatedly shown
that most people are inclined towards co-operative rather than op-
portunistic behavior. An illustrative example is the so-called “pub-
lic-good game” (see Fehr & Gächter 2000). The players of this
game, who do not know each other personally and do not get in
touch with each other, decide which part of a sum given by the
instructor they will contribute to the common pool. At the end of
each round, the sum in the common pool is multiplied by 1.6 by
the instructor and then divided equally among the players. Players
who act rationally and are purely self-interested would add noth-
ing to the pool (which is what economic theory predicts). How-
ever, the players actually deposit, on average, about half of their
sum in the common pool and keep the other half themselves. As
a consequence, all are better off than if they would have acted in a
purely selfish way, since each ends up with about a third more
than their stake. What appears to be irrational behavior – at least,
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from the perspective of mainstream economics – turns out to be
beneficial to all and is, therefore, quite rational. Thus, the readi-
ness of people to co-operate and contribute to a common pool hap-
pens to be rather large, even if they are not able to enter into any
explicit agreement. Furthermore, these experiments show that if
the game is repeated a number of times, the average stake de-
clines with each new round. The players tend to adjust their stake
to the lowest stake in the previous round. Apparently, people do
not like contributing more than others if everyone benefits
equally. Thus, the fact that some contribute less than others un-
dermines the support for the public pool.
There is, however, a very effective way to counteract this erosion
of co-operative behavior – at least in the laboratory experiment. If
the players are given the opportunity to punish defectors – even if
this is costly to them – the level of co-operation is sustained. Many
players are willing to endure greater costs in order to punish the
player who has contributed the least in the previous round of the
game. As a consequence, the players take heed not to contribute
substantially less than the other players in order to avoid being
punished in the next round. This kind of behavior is called “strong
reciprocity”: people reward co-operative behavior and punish op-
portunistic behavior, even if they have no direct interest.
From these experiments we can glean that the readiness to con-
tribute to public provisions could erode if it is believed that many
people get away with avoiding their contribution. Apart from
abuse of social benefits, a perceived rise in tax evasion might also
undermine public support for the welfare state. In general, people
seem to condemn tax evasion somewhat less vehemently than
abuse of social benefits (Table 9.2). All the same, in 1999, over
half of the European people said that cheating on taxes could
never be justified. This was a little more than in 1990. However,
tax evasion is perceived as much more widespread than benefit
abuse. Almost two-thirds of the Europeans think that many or al-
most all of their fellow citizens cheat on tax, a figure that re-
mained virtually unchanged between 1990 and 1999. Once again,
the discrepancy between the condemnation of tax evasion and the
perceived pervasiveness of tax evasion is rather worrying, but
there is no indication that this discrepancy is growing.
With respect to all four factors that might exert pressure on two-
sided solidarity, it should be stressed that the perception of
the behavior of other people is more important than their actual
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Table 9.2 Justifiability and perception of cheating on taxes, 1990 and 1999
Cheating on tax if you have the chancea How many compatriots cheat
on tax?b
1999 1990 change 1999 1990 change
never
justifiable
1-4 ave-
rage
never
justifiable
1-4 ave-
rage
never
justifiable
1-4 ave-
rage
almost all/many
Austria 58.2 86.3 2.2 61.3 88.9 2.0 -3.2 -2.6 0.2 62.6 61.9 0.6
Belgium 37.9 62.6 3.7 37.8 61.6 3.8 0.1 0.9 -0.1 68.2 65.4 2.8
Bulgaria 66.9 88.4 2.0 63.4 85.8 2.2 3.5 2.5 -0.2 60.1 61.7 -1.6
Belarus 26.3 55.4 4.2 38.2 64.6 3.6 -11.9 -9.2 0.6 62.4 62.4 0.0
Croatia 61.2 78.3 2.5 43.3 70.6 3.2 17.9 7.8 -0.7 57.5 58.4 -0.9
Czech Republic 59.0 88.8 2.1 59.5 87.5 2.1 -0.4 1.2 -0.1 65.9 65.6 0.3
Denmark 65.6 88.3 2.0 62.8 83.2 2.3 2.8 5.1 -0.3 49.5 49.5 0.0
Estonia 39.9 71.8 3.2 48.8 75.6 2.9 -9.0 -3.8 0.3 63.5 63.5 0.0
Finland 52.9 84.3 2.5 49.9 80.3 2.7 3.0 4.0 -0.2 51.8 52.2 -0.4
France 48.4 71.0 3.1 46.9 69.8 3.2 1.4 1.2 -0.1 39.7 40.1 -0.4
Germany 57.1 85.7 2.4 51.6 81.1 2.6 5.5 4.6 -0.3 64.5 60.8 3.7
Greece 37.1 72.8 3.2 37.1 72.8 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 87.2 87.2 0.0
Hungary 65.6 87.5 2.1 61.2 81.3 2.5 4.4 6.2 -0.4 97.3 97.4 0.0
Iceland 57.9 86.7 2.2 56.0 82.9 2.4 1.9 3.8 -0.2 80.2 80.2 0.0
Ireland 57.4 83.1 2.3 50.3 76.0 2.8 7.2 7.1 -0.5 63.4 62.0 1.4
Italy 56.6 83.4 2.4 60.3 84.2 2.3 -3.6 -0.8 0.1 83.9 83.9 0.0
Latvia 59.8 83.4 2.4 50.1 76.1 2.9 9.6 7.3 -0.5 52.1 52.1 0.0
Lithuania 39.0 61.1 3.8 46.9 73.0 3.1 -7.9 -11.9 0.7 57.1 58.8 -1.7
Malta 80.0 94.6 1.5 81.9 93.3 1.6 -1.9 1.3 0.0 90.3 90.3 0.0
Netherlands 46.4 79.8 2.8 43.6 74.8 3.0 2.8 5.0 -0.2 48.1 48.8 -0.7
Poland 59.8 86.2 2.2 54.4 81.9 2.5 5.5 4.4 -0.3 69.2 69.0 0.1
Portugal 54.8 82.7 2.4 46.3 72.4 3.2 8.5 10.3 -0.7 71.1 71.6 -0.5
Romania 57.1 77.5 2.8 63.1 83.5 2.4 -6.0 -6.0 0.4 80.1 80.1 0.0
Russian Federation 45.6 72.1 3.1 48.8 72.9 3.0 -3.2 -0.8 0.1 68.3 67.4 0.8
Slovakia 59.4 86.3 2.2 51.9 82.5 2.5 7.5 3.9 -0.3 66.9 66.8 0.1
Spain 56.8 85.5 2.3 56.3 81.0 2.5 0.5 4.5 -0.2 32.4 32.4 0.0
Sweden 50.7 83.2 2.4 56.2 85.1 2.3 -5.4 -1.9 0.1 52.2 52.1 0.1
Turkey 92.0 98.7 1.2 91.1 98.4 1.2 0.9 0.2 0.0 88.4 88.4 0.0
Ukraine 40.6 67.3 3.4 41.3 67.3 3.4 -0.7 0.0 0.0 67.9 66.9 1.0
Great Britain 55.7 82.4 2.4 53.9 79.9 2.6 1.7 2.4 -0.2 63.9 64.2 -0.3
Northern Ireland 58.9 81.2 2.4 60.3 81.4 2.4 -1.4 -0.2 0.0 57.6 57.2 0.4
Average 54.7 80.5 2.6 53.3 78.7 2.7 1.3 1.8 -0.1 65.6 65.3 0.4
a The full question reads: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be
justified, or something in between: Cheating on tax if you have the chance.”
b The full question reads: “According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following?: Cheating on tax if they have the
chance.”
Source: EVS (1990 and 1999)
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behavior. If one thinks that the benefits of public provision are
increasingly ill-balanced, if one believes that people increasingly
claim support for something for which they are themselves re-
sponsible, if one is convinced that abuse and fraud of social bene-
fits are increasingly widespread and that more and more people
evade taxes and contributions, then it is very likely that one’s sup-
port for the welfare state will crumble. Consequently, increasing
attention paid by the mass media to these phenomena, even if
they do not reflect actual changes in society, might act as a self-
fulfilling prophecy and, thus, erode social support for the welfare
state.
The demand for freedom of choice
A final development that might erode the support for public provi-
sions based on two-sided solidarity is a growing demand of mod-
ern citizens for freedom of choice. It is said that, as a consequence
of individualization, the preferences of present-day citizens in-
creasingly diverge. Whereas in the past they passively accepted
the one-size-fits-all provisions of the state, today they demand
tailor-made provisions which suit their personal preferences and
needs. If the state persists in providing uniform services, more
and more citizens might turn away from public provisions and
resort to the private market, which offers a much more varied sup-
ply of services. This might lead to the advance of private clinics,
private schools, private surveillance, etc.
It is, however, doubtful whether this general analysis is valid
and whether the public support for the welfare state requires that
it increasingly accommodates individual choices. Contrary to what
is often suggested, there are no clear signs of a growing heteroge-
neity of opinions among the population of wealthy countries, as
was shown in Chapter 4. On the contrary, most people are still
like herd animals – although they might choose which herd to
follow – and act accordingly.
Nevertheless, even if the diversity of preferences does not grow,
people might increasingly value the opportunity to make their
own choices. It is rather difficult to determine whether this really
is the case. Probably, the demand for freedom of choice differs
strongly, depending on the kind of provision that is at stake. It is
not particularly plausible that people are strongly interested in
choosing their own electricity company or even their pension
scheme or health insurance. A study by the Dutch Social and Cul-
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tural Planning Office with respect to social insurance showed that
there was only weak demand for choice options (Hoff & Vrooman
2002). As far as people had any preference for individual choice,
they mainly valued the opportunity to top-up their benefits by pay-
ing extra contributions. Some 41 percent of the respondents said
they preferred to pay a two percent extra contribution in order to
raise their entitlement to a disability benefit from 70 to 80 percent
of their previous earnings. Only eight percent preferred a two per-
cent rebate on their contribution in exchange for a ten percent
lower disability benefit.
In general, most people seem to prefer security before anything
else. They would rather have the state safeguarding an adequate
level of social provisions than have to provide for it themselves.
As far as social benefits and public services are concerned,
present-day citizens do not resemble the proverbial consumer,
who prefers to pick and choose from the displayed “articles” the
social insurances and services that meet their personal tastes best.
9.6 Is the support for one-sided solidarity crumbling?
In the previous section we assumed that modern, individualized
citizens are primarily concerned with their own self-interest and
support public provisions only as far as they benefit themselves.
Evidently, this is a biased image of the average citizen of today. It
suffices to take a look around and notice that in many situations
people do not simply pursue their (direct) self-interest but act out
of concern for others. Millions of people donate blood, many more
look after needy relatives or are engaged in voluntary work, bil-
lions of euros are donated to charities. The point is not whether
these acts can be truly called altruism. It is not hard to argue that,
in the end, these acts also stem from self-interest. Whoever do-
nates blood might consider the possibility of needing blood him-
self someday, a volunteer might hope for new experiences or
might want to enrich his résumé, a gift to a charity might give
you a warm glow, etc. However, ultimately, it is actual behavior
that is most relevant, not the “true” motive. An act of solidarity
that is motivated by enlightened self-interest is of more use to
others or to society than an eloquent expression of solidarity that
is not translated into actual behavior. What really matters is that
many people are prepared to help others without getting some-
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thing back and without expecting that they will be repaid. This
one-sided solidarity is contrary to the dominant image of the cal-
culating, selfish citizen. Of course, many modern citizens some-
times do calculate and act selfishly. But most people show a much
more varied pattern of behavior, including both selfish acts and
acting out of concern for others. Consequently, it is wrong to state
that in modern society solidarity can only persist if it is primarily
based on enlightened self-interest (cf. Chapter 3). It is, however,
equally wrong to believe that an unlimited appeal to people can be
made to show solidarity without ever getting something back.
One-sided solidarity presupposes commitment with the recipients
of solidarity, the acknowledgement that they are members of the
same community. In Chapter 5 we discussed three factors that
determine the community spirit that is essential for one-sided so-
lidarity, viz. affection, tradition and identification. We will now
discuss whether these three factors might be weakening.
Is community spirit declining?
As a consequence of individualization, the importance of tradi-
tions decreases. “Heavy communities”, strongly based on tradi-
tion, are gradually replaced by “light communities”, the member-
ship of which is a free choice. If individualization means that free
choice becomes more important, the role of traditions as the glue
of society might lose its strength.
The impact of individualization on affection and identification
is more ambiguous. Probably, affection will remain an important
source of solidarity within small communities, especially within
the family. Indeed, affection might even become more important
if, for example, a marriage bond is a matter of free choice rather
than being arranged by the family. Nevertheless, the decision to
join a group – whether it’s a circle of friends or an association –
might increasingly depend on one’s personal interest. Moreover,
these bonds might become less enduring.
If individualization results in a larger heterogeneity of opinions
and attitudes, it might become harder to identify with others who
do not share your values and norms. This might be worsened if
one believes that those deviating opinions and attitudes are some-
one’s free choice. However, individualization facilitates identifi-
cation with kindred souls outside your own group. Most likely,
individualization will not so much result in less or more identifi-
cation, but in identification with different people than before. This
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Table 9.3 Concerns of European citizens (percentage of population much or
very much concerned about…)a, 1999
Your
immediate
family
People
in your
neighbor-
hood
The
people
of the
region
you
live in
Your
fellow
country-
men
Elderly
people
in your
country
Unem-
ployed
people
in your
country
Sick and
disabled
people in
your
country
Immigrants
in your
country
Euro-
peans
Human
kind
Austria 75.9 26.6 14.9 16.0 48.9 32.2 49.3 15.8 8.1 17.1
Belgium 92.7 35.9 16.7 13.7 58.2 32.1 51.3 15.5 8.9 22.2
Bulgaria 96.8 30.8 20.6 30.4 70.2 57.5 60.2 9.1 12.5 24.4
Belarus 96.3 38.0 35.9 50.6 51.0 27.4 35.3 9.4 31.0 34.4
Croatia 72.7 36.8 32.6 34.7 67.6 68.7 68.6 20.2 16.2 33.8
Czech Republic 30.0 11.6 11.6 17.4 47.4 43.5 64.5 13.1 10.7 28.7
Denmark 34.3 10.6 8.3 11.7 53.1 24.2 53.6 15.2 9.8 36.2
Estonia 88.1 22.3 11.7 13.0 47.5 38.1 41.8 11.2 4.9 12.6
Finland 34.0 7.5 8.6 15.0 61.9 47.4 56.3 15.3 7.1 36.3
France 88.5 31.5 17.4 18.5 66.6 54.3 60.5 26.8 13.6 23.7
Germany 97.7 54.7 33.1 30.4 64.4 34.2 52.6 21.9 18.4 22.8
Greece 96.4 26.0 19.6 31.3 67.9 52.5 68.6 26.8 12.3 45.8
Hungary 96.7 24.2 13.0 20.0 57.0 29.7 46.1 5.3 9.3 22.6
Iceland 92.9 24.7 17.5 26.7 62.3 35.5 64.8 20.6 12.9 20.3
Ireland 81.1 52.2 37.5 35.2 80.5 49.7 79.2 28.3 20.0 35.0
Italy 83.2 25.2 19.6 24.8 75.7 60.4 73.5 34.6 17.7 28.7
Latvia 86.4 9.8 8.2 9.6 38.1 22.5 33.5 5.3 3.3 9.2
Lithuania 98.7 23.4 19.4 32.1 76.3 63.1 63.7 7.4 11.3 16.4
Malta 96.4 43.7 33.0 39.6 79.5 46.4 79.4 21.4 26.8 35.8
Netherlands 94.3 33.9 8.4 11.0 52.7 20.7 49.6 15.5 5.9 32.7
Poland 94.5 36.8 19.9 29.5 72.4 50.6 64.6 8.7 12.0 13.8
Portugal 94.5 31.3 23.8 31.7 83.1 48.7 73.3 24.3 17.7 39.6
Romania 89.0 27.3 34.1 44.0 66.8 57.8 65.0 19.5 17.1 19.9
Russian Federation 87.4 14.8 16.3 20.5 70.3 52.5 62.4 11.0 6.0 18.7
Slovakia 88.7 47.1 33.5 29.3 68.8 49.3 61.1 11.6 15.7 19.9
Spain 92.1 41.8 30.4 27.9 63.3 52.8 51.8 30.7 17.5 35.1
Sweden 97.5 28.3 18.7 28.4 67.5 35.9 60.4 29.7 16.2 33.9
Ukraine 95.8 20.9 21.2 23.8 72.2 59.2 64.6 8.5 6.3 18.2
Great Britain 71.5 31.7 22.7 20.6 69.8 33.4 64.4 14.6 9.8 29.2
Northern Ireland 73.8 39.9 26.2 23.0 68.9 32.8 60.8 17.6 12.7 24.8
Average 83.9 29.6 21.1 25.3 64.3 43.8 59.4 17.2 13.1 26.4
a The full question reads: “To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of …?”
Source: EVS (1999)
implies that the group that one is committed to and to which one
wants to show solidarity changes. In itself, this is no threat to soli-
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darity, but it might mean that the form of solidarity or the way it is
organized has to change. However, it is important to note that the
empirical evidence we presented in Chapter 4 does not show
much of an individualization trend yet, so the reasoning above
might not be particularly relevant for the current situation.
Regarding the sustainability of the (national) welfare state, the
most important source of one-sided solidarity is probably identifi-
cation with your fellow-citizens. Some indication for this can be
derived from the 1999 wave of the European Values Survey. In
this survey the respondents were asked whether they felt con-
cerned about the living conditions of various groups of people.
Table 9.3 shows the results. Unsurprisingly, Europeans are most
concerned about their immediate family. Although most of the
respondents are not much concerned about their fellow country-
men in general, they do feel concerned about elderly people and
sick and disabled people in their country and, to a somewhat les-
ser extent, about unemployed countrymen. These figures suggest
that people do indeed identify with fellow citizens who are in
need. The share of Europeans that feel concerned about immi-
grants in their country is rather small, although it should be noted
that this is partly caused by the very small percentages in most
Central and East European countries. Nevertheless, it is clear
from Table 9.3 that most Europeans do not strongly identify with
immigrants. This might mean that the public support for social
provisions from which mainly immigrants benefit is rather weak.
Unfortunately, these questions were not asked in previous waves
of the EVS, so we do not know whether the concern about the
different groups has changed over time.
Abuse and free-riding behavior
Of the four factors mentioned in the previous section that might
erode two-sided solidarity, the last three are also relevant for one-
sided solidarity (the first one actually means that two-sided soli-
darity increasingly becomes one-sided solidarity).
The belief that the recipient of one-sided solidarity does not
claim support unjustly might be even more important than in the
case of two-sided solidarity, since the beneficiary did not contrib-
ute much himself. This makes it essential that the recipient is
really in need, is not able to cope himself and tries to limit his
claims as much as possible.
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Table 9.4 Opinion on job taking of the unemployeda
1999 1990 change
1-5b averagec 1-5b averagec 1-5b averagec
Austria 75.8 3.9 77.6 3.7 -1.7 0.2
Belgium 59.8 4.9 61.4 4.8 -1.6 0.1
Bulgaria 57.1 5.2 44.2 6.0 12.9 -0.8
Belarus 49.9 5.8 49.9 5.8 0.0 0.0
Croatia 63.7 4.7 60.5 4.9 3.2 -0.2
Czech Republic 63.8 4.7 64.2 4.7 -0.4 0.0
Denmark 62.3 4.9 63.6 4.7 -1.4 0.2
Estonia 36.7 6.4 34.6 6.6 2.0 -0.2
Finland 58.2 5.1 66.1 4.6 -7.9 0.5
France 66.8 4.5 67.9 4.5 -1.1 0.1
Germany 71.7 4.1 64.2 4.7 7.5 -0.6
Greece 50.9 5.5 50.9 5.5 0.0 0.0
Hungary 69.5 4.3 61.3 4.8 8.2 -0.5
Iceland 62.6 4.7 66.6 4.4 -4.0 0.3
Ireland 49.6 5.6 51.9 5.4 -2.3 0.2
Italy 80.7 3.4 78.5 3.6 2.2 -0.2
Latvia 48.8 5.6 38.1 6.4 10.6 -0.7
Lithuania 52.3 5.4 51.0 5.6 1.4 -0.2
Malta 52.6 5.3 50.3 5.4 2.4 -0.1
Netherlands 53.3 5.2 56.3 5.1 -3.0 0.1
Poland 68.4 4.4 62.6 4.7 5.8 -0.3
Portugal 63.1 4.6 65.7 4.6 -2.6 0.1
Romania 55.7 5.0 53.4 5.3 2.3 -0.3
Russian Federa-
tion
43.1 6.1 47.6 5.8 -4.5 0.3
Slovakia 64.9 4.7 58.7 5.1 6.3 -0.4
Spain 70.5 4.4 65.8 4.6 4.8 -0.2
Sweden 78.0 3.9 76.5 3.9 1.5 0.0
Ukraine 42.3 6.3 42.0 6.3 0.4 0.0
Great Britain 61.9 4.9 55.7 5.3 6.3 -0.4
Northern Ireland 60.9 5.2 59.4 5.2 1.5 -0.1
Average 59.8 5.0 58.2 5.1 1.6 -0.1
a The full question reads: “Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would
you place your views on this scale?:”
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
People who are unemployed should have to
take any job available or else lose their unem-
ployment benefits.
People who are unemployed should
have the right to refuse a job they do
not want.
b Percentage of the population that gives a score from 1 to 5.
c Average score.
Source: EVS (1990 and 1999)
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Throughout the ages, attempts have been made to distinguish the
deserving poor from the undeserving poor. Whoever is dependent
on the help of others is easily suspected of laziness and scroun-
ging. In the past, just to remove any doubts about the true causes
of neediness, the poor and destitute were often requested to do
something in return for poverty relief: in former centuries they
were set to work in bride wells, these days they are sometimes
employed in subsidized community jobs. Recently, the policy of
“workfare” or “work first” has become rather popular, meaning
that the needy only get a social benefit if they are prepared to take
any job that is offered to them. Although these policies are gener-
ally justified with the argument that they foster the re-employ-
ment of the beneficiaries, probably another, tacit argument is that
these kinds of measures meet the wishes of the population and,
thus, foster public support for social benefits. Even though the
benefit recipients are not able to repay their benefit fully, they
should contribute as much as possible in order to show the tax-
payers that their solidarity is to some extent repaid by the recipi-
ents and is thus based on reciprocity.
Figures from the European Values Survey 1999 show that a ma-
jority of the European population says that the unemployed
should have to take any job available or else lose their unemploy-
ment benefits, although most people choose a middle position be-
tween the requirement to accept any job and the right to refuse a
job (Table 9.4). Compared to 1990, the demands on the unem-
ployed beneficiaries had slightly increased. These figures suggest
that the requirement of the unemployed to accept any job will
probably reinforce the public support for the social benefit system.
With respect to the same point, it is also of interest to find out
why the population thinks that there are people in their country
who live in need. About half of the Europeans believe that people
are in need because of injustices in their society or because they
are unlucky (Table 9.5). The other half thinks it is because people
in need are lazy and lack willpower or that it is an inevitable part
of modern progress. To phrase it differently, half of the European
population believes that those who are dependent on one-sided
solidarity are not to be blamed, but are the victim of unfavorable
circumstances. Only about a quarter thinks that those people are
really themselves to be blamed for being in need. This suggests
that there is considerable support for one-sided solidarity.
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Table 9.5 Why are there people who live in need?a (most impor-
tant reason by percentage of population), 1999
Because of injustice
in our society
Because they
are unlucky
It's an inevitable
part of modern
progress
Because of laziness
and lack of willpower
Austria 22.3 12.9 25.3 31.9
Belgium 35.6 26.6 19.8 16.0
Bulgaria 49.2 9.6 20.4 15.6
Belarus 45.9 8.0 19.3 21.3
Croatia 68.9 4.3 13.9 11.4
Czech Republic 19.2 15.4 17.6 42.4
Denmark 17.0 19.3 33.9 17.2
Estonia 41.1 10.9 30.2 15.3
Finland 24.0 14.8 35.9 22.0
France 44.2 14.8 26.7 11.5
Germany 44.6 11.4 16.9 24.0
Greece 24.0 10.6 40.6 22.6
Hungary 38.7 11.7 18.9 27.7
Iceland 29.5 20.8 24.2 22.3
Ireland 33.4 22.3 19.4 21.7
Italy 37.7 19.5 15.6 23.0
Latvia 32.4 11.7 23.9 29.1
Lithuania 50.1 14.1 25.2 9.6
Malta 23.7 12.4 11.7 50.6
Netherlands 25.9 33.6 18.1 13.6
Poland 50.2 6.5 19.0 22.6
Portugal 23.7 21.2 12.0 40.9
Romania 43.3 11.3 13.1 30.0
Russian Federation 22.9 10.3 43.3 22.4
Slovakia 37.6 11.0 11.3 31.3
Spain 48.4 19.8 10.4 19.6
Sweden 49.3 10.8 32.5 7.5
Ukraine 26.0 13.5 40.4 17.1
Great Britain 31.7 15.8 23.1 25.1
Northern Ireland 26.5 17.4 24.3 29.1
Average 35.6 14.7 22.9 23.1
a The full question reads: “Why are there people in this country who live in need? Here are four possible
reasons. Which one reason do you consider to be most important?”
Source: EVS (1999)
Just as with two-sided solidarity, it is important that people are
confident that others will contribute to one-sided solidarity, too. If
one believes they are disproportionately burdened, for instance
because others shun their contribution (free-riding behavior), this
214
might severely hurt their willingness to contribute. While it is of-
ten possible to exclude free-riders from benefiting from public
services in the case of two-sided solidarity (e.g. someone who
does not pay contributions for a social insurance scheme is not
entitled to a disability or unemployment benefit), this is not a
practicable solution in the case of one-sided solidarity, since most
of the recipients are simply not able to contribute. Thus, an evenly
distributed tax-burden and strict enforcement of social duties is
perhaps even more important to sustain one-sided solidarity than
it is with respect to two-sided solidarity.
In short, it is not so much individualization as such that erodes
the conditions for one-sided solidarity, but the image that it evokes
of the behavior of one’s fellow citizens. If the trust in others de-
clines, if people no longer believe that the recipients of solidarity
(benefit claimants, in particular) are willing to do something in
return and that their fellow countrymen will make their contribu-
tion, then the readiness to show one-sided solidarity might crum-
ble, even though people’s actual behavior does not change.
9.7 You ain’t seen nothin’ yet?
The fact that our research did not show strong effects of globaliza-
tion on the welfare state and on the solidarity that constitutes its
foundation does not necessarily imply that it will stay like this in
the future. For at least four reasons a continuing process of globa-
lization might have unfavorable effects in the future which have
not yet materialized.
First, it is often claimed that we are only facing the beginning of
the globalization process or that globalization may enter a new,
more radical phase. A well-known representative of this view is
Thomas Friedman who, in his best-selling book The World is Flat
(2005), depicts the radical changes that still lie ahead of us.
Whereas the previous phase of globalization primarily involved
regionalization, i.e. the intensification of the economic relations
within and between the so-called Triad of the European Union,
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Association) and East Asia,
the rise of new economic superpowers such as China and India
will thoroughly reshuffle global relations. To date, the developed
welfare states of Europe mainly experienced the competition of
other prosperous countries, most of which have quite expensive
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social protection systems, too. But in the future, competition
might increasingly come from low-wage countries which have
hardly any social protection at all and are, thus, able to produce
much more cheaply. This might result in social dumping.
Another international development that might exert pressure
on generous welfare states is the growing influence of share-
holder activism. Private equity funds and hedge funds that go for
the highest return on investment might shun the companies in
generous welfare states that are burdened by high tax rates and
social contributions. Consequently, these welfare states might
face a fall in investments and lower economic growth unless they
create a more favorable tax environment. The consequence might
be a race to the bottom regarding tax rates, as seems already to be
happening with respect to corporate taxes in the EU. To compen-
sate for these tax reductions, public provisions will have to be cur-
tailed, too.
Secondly, the current migration flows might only be the fore-
runner of much larger flows of laborers and fortune-hunters that
will swarm around the world in the near future. The African peo-
ple that cross the sea to Fort Europe in ramshackle boats might be
the heralds of the immense masses that will flee their poor home
countries to try their luck elsewhere. Irrespective of whether they
will come as legal guest workers or as illegal immigrants, they will
exert pressure on the rich welfare states, since they are prepared to
work for much lower wages than the incumbent workers and will,
thus, erode employment conditions in the host country. The long-
er these immigrants stay in the host country, the harder it be-
comes, both legally and practically, to exclude them from the pro-
visions of the welfare state. This will make the welfare state more
expensive on the one hand and, on the other hand, will under-
mine the public support for the welfare state among the native
population (see Table 9.3).
Thirdly, the process of European integration can also put pres-
sure on the welfare state. In contrast to the first two develop-
ments, this is not something just happening to us but something
which we have deliberately chosen. Of course, European integra-
tion is not meant to harm the sustainability of welfare states. On
the contrary, in the past ten years the European Union has taken a
number of initiatives to sustain the European social model.
Through the so-called Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC), the
EU has implemented programmes in the fields of employment,
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social exclusion, pensions and health care. However, since Com-
munitarian monetary and economic policies are much more strin-
gent and demanding, there is a real danger that member states
accommodate their social protection systems in order to comply
with budgetary demands. Economic integration may stimulate
policy competition between member states, which increases the
emphasis on financial and economic issues at the cost of social
issues. The cuts of corporate tax rates, mentioned above, might be
an example of this. A further reduction of barriers for interna-
tional trade in services, as intended by the so-called Services Di-
rective, might have (unintended) consequences for national wel-
fare states as public services become increasingly subject to
international competition. The enlargement of the EU with Cen-
tral and Eastern European member states, which have much lower
labor costs and often less generous welfare states, could increase
the pressures on social protection in the old member states even
further.
Finally, the future impact of globalization on the welfare state
might simply be larger because we attach greater importance to it.
In other words, the belief that globalization threatens the sustain-
ability of the welfare state might become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
As we observed in Chapter 7, globalization appears to be an im-
portant rhetorical argument for reforming the welfare state. Politi-
cians who want to reform the welfare state for ideological reasons
might prefer, considering the likely electoral consequences, to
state that globalization forces them to reduce public expenditure.
If the voters are convinced by this argument, even though they
prefer to leave the welfare state intact, globalization might indeed
be accompanied by increasing austerity. If this happens first in
those countries that are most open to globalization, this will result
in a negative relationship between openness and welfare state
generosity. Thus, this finding would be grist to the mill of those
politicians who prefer to cut back on public spending!
It is not easy to assess the weight of these four arguments for an
increasingly unfavorable impact of globalization on the welfare
state. Since the arguments are mainly based on speculations about
the future development of globalization, it is hard to say whether
the expectations are realistic. However, recalling the past, pru-
dence is called for. The current prospects of the future develop-
ments of China and India resemble the expectations of the 1970s
and 1980s with respect to Japan. At the time, Japan was expected
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to keep on growing and surpass the United States as the world’s
largest economy before very long. But then a long-lasting reces-
sion set in, and Japan became just a prosperous country like most
European countries and was no longer considered to be a threat.
Likewise, expectations of huge numbers of immigrants coming to
the generous welfare states of Europe that have been uttered fre-
quently in the past have not materialized, yet. And although there
has been a lot of talking about social dumping and a race to the
bottom in the past ten years, to date no downward convergence of
social expenditures in the EU has occurred.
9.8 Conclusion
The reports of the death of the welfare state are greatly exagger-
ated, to paraphrase the famous quote of Mark Twain. Neither our
own research nor many studies by others, which we discuss in
this book, justify the general statement that the sustainability of
the welfare state is endangered by the processes of individualiza-
tion and globalization. Individualization is a much less clear-cut
phenomenon than is generally believed and need not undermine
solidarity. In a globalizing world many generous welfare states
turn out to hold their own remarkably well. In the more open
countries, the commitment of citizens to their fellow countrymen
does not crumble, contrary to expectations.
From these hopeful conclusions it does not follow that nothing
changes and that the welfare state can remain just as it is.
Although there is no general decline of solidarity, the nature of
solidarity is changing. Our research points to a slight shift of the
balance from one-sided to two-sided solidarity and from national
to local solidarity. Though individualized persons do not show less
solidarity than traditional persons, they seem to be more inclined
to two-sided solidarity rather than one-sided solidarity. Increasing
openness of countries appears to go hand-in-hand with a prefer-
ence of the population for informal solidarity of the local commu-
nity instead of state solidarity. What the consequences of these
trends might be for the design and organization of the welfare
state is the subject of the final chapter of this book.
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10 Between community care and
European welfare state
Policy alternatives for the national welfare
state
Although the analyses in the preceding chapters do not add fuel to
the belief that individualization and globalization render the wel-
fare state unsustainable in the long run, they nevertheless point to
some weaknesses of many present welfare states. These weak-
nesses relate mainly to the balance between one-sided and two-
sided solidarity and to the strong focus of contemporary welfare
states on the national level. This final chapter discusses some pol-
icy options that address these weaknesses. However, neither theo-
retical considerations nor empirical results are conclusive with re-
spect to the direction these changes should take. On the one hand,
there is a case in point for shifting the balance of the welfare state
to two-sided solidarity, in order to foster the support of the middle-
classes. On the other hand, there may be good reasons to restrict
public provisions to one-sided solidarity, too, in order to reduce
public expenditures. The simultaneous processes of globalization
and localization could be an argument for shifting the main provi-
der of welfare services to the supranational level (e.g. the Euro-
pean Union), but also to the local level (e.g. the municipality).
In this chapter we discuss the pros and cons of the various op-
tions that national governments can choose from. These options
arise from the combination of the two dimensions we just men-
tioned: one-sided versus two-sided solidarity and supranational
versus local provisions of social services. First, we discuss three
options for national welfare states based on the particular mix of
one-sided and two-sided solidarity. These options correspond with
the well-known welfare regime types of Esping-Andersen. Next,
we consider the options of scaling down the welfare state to the
local level and scaling it up to the supranational level, respectively.
We conclude that there is not one best option for the welfare state,
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but that a combination of scaling down and scaling up might offer
the most attractive prospects.
10.1 Nine options for the welfare state
Much of the recent comparative literature on the welfare state is
about differences and similarities between welfare states. In the
wake of Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s seminal The Three Worlds of Wel-
fare Capitalism (1990), numerous papers have been written about
the best way to classify welfare states. Most of the criticism of Esp-
ing-Andersen’s typology of social-democratic, conservative-corpor-
atistic and liberal welfare regimes stems from the observation that
some existing welfare states do not fit in his ideal types. The clas-
sification of welfare states we present in this chapter serves a dif-
ferent purpose. We do not want to classify existing welfare states
but give a theoretical typology of welfare states that might serve as
a target for welfare state reform. Of course, depending on the cur-
rent shape of the welfare state, some options might be closer,
while others are further away. Thus, not every option might be a
real alternative for each kind of welfare state that currently exists.
In the vein of this book, the basic criterion in distinguishing wel-
fare state types will be the kind of solidarity that the welfare state
embodies. We utilize two distinctions we made in Chapter 2 with
respect to solidarity, viz. the extent of reciprocity, i.e. one-sided
versus two-sided solidarity, and the scope of solidarity, i.e. the size
of the group covered by the welfare state. Since we also distin-
guish a middle position along both dimensions, and include com-
binations of the two dimensions this leaves us with nine possible
types of welfare states, which are summarized in Scheme 1.
Scheme 1 Options for the welfare state
Extent of reciprocity:
Scope:
One-sided solidarity One-sided and
two-sided solidarity
Two-sided solidarity
Local Community care Welfare city Direct-benefit principle
National Liberal welfare state Social-democratic
welfare state
Conservative welfare
state
Supranational European night
watchman state
Broad European
welfare state
Supranational risk-pool-
ing
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If we move along the dimension of reciprocity at the national
level, we come across the three welfare regime types of Esping-
Andersen. The liberal welfare state represents a national welfare
state that is primarily based on one-sided solidarity, the conserva-
tive (Bismarckian) welfare state represents a national welfare state
based on two-sided solidarity, and the social-democratic welfare
state includes both kinds of solidarity. Along the vertical axis we
distinguish the current national welfare state from the alternatives
of a locally organized welfare state – or, rather, welfare city – and a
supranational, supposedly European, welfare state. Depending on
the extent of solidarity, both a local and a supranational welfare
state can take different shapes, which are indicated in the second
row and the bottom row of Scheme 1.
In the next sections we discuss the main advantages and draw-
backs of each kind of welfare state. We base these assessments as
much as possible on the theoretical and empirical analyses in this
book. Thus, we will focus primarily on the viability of the various
welfare state types in the light of individualization and globaliza-
tion.
Before starting, it should be noted that a preference for a parti-
cular kind of welfare state need not concern the whole welfare
state, but might be limited to particular welfare state programmes.
For instance, it is conceivable to favor a supranational organiza-
tion of social insurances, such as unemployment or disability ben-
efits, and prefer a local organization of social assistance and child
care at the same time.
10.2 A liberal welfare state based on one-sided
solidarity
For those who fear that the welfare state may not be affordable in
the long run, a reduction of welfare services to those who are
really in need seems the most logical option. Actually, this
amounts to limiting the welfare state to one-sided solidarity, since
it means that one draws a strict dividing-line between those who
contribute to the welfare state and those who benefit from it. This
way, the circulation of public funds within the same group of peo-
ple is prevented, which makes the welfare state needlessly expen-
sive. Estimates for Denmark, for example, suggest that three-quar-
ters of the income transfers via the welfare state end up with the
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same people that contributed to them (Sørensen et al. 2006). In
other words, only one in every four euros (or kroner, for that mat-
ter) transferred by the welfare state actually boils down to a redis-
tribution of income between persons, the other three euros are a
kind of intrapersonal redistribution over time. An average citizen
pays most or all of their old age pension, their health care ex-
penses and the costs of education for their children. By canceling
out these intrapersonal contributions and benefits, public social
protection expenditures could be reduced by more than half and,
consequently, taxes and contributions could be cut considerably.
The remaining welfare provisions will then primarily be transfers
based on one-sided solidarity, such as social assistance and
means-tested subsidies for education, health care and housing.
Social insurances, which are for the most part based on two-sided
solidarity, such as unemployment benefits and disability benefits,
are thus considered an individual responsibility that can be left to
the free market. The outcome will be a liberal, residual welfare
state that concentrates on poverty relief by providing services at a
subsistence level only.
The main advantage of such a liberal welfare state is that its
costs are modest and, as a result, its tax rates are rather low. This
welfare state seems, thus, well-prepared for the competition with
other European countries and with low-wage countries, such as
China and India. However, the other side of the coin is that a lib-
eral welfare state, since it is almost exclusively based on one-sided
solidarity, appeals strongly on affective motives for solidarity in-
stead of on calculating, self-interested motives of the contributors.
As we explained in Chapter 5, such affective motives for one-sided
solidarity presuppose a strong (national) community spirit. In the
absence of this community spirit, citizens would not be prepared
to contribute to social services which they will probably never ben-
efit from themselves. In modern societies, this community spirit
depends principally on identification with fellow citizens.
A common fear is that the processes of individualization and
globalization hamper this identification with fellow countrymen,
but, in Chapters 5 and 8, we did not find empirical support for
the hypotheses that either individualization or globalization un-
dermines the willingness to contribute to one-sided solidarity.
Nevertheless, international comparisons show that residual wel-
fare states with a strong focus on poor relief, such as the United
States and the United Kingdom, offer less protection to their least-
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advantaged citizens than more comprehensive welfare states,
such as the Nordic countries. For instance, poverty rates are
much higher in the USA and the UK than in Sweden and Den-
mark. This suggests that a strong focus on one-sided solidarity
might ultimately erode the public support for this kind of solidar-
ity (cf. Skocpol 1995; van Oorschot 2007).
Of course, two-sided solidarity need not be absent in a liberal
welfare state that only embodies one-sided solidarity, but it will be
organized outside the welfare state. Two-sided solidarity may take,
partly, the form of informal solidarity, such as friendly services in
return, but the greater part will probably be organized through
private companies operating on the free market. For instance, pri-
vate insurances might replace obligatory social insurances. Only if
these private insurances are more efficient and, thus, less costly
than social insurances, or if people prefer less insurance coverage
than a more comprehensive welfare state would provide, will the
private provision of insurance be cheaper for the average citizen.
If these conditions are not met, the relatively low tax rates of a
liberal welfare state will only be a seeming advantage, since citi-
zens will have to pay more for their private insurances and provi-
sions.
10.3 A conservative welfare state based on two-sided
solidarity
A typical conservative welfare state in Esping-Andersen’s typology
rests on the principle of two-sided solidarity. It focuses on the in-
terests of middle-class people who want to insure themselves
against the risks of modern capitalist society, such as sickness,
disability, unemployment and old age. Social insurances, which
balance contributions and receipts, are the main social provision
of such a welfare state. But it might also include provisions in
kind from which large groups benefit, such as education, health
care and childcare facilities.
The main advantage of such a conservative welfare state is, of
course, that it does not appeal to affective motives, like com-
munity spirit or altruism, but is simply based on enlightened self-
interest. It thus appears not to be vulnerable to the consequences
of individualization and globalization. The most apparent draw-
back is that a conservative welfare state does not have much to
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offer to the weak and least-advantaged groups in society. It will
result in a deep cleft between the insiders, who are well provided
for, and the outsiders, who are hardly supported by the welfare
state at all. Moreover, to protect the interests of the insiders, the
outsiders will probably be kept out as much as possible, and only
those who are expected to be net-contributors to the welfare state
will be let in.
Although a welfare state based on two-sided solidarity may get
strong support from the middle classes, it also runs the risk of
gradually eroding its own foundation. This is caused by the prob-
lem of adverse selection. If solidarity is based on weighing the
costs and benefits, people who know that they run a lower risk
than the average citizen have an interest in withdrawing from the
collective insurance. If they are not able to do that, since social
insurances are mandatory, they will support any proposal to cut
back benefit levels. The more information that is available about
individual risks, the stronger the incentive will be for these groups
to withdraw from the public system. This incentive will be even
stronger if the welfare state also provides services that are targeted
at particular groups. For instance, childcare facilities and educa-
tional subsidies will only be supported by those who (expect to)
benefit from them, viz. (future) parents. Theoretically, a package
of social services might be put together that offers a reasonable
balance of benefits and contributions to almost every citizen and
might, thus, get sufficient public support. But even then, most
people will have an interest in taking out those elements of that
package which they do not ever expect to utilize. Ultimately, a wel-
fare state that is principally based on two-sided solidarity may end
up being a lean and mean welfare state, which is limited to the
provision of a few basic insurances, such as sickness, disability
and old age benefits.
10.4 A social-democratic welfare state based on both
one-sided and two-sided solidarity
Since most people seem to be motivated both by affective and by
calculating motives, a welfare state that appeals to one-sided and
two-sided solidarity simultaneously might get the strongest sup-
port from the people at large. This appears to be confirmed by the
favorable experiences of the social-democratic Nordic welfare
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states. These welfare states offer both a high standard of public
services to the middle classes and decent support to the least ad-
vantaged groups in society, resulting in low poverty rates, rela-
tively small income disparities and a high quality of life in general.
Evidently, the people in the Nordic countries have to pay a high
price for their comprehensive welfare state: tax rates are among
the highest in the world. This raises the question of whether such
welfare states will be sustainable in the long run. In the sociologi-
cal and economic literature, the long-term sustainability of the
Scandinavian welfare states is still a subject of much debate.
Many economists are convinced that a high tax burden will inevi-
tably hurt economic progress, while many sociologists point to the
favorable social returns of an encompassing welfare state (cf.
Lindbeck 1997 and Esping-Andersen 1990). Our research has
shown that there is no reason to fear that the processes of globali-
zation will render the social-democratic welfare state untenable
(Chapter 7). However, we did find that in a more open economy,
the public support shifts slightly from state-organized solidarity
towards informal, communal solidarity (Chapter 8). Thus, the
weight of the social-democratic welfare state may ultimately have
to move to a lower level of organization (see Section 10.5 below).
The process of individualization may put pressure on the social-
democratic welfare state if the balance between one-sided and two-
sided solidarity is perceived as tilting over to the side of one-sided
solidarity. If the knowledge about individual differences in risks
grows, if people perceive risks increasingly as being caused by in-
dividual choices, if people more often distrust each other, then for
many the balance between individual costs and benefits might
seem to be disturbed. Although we did not find empirical indica-
tions that this is already happening, it might be very hard to main-
tain the delicate balance between one-sided and two-sided solidar-
ity in the long run.
10.5 A local welfare state
There are several reasons why a welfare state that is organized at a
lower level than the national state might promote public support.
In general, community spirit appears to be stronger in local com-
munities than in national communities, since local communities
are usually more homogeneous, making identification with other
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members of the community easier. Moreover, in small commu-
nities, counting no more than a few hundred members, such as a
neighborhood, a company or a sports club, personal contact be-
tween the members may foster affective ties and facilitate control
of individual behavior. All these factors may contribute to the sup-
port for one-sided solidarity.
According to the European Values Survey of 1999, 56 percent
of European citizens say they belong first of all to their locality,
town or region, and only 31 percent say to their nation. These fig-
ures suggest that people feel more attached to their local commu-
nity than to the national community. Thus, there might be a viable
alternative for the national welfare state in organizing one-sided
solidarity at the local level, which we may call community care.
The willingness to show two-sided solidarity could also be
strengthened by organizing it on a smaller scale than the national
level. Once again, the fact that a smaller community is often more
homogeneous is a crucial factor. If one restricts a (social) insur-
ance scheme to persons sharing similar risks and preferences,
the odds are much smaller that particular groups will benefit dis-
proportionably than in the case of a nationally organized insur-
ance scheme. Within a homogeneous group the emphasis lies on
chance solidarity rather than on risk solidarity (based on differ-
ences in risk), meaning that everyone has about the same chance
of benefiting from the insurance. Another advantage of a small
group is that often more information is at hand about individual
behavior, making it easier to prevent opportunistic behavior and
abuse.
While the local community, such as a neighborhood or a small
town, may be quite suitable to organize one-sided solidarity, two-
sided solidarity is probably better organized at the level of a large
company or an industry. Employees of the same company or in-
dustry often have a lot of characteristics in common and run simi-
lar risks, which makes it a matter of enlightened self-interest to
pool these risks. This might be called the direct-benefit principle:
those who benefit from a particular social provision contribute to
it. For example, metalworkers or civil servants might organize
their own sickness, disability and unemployment insurances and
pension schemes. In fact, in many countries such occupational
schemes already exist as a supplement to mandatory national so-
cial insurances. If the balance of costs and benefits is well-pre-
served in each homogeneous group, people will have a strong in-
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centive to support those occupational schemes. One could also
imagine other groups organizing their own social provisions on
the basis of common interests. For example, young parents may
organize their own day-care centers, retired people may collec-
tively finance their own rest homes, etc.
Although organizing two-sided solidarity at a smaller scale may
strengthen its internal support, the flip side is, of course, that it
nullifies solidarity between groups. In the above examples, there
will be no solidarity between employees in different industries
whose risks may differ, or between younger and older people.
This can have two undesirable consequences. First, people whose
risks are above average might find it hard to get access to a group,
because they will be considered to be net-profiteers. For example,
a company may decide not to hire employees that belong to a
high-risk group, such as handicapped or chronically ill people, if
it is fully responsible for paying sickness benefits. Second, groups
that are homogeneous with respect to risk may not be able to
spread their risks sufficiently. This may be caused by so-called in-
terdependent risks. For instance, a cyclical downturn may cause
many employees in the same industry to become unemployed si-
multaneously, making it very hard to finance an unemployment
insurance scheme. For that reason, a more heterogeneous group
has the advantage of making it easier to spread these risks.
In combining one-sided solidarity and two-sided solidarity at a
local level, one would end up with a welfare city instead of a welfare
state. This might be an attractive alternative for the same reasons
that organizing one-sided solidarity (community care) and two-
sided solidarity (direct-benefit principle) at the local level can be
attractive. However, since the optimal group in organizing one-
sided solidarity may differ from the optimal group in organizing
two-sided solidarity – and the last may differ between different
kinds of two-sided solidarity – it will not be easy to reap all the
benefits of organization at a smaller scale in a welfare city. The
citizens of a city may be homogeneous in one respect, for example
language (dialect) or religion, but may differ strongly in another
respect, for example occupation and industry. Thus, it might not
be wise to organize both social assistance and unemployment and
disability insurance at the level of the municipality. On the other
hand, a metropolitan area, which might be the size of a small na-
tion-state, may be sufficiently large to organize all aspects of a wel-
fare state, but will generally not have the advantage of a homoge-
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neous population. Although the nation-state is not by definition
the optimal scale to organize a broad, social-democratic welfare
state – unless its population is rather homogeneous – it is not
clear what the optimal scale would be.
10.6 A supranational welfare state
If national borders gradually lose their salience and national states
gradually become part of a global – or at least European – econo-
my, then a natural thought is to organize the welfare state at a
higher, supranational level, too. Though the idea of a European
welfare state, which includes income transfers between the citi-
zens of different member states, has been put forward once or
twice, it is considered to be a viable and realistic alternative for
the national welfare state by very few people. There are a number
of reasons for this.
A practical reason is, first, that the differences between the in-
stitutions of the current national welfare states in Europe are so
large that it is hardly imaginable how they could be merged into
one overarching European welfare state. A more fundamental rea-
son is that most preconditions, discussed in Chapter 5, for one-
sided and two-sided solidarity are not met at the European level.
A European welfare state that is limited to one-sided solidarity,
i.e. a European night watchman state, might not seem a utopian
idea at first sight, since the principle that the rich member states
contribute more to the European Union than the poorer member
states was recognized a long time ago. Since 1988 the contribu-
tions of the member states to the EU are mainly dependent on
their gross domestic product (GDP). However, this only refers to
one-sided solidarity between member states. There are no direct
payments of the EU to individual citizens of member states. In
view of the conditions that have to be met to create public support
for one-sided solidarity, it is not very likely that such income trans-
fers to individual EU citizens will come about in the foreseeable
future. After all, one-sided solidarity requires a community spirit,
which is absent at the European level. Most people in the EU do
not consider themselves primarily European citizens. According
to the European Values Survey 1999, only eight percent of the
European residents say they belong first of all to Europe, as op-
posed to 31 percent that say they belong primarily to their nation.
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Probably, the willingness to support poor and needy people in
other member states (one-sided solidarity) is very feeble, apart
from extreme circumstances, such as following the occurrence of
a natural disaster. Moreover, in Chapter 8, we observed that Eur-
opeans are much less concerned about the living conditions of
immigrants than about other countrymen, which confirms that
there is not a strong commitment to foreigners. On the other
hand, the more open a country is, the stronger the solidarity with
immigrants appears to be. Thus, the gradual integration of coun-
tries in the EU may contribute to a growing solidarity with the
citizens of other member states.
Two-sided solidarity requires mutual interdependence, limited
information of individual risks and trust that others will also con-
tribute to solidarity (Chapter 5). As a consequence of European
integration, the mutual dependency of the citizens of different
member states has increased, so this is less of a hindrance to soli-
darity at the European level than it was in the past. However, due
to the enlargement of the European Union, which at present con-
sists of 27 countries, the economic diversity of the EU has in-
creased. As a consequence, certain economic risks, such as unem-
ployment, are distributed unevenly across the member states.
This makes it rather predictable which countries would benefit
most from a European welfare state based on two-sided solidarity
and which countries would contribute most. Thus, two-sided soli-
darity between European citizens will probably be perceived as
one-sided solidarity between member states. Consequently, the
willingness to contribute to a European system of social insur-
ances will be rather small among the populations of those coun-
tries that will be net-contributors.
The third condition for two-sided solidarity, trust, is not likely to
be met at the European level, either. In a 1996 survey, EU citizens
said they trusted their fellow countrymen much more than citi-
zens of other member states. On a scale from 1 to 4, the average
score of trust in compatriots was 3.39 and the average trust in citi-
zens of other member states only 2.75 (European Commission
1997: Table 4.4; unfortunately this question was not repeated in
later years). The fear that the funds of a European welfare state
will not end up with the people that it was intended for and that
others will not contribute proportionally is probably a severe hin-
drance in getting public support for a European welfare state.
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Considering these problems, it is no surprise that the up-to-date
social policy of the European Union does not comprise much
more than the formulation of common targets. The responsibility
for realizing these targets and the choice of the means and instru-
ments to accomplish them lie at the national level. This so-called
Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) is currently applied to the
fields of employment, social inclusion, healthcare and pension po-
licies. Although the European Union formally considers social
policy to be a communitarian objective, it is rather unlikely that
this will represent a first step towards a truly European welfare
state.
Although a European welfare state, based on either one-sided
solidarity or two-sided solidarity, does not seem a realistic option,
another kind of supranational income transfer might have better
prospects. This is the option of supranational risk-pooling. With re-
spect to private insurances and pension funds, it is already com-
mon practice to share risks internationally. Private insurance com-
panies reassure their risks with internationally operating insurers
and investors, who specialize in spreading risks optimally on a
global market. Pension funds and life-assurance companies invest
worldwide to maximize their returns and minimize their risks.
Actually, these international activities amount to organizing two-
sided solidarity globally, even though the policyholders themselves
may not be aware of that.
It is conceivable that national governments would spread the
risks of social insurances internationally, too. Thus, they could
benefit from the fact that countries often pass through different
phases of the business cycle. For instance, in the US the phase of
the business cycle is often one or two years ahead of the business
cycle in continental Europe. If, for example, the unemployment
risks of the US and of Germany would be pooled, then the expen-
ditures on unemployment benefits and, consequently, the social
contributions would be less volatile in both countries. Although
one might expect that business cycles would become more syn-
chronized as a consequence of globalization, empirical research
shows that this is not the case, yet (cf. Kose et al. 2003).
International risk-pooling is based purely on enlightened self-
interest and is, thus, only a realistic option for two-sided solidarity.
Moreover, trustworthy international financial institutions are
needed to minimize the risk that foreign partners will not live up
to their obligations or abuse the solidarity of others. In the past,
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such institutions did not exist, but the boom of global capital mar-
kets might rapidly increase the opportunities for such forms of
international risk-pooling. The American economist Shiller
(2003) anticipates a great future for numerous forms of global
risk-sharing. At the time of writing, it was not yet clear whether
the global financial crisis that started in 2008 will speed up or, on
the contrary, delay the development of such institutions for global
risk-sharing.
10.7 Conclusion
Although, in Chapter 9, we concluded that the processes of indi-
vidualization and globalization do not render the current welfare
states untenable, there may nevertheless be good reasons to re-
consider the present organization of the welfare state. Public sup-
port for the liberal welfare state, based on one-sided solidarity,
may gradually erode due to the increasing diversity of national
populations. The conservative welfare state, based on two-sided
solidarity, is vulnerable to the problem of adverse selection, which
might hollow out its foundation. The social-democratic welfare
state, embodying both kinds of solidarity, will only be sustainable
in the long-term if it succeeds in maintaining the delicate balance
between one-sided and two-sided solidarity. Some of the pressures
on present-day welfare states might be withstood by either redu-
cing or extending the scope of solidarity. Scaling down the welfare
state to the local level of cities or even neighborhoods has the ad-
vantage of a more homogeneous community, which might pro-
duce a stronger community spirit and, thus, more support for
one-sided solidarity. However, the idea of a “welfare city” also
raises a number of problems, such as a weak financial basis due
to fewer opportunities for spreading risks. Alternatively, the op-
tion of a supranational, European, welfare state as such does not
seem plausible, but introducing elements of international risk-
pooling is certainly worthwhile considering.
Perhaps the most interesting option would be to combine ele-
ments of scaling down and scaling up. The growing demand for
local security and community spirit could then be met in a Euro-
pean or even global context of spreading risks all over the world.
This would fit in with the theory of the political economists Alesi-
na and Spolaore (2003) about the optimal size of nations. They
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argue that in a globalizing world, the advantage of the homogene-
ity of small geographical entities might gain weight. Thus, a stron-
ger emphasis on the local community would not mean that people
turn their backs on the global community, but that they utilize the
opportunities offered by economic, social and political globaliza-
tion to secure welfare and security for all at the local level.
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